Microsoft Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2014-6324)
Published In CISA KEV since Sources: CVE.org
What is affected, what to do
The Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) in Microsoft Windows Server 2003 SP2, Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, and Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2 allows remote authenticated domain users to obtain domain administrator privileges via a forged signature in a ticket, as exploited in the wild in November 2014, aka "Kerberos Checksum Vulnerability."
The vulnerability is being actively exploited; treat it as a priority. The available sources name no fixed version. Check the vendor guidance in the references below. Immediate actions, mitigation and detection rules are in the runbook below.
- Affected
- Microsoft Windows Server 2008
eq r2..r2 - Microsoft Windows Server 2012
eq r2..r2
- Microsoft Windows Server 2008
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Metrics
8.8
Priority
XIEM Effective CVSS: highest available CVSS rating from NVD and vendor data.
Source: Vendor (CNA), CVSS v3
8.8
CVSS v3
Severity High on the scale from 0 to 10.
Source: CVE.org
87.3 %
EPSS score
High — model estimates ≥ 50% chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days.
Source: FIRST EPSS, percentile 99.75
Show all metrics
- Severity
- Critical
Priority (0–325)
The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?
Read in glossary- 223.60 Methodology
Exploit maturity
An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.
Read in glossary- actively exploited
XIEM Effective CVSS
XIEM® is the tiered managed-security operating model from NEOSEC and a registered trademark of NEOSEC GmbH. It extends classic SIEM — the central collection, normalisation and correlation of security-relevant events — with endpoint forensics, network visibility and deception technology, and consolidates them into three building tiers: Sentry, Orchestrate and Command.
Read in glossary- 8.8 Methodology
CVSS v3
CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.
Read in glossary- 8.8
EPSS score
The EPSS score is the absolute model output for an individual vulnerability: the estimated probability of real-world exploitation within the next 30 days, expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 % to 100 %). A score of 0.42 means „the model estimates a 42 % chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days“.
Read in glossary- 87.3 %
- High — model estimates ≥ 50% chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days.
EPSS percentile
The EPSS percentile is the relative position of a vulnerability within all EPSS-scored CVEs, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A percentile of 0.90 means „this CVE has a higher EPSS score than 90 % of all other scored CVEs“. Unlike the EPSS score, it is not a probability — but a positioning within a ranking.
Read in glossary- 99.75
- Critical — this CVE ranks in the top fifth of all CVEs scored today (rank ≥ 80%).
KEV status
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- Actively exploited
- Published
In CISA KEV since
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- CISA assessment (SSVC)
- Exploitation: active · not automatable · Technical impact: total
- Source: CISA Vulnrichment, as of 10 February 2025
Response and mitigation
Why act now?
Prioritisation rationale
This flaw lets any authenticated domain user take over Active Directory completely, over the network and without user interaction. The attack is low-complexity and fully automated by public tooling (PyKEK, Impacket goldenPac, Kekeo), so exploitation likelihood is very high. Typical victims run outdated or partially patched DC estates — often KRITIS and mid-market environments with legacy servers — where a single phished account is all an attacker needs. Score any unpatched DC as critical with immediate action required, because it effectively means losing the domain. Once every DC is verifiably patched, the priority shifts to a retrospective compromise review.
Runbook step 1
Immediate response (0-24 h)
- Inventory every domain controller and verify its patch level. The flaw sits in the KDC service, so each DC is the critical asset. Microsoft fixed it out-of-band in security bulletin MS14-068 (KB3011780). Check the vendor advisory for the exact KB mapping per OS. Run
Get-HotFix -Id KB3011780 -ComputerName <DC>against each DC. - Patch and reboot any unpatched DC immediately. Treat DCs on Windows Server 2003/2008 without extended support as untenable. Schedule their migration or demotion, and assume they are compromisable until it is done.
- Run a compromise assessment if any DC was ever left unpatched. Diff the membership of
Domain Admins,Enterprise Admins,Schema Admins,AdministratorsandAccount Operators, plus AdminSDHolder and GPO changes, against a known-good baseline. - If compromise is suspected, reset the
krbtgtpassword twice. Allow full AD replication and at least the maximum ticket lifetime to pass between the two resets. Then rotate all privileged and service account credentials. - Treat every domain user account as a potential launch point. Any authenticated account, including phished credentials, is enough to exploit the flaw. Disable stale, unused and third-party accounts.
- Inventory every domain controller and verify its patch level. The flaw sits in the KDC service, so each DC is the critical asset. Microsoft fixed it out-of-band in security bulletin MS14-068 (KB3011780). Check the vendor advisory for the exact KB mapping per OS. Run
Runbook step 2
Mitigation layers
- Patch (the only real fix): No configuration workaround stops the KDC from accepting a forged PAC signature. Everything below only reduces exposure and improves your chances of detection.
- Network segmentation: Allow Kerberos (TCP/UDP 88) and kpasswd (TCP/UDP 464) to DCs only from defined client and server segments. Deny DC ports entirely from guest, OT and DMZ networks.
- IPS/NDR: Enable the MS14-068 signatures. Snort and Suricata rules exist for PyKEK/Kekeo behaviour: an AS-REQ with
PA-PAC-REQUEST= false, followed by a TGS-REQ carrying a client-supplied PAC with an RSA-MD5 checksum (cksumtype 7). - IAM / least privilege: Implement Microsoft's admin tiering model, with Tier 0 covering DCs and AD. Keep privileged groups minimal and allow Domain Admins to work only from dedicated PAWs.
- Endpoint hardening: Make the credential theft that precedes this attack harder. Deploy LAPS for local admin accounts, enable Credential Guard where supported, and restrict workstation-to-workstation RDP/SMB.
- Legacy systems: Isolate or retire unpatchable Vista/7/8 clients. They are not the primary target, but they are a common source of harvested credentials.
Runbook step 3
Detection rules
- DC Security log, Event ID 4624/4672: Look for successful logons where
TargetUserSidandTargetUserNamedon't match, and for non-admin accounts receiving special privileges (4672). Sigma shape:EventID=4672 AND SubjectUserName NOT IN (<admin allowlist>). - Event ID 4768/4769 (Kerberos ticket requests): Flag TGS requests (4769) from accounts with no preceding normal TGT, and
Account Domainvalues with odd casing or an FQDN where NetBIOS is expected. KQL:SecurityEvent | where EventID==4769 | where TargetDomainName !~ "<DOMAIN>" and TargetDomainName !~ "<domain.fqdn>". - Zeek
kerberos.log/ Suricata: Watch for an AS-REQ without a PAC request, followed within seconds by a TGS-REQ from the same client. Also flag unusual encryption types, such as RC4 (0x17) in an AES-dominant environment. - EDR/Sysmon EID 1: Look for process launches of
ms14-068.py,goldenPac,kekeo.exe,mimikatz(kerberos::ptc) or Python interpreters on workstations. These are typically followed byklist,psexecorwmicagainst a DC (Sysmon EID 3, destination port 445/135). - Follow-on activity, Event ID 4728/4732/4756: Members being added to privileged groups shortly after a standard account logs on to a DC.
- DC Security log, Event ID 4624/4672: Look for successful logons where
Detection rules
No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.
Classification under NIS2 and CRA
Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.
NIS2
NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.
Read in glossary- Actively exploited: treat the vulnerability as a priority in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2. If it is exploited in your environment, check the reporting obligation under Art. 23 (early warning within 24 hours).
CRA
The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.
Read in glossary- Since 11.09.2026, manufacturers of affected products with digital elements must report actively exploited vulnerabilities under Art. 14 CRA, with an early warning within 24 hours via ENISA's single reporting platform.
ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.
Read in glossary- Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.
Description
The Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) in Microsoft Windows Server 2003 SP2, Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, and Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2 allows remote authenticated domain users to obtain domain administrator privileges via a forged signature in a ticket, as exploited in the wild in November 2014, aka "Kerberos Checksum Vulnerability."
Source: NVD (NIST), cvelistv5, CISA KEV Catalog, CVE.org (MITRE)
Vendors and products
Affected operating systems
| Windows | microsoft | windows_7 | — |
| Windows | microsoft | windows_8 | — |
| Windows | microsoft | windows_8.1 | — |
| Windows | microsoft | windows_server_2003 | — |
| Windows | microsoft | windows_server_2008 | r2 |
| Windows | microsoft | windows_server_2008 | — |
| Windows | microsoft | windows_server_2012 | r2 |
| Windows | microsoft | windows_server_2012 | — |
Public exploit references
Publicly reported proof-of-concepts, exploit modules and detection templates for this vulnerability. NEOSEC links to the original sources only and does not provide any exploit code.
| CISA KEV Catalog | CISA Known Exploited Vulnerability (opens in a new tab)cisa.gov | actively exploited |
References & sources
- securitytracker.com1031237Vulnerability database, x_refsource_SECTRACK, Broken link, Third-party advisory, Vulnerability database
- marc.infoHPSBMU03224Vendor advisory, x_refsource_HP, Mailing list, Third-party advisory
- blogs.technet.comb/srd/archive/2014/11/18/additional-information-about-cve-2014-…x_refsource_CONFIRM, Not applicable, Vendor advisory
- securityfocus.com70958Vulnerability database, x_refsource_BID, Broken link, Third-party advisory, Vulnerability database
- docs.microsoft.comMS14-068Vendor advisory, x_refsource_MS, Patch, Vendor advisory
- us-cert.govTA14-323AThird-party advisory, x_refsource_CERT, Third-party advisory, US government resource
- secunia.com62556Third-party advisory, x_refsource_SECUNIA, Broken link
- cisa.govknown-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2014-6324government-resource, US government resource
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<a href="https://intel.neosec.eu/en/cve/CVE-2014-6324"><img src="https://intel.neosec.eu/badge/cve/CVE-2014-6324.svg?lang=en" alt="CVE-2014-6324 – NEOSEC Intel" height="20"></a>