CriticalCVE-2026-75521

    Mirendev Runtime: Improper Certificate Validation (CVE-2026-75521)

    Published Last modified Sources: EUVD, OSV, Hersteller, CVE.org

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    What is affected, what to do

    Update Mirendev Runtime to version 0.11.1.

    Affected
    • Mirendev Runtime lt *..0.11.1
    Fixed in
    • Mirendev Runtime 0.11.1

    Not sure whether and how you are affected? Ask a question about this vulnerability

    Metrics

    10.0

    XIEM Effective CVSS

    Highest available CVSS rating from NVD and vendor data.

    Source: Vendor (CNA), CVSS v4

    10.0

    CVSS v4

    Severity Critical on the scale from 0 to 10.

    Source: EUVD, OSV, Hersteller, CVE.org

    —

    EPSS score

    No value is available for this vulnerability.

    Show all metrics
    Severity
    Critical
    Priority (0–325)

    The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?

    Read in glossary
    80.00 Methodology
    Exploit maturity

    An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.

    Read in glossary
    no public PoC known
    XIEM Effective CVSS

    XIEM® is the tiered managed-security operating model from NEOSEC and a registered trademark of NEOSEC GmbH. It extends classic SIEM — the central collection, normalisation and correlation of security-relevant events — with endpoint forensics, network visibility and deception technology, and consolidates them into three building tiers: Sentry, Orchestrate and Command.

    Read in glossary
    10.0 Methodology
    CVSS v4

    CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.

    Read in glossary
    10.0
    KEV status

    The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.

    Read in glossary
    —
    Published
    CWE

    CWE is a catalogue of typical weakness types in software and hardware — such as flawed input validation, unsafe memory handling or poor authentication. Where a CVE names a concrete vulnerability in a concrete product, a CWE describes the underlying class of defect.

    Read in glossary
    CWE-295

    Detection rules

    No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.

    Classification under NIS2 and CRA

    Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.

    NIS2

    NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.

    Read in glossary
    High technical severity: assess and remediate the vulnerability in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2 and document the decision.
    CRA

    The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.

    Read in glossary
    From 11.12.2027, Annex I Part II CRA requires manufacturers of affected products with digital elements to handle vulnerabilities without delay and provide security updates.
    ISO/IEC 27001

    ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.

    Read in glossary
    Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.

    Description

    Summary

    The Miren Runtime RPC server (QUIC/HTTP3, default port :8443) requested TLS client certificates but never verified that a presented certificate chained to the cluster Certificate Authority. Because a client-certificate identity is granted a blanket RBAC bypass, any party able to reach the RPC listener could present a forged, self-signed certificate and be authenticated as a cluster superuser — no valid CA signature, credential, or prior authorization required.

    Impact

    This is a complete, unauthenticated authentication bypass against the cluster control plane. An attacker who can reach the RPC port can perform any RPC operation with full privileges: enumerate and manipulate entities, apps, sandboxes, disks, and other cluster resources. This yields full compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the cluster and everything it orchestrates.

    Exposure is network-reachability–gated only. Deployments that expose :8443 beyond a trusted network (e.g. 0.0.0.0/0) are remotely exploitable from the internet by anyone; deployments that restrict :8443 to a trusted network are exploitable by any party with access to that network.

    Due to a lack of ability to detect if the RPC has been accessed unauthorized, Miren recommends that all applications are redeployed and any credentials reference in environment variables are rotated. A read-only script to help review standing access, recent changes, and the exact secrets to rotate is available at https://github.com/mirendev/runtime/tree/089582a132f7fc1e1d5b5c0aee1e0911535fed53/scripts/security/audit-exposure.

    Details

    Three independent factors combined to produce the bypass:

    1. The listener never verified the client-certificate chain. When a cluster CA was configured, the RPC listener used tls.RequestClientCert, which requests a client certificate but does not verify it against the configured ClientCAs. tls.ConnectionState.VerifiedChains was therefore always empty, and no VerifyPeerCertificate/VerifyConnection hook re-checked the chain.

    2. The authenticator derived identity from an unverified certificate. The RPC authenticators read PeerCertificates[0].Subject.CommonName directly as the caller identity, with method cert, without checking that the chain had been verified.

    3. Authorization granted a blanket bypass to certificate identities. The authorizer returned "allowed" for any cert-method identity, skipping all RBAC checks.

    Go's TLS client only presents a certificate whose issuer Distinguished Name matches a CA advertised by the server, but that comparison is on the (public, non-secret) DN bytes only — it does not require a valid signature from the CA. An attacker can therefore mint a self-signed certificate whose issuer DN is byte-identical to the cluster CA subject, signed with an attacker-controlled key. The stock client presents it, and the vulnerable server accepts it and trusts its CommonName as a superuser identity.

    Patches

    Fixed by verifying the client-certificate chain before trusting it:

    • The listener now uses tls.VerifyClientCertIfGiven when a cluster CA is configured. A presented certificate must chain to the configured CA to complete the handshake, while certless callers (JWT/OIDC, which authenticate via the Authorization header) are still admitted.
    • As defense in depth, both RPC authenticators now require a non-empty VerifiedChains before deriving an identity from a client certificate.

    Users should upgrade to the patched release and restart the server so the new listener configuration takes effect.

    Workarounds

    Until the patch is deployed, restrict network access to the RPC port (:8443) so that it is not reachable from untrusted networks — remove any 0.0.0.0/0 ingress and limit it to trusted management networks. This is a containment measure only and does not remove the underlying vulnerability.

    Source: ENISA EUVD, OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities), GitHub Security Advisories, cvelistv5, CVE.org (MITRE), NVD (NIST)

    Affected products

    The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.

    Affected products
    Affected versionsFixed in
    mirendevruntime
    • < 0.11.1
    • 0.11.1
    gomiren.dev/runtime
    • —
    • < 0.11.1
    • 0.11.1
    • 0.11.1

    Vendors and products

    Weakness classes (CWE)

    • CWE-295Improper Certificate Validation

      Base

      The product does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate.

      Entry at MITRE CWE-295

    References & sources

    • github.commirendev/runtime/commit/e2159c8c8559da3f1c1485b463c794d656cd2fe4x_refsource_MISC, euvd, web
    • github.commirendev/runtime/releases/tag/v0.11.1x_refsource_MISC, euvd, web
    • github.commirendev/runtime/security/advisories/GHSA-8fh7-7q4q-cq52x_refsource_CONFIRM, euvd, web
    • NVD (NIST)vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75521advisory, euvd
    • github.commirendev/runtimepackage

    Changes to this CVE

    Who changed this CVE and when: NVD (analysis, affected products, CVSS), the CVE publisher (CNA) and additional providers such as CISA (ADP).

    1. ReceivedGitHub

      Show 7 original changes
      Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
      TypeActionBeforeAfter
      Descriptionadded
      —
      Miren Runtime provides the runtime component for the Miren application platform. Prior to 0.11.1, the QUIC/HTTP3 RPC server on the default port 8443 uses tls.RequestClientCert and does not verify that presented certificates chain to the configured cluster certificate authority. The RPC authenticators derive a caller identity from PeerCertificates[0].Subject.CommonName without requiring a non-empty VerifiedChains value, and certificate identities bypass all RBAC checks. A network attacker who can reach the listener can present a self-signed certificate with an issuer distinguished name matching the public cluster CA subject and gain cluster superuser access, allowing disclosure, modification, or disruption of applications, sandboxes, disks, credentials, and other managed resources. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.1.
      CVSSadded
      —
      AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
      Weakness type (CWE)added
      —
      CWE-295
      Affected versions (publisher)added
      —
      New affected value received. <a href="https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/75xxx/CVE-2026-75521.json">CVE-2026-75521</a>
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://github.com/mirendev/runtime/commit/e2159c8c8559da3f1c1485b463c794d656cd2fe4
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://github.com/mirendev/runtime/releases/tag/v0.11.1
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://github.com/mirendev/runtime/security/advisories/GHSA-8fh7-7q4q-cq52

      Source identifier: security-advisories@github.com

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