HighCVE-2026-71887

OpenPGP data signature accepted from a signing subkey without cross-certification (CVE-2026-71887)

Published 03.10.2026Last modified 05.10.2026Sources: BSI, CVE.org, SUSE

What is affected, what to do

Update Legion of the Bouncy Castle BC-JAVA to version 1.86.

Affected: Legion of the Bouncy Castle BC-JAVA lt 1.81..1.86
Fixed in: Legion of the Bouncy Castle BC-JAVA 1.86

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Metrics

8.2

Priority

XIEM Effective CVSS: highest available CVSS rating from NVD and vendor data.

Source: Vendor (CNA), CVSS v4

8.2

CVSS v4

Severity High on the scale from 0 to 10.

Source: BSI, CVE.org, SUSE

0.1 %

EPSS score

Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.

Source: FIRST EPSS, percentile 0.4

Show all metrics

Severity: High
Priority (0–325) The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first? Read in glossary: 71.00 Methodology
Exploit maturity An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack. Read in glossary: no public PoC known
XIEM Effective CVSS XIEM® is the tiered managed-security operating model from NEOSEC and a registered trademark of NEOSEC GmbH. It extends classic SIEM — the central collection, normalisation and correlation of security-relevant events — with endpoint forensics, network visibility and deception technology, and consolidates them into three building tiers: Sentry, Orchestrate and Command. Read in glossary: 8.2 Methodology
CVSS v4 CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions. Read in glossary: 8.2
EPSS score The EPSS score is the absolute model output for an individual vulnerability: the estimated probability of real-world exploitation within the next 30 days, expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 % to 100 %). A score of 0.42 means „the model estimates a 42 % chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days“. Read in glossary: 0.1 %; Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.
EPSS percentile The EPSS percentile is the relative position of a vulnerability within all EPSS-scored CVEs, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A percentile of 0.90 means „this CVE has a higher EPSS score than 90 % of all other scored CVEs“. Unlike the EPSS score, it is not a probability — but a positioning within a ranking. Read in glossary: 0.4; Low — this CVE sits in the lower 10% of all CVEs scored today.
KEV status The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching. Read in glossary: —
Published: 03.10.2026
CISA assessment (SSVC): Exploitation: none known · not automatable · Technical impact: partial; Source: CISA Vulnrichment, as of 5 October 2026
CWE CWE is a catalogue of typical weakness types in software and hardware — such as flawed input validation, unsafe memory handling or poor authentication. Where a CVE names a concrete vulnerability in a concrete product, a CWE describes the underlying class of defect. Read in glossary: CWE-347, CWE-345

Detection rules

No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.

Classification under NIS2 and CRA

Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.

NIS2 NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management. Read in glossary: High technical severity: assess and remediate the vulnerability in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2 and document the decision.
CRA The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates. Read in glossary: From 11.12.2027, Annex I Part II CRA requires manufacturers of affected products with digital elements to handle vulnerabilities without delay and provide security updates.
ISO/IEC 27001 ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security. Read in glossary: Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.

Description

In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP API accepted a data signature made by a signing subkey whose Subkey Binding signature carried no embedded Primary Key Binding (cross-certification) signature, in the case where that binding omits a Key Flags subpacket. RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.1.8 and sec. 10.1.3 require the embedded Primary Key Binding signature on any subkey that can issue signatures; it is the subkey's own statement that it belongs to the primary key it is bound under. OpenPGPCertificate resolved the subkey's key flags two different ways. isSigningKey() goes through getKeyFlags() and getApplyingSubpacket(), which falls back to the primary key's direct-key or primary User ID self-signature when the binding signature omits the subpacket, so the subkey inherited the primary's SIGN_DATA and counted as signing-capable; verifyEmbeddedPrimaryKeyBinding(), which enforces the requirement, reads the binding signature's own hashed subpackets, found no SIGN_DATA there, and returned early as a non-signing key without ever demanding the back signature. The same subkey was therefore signing-capable - so its signatures were attributed to the certificate and OpenPGPSignature.OpenPGPDocumentSignature.isValid() returned true - while being exempt from cross-certification, where GnuPG refuses the identical certificate and message. An attacker needs only the victim's public signing subkey, which is public material: they bind it to their own primary key with a Subkey Binding signature they are able to make, carrying no Key Flags and no embedded Primary Key Binding signature, which they cannot make without the subkey's private key, and a relying party verifying one of the victim's genuinely signed messages against that certificate is told the signature is valid and given the attacker's certificate as its issuer. Because a certificate's User IDs are self-asserted, a verifier that pins on the subkey's fingerprint or key ID while taking the identity from the enclosing certificate reports a real signature under an attacker-chosen identity. This is misattribution of a genuine signature rather than forgery of a new one: no private key is recovered, and the signature must be one the grafted subkey actually made. The low-level PGPSignature / PGPPublicKeyRing API performs no binding checks by design and is unaffected. Key Flags are a statement about the key the carrying signature refers to (RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29), so a subkey no longer inherits them from the certificate-wide signatures of the primary key: a Subkey Binding signature that omits the subpacket now leaves the subkey with no capabilities rather than the primary's, which makes the flags the cross-certification check consults the same flags every other decision consults. Preferences and the other subpackets a direct-key signature carries are inherited as before, and the primary key itself, whose flags legitimately come from its own direct-key or User ID self-signature, is unaffected.

Source: BSI WID Portal, BSI CSAF, NVD (NIST), cvelistv5, suse_csaf

Affected products

The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.

Affected products
		Affected versions	Fixed in
Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc.	BC-JAVA	`1.81 – < 1.86`	`1.86`
Open Source	Bouncy Castle Java	`< 1.86`	`1.86`
Open Source	Bouncy Castle Java LTS	`< 2.73.13`	`2.73.13`

Vendors and products

Weakness classes (CWE)

CWE-347Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Base
The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data.
Entry at MITRE CWE-347
CWE-345Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Class
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
Entry at MITRE CWE-345

References & sources

github.combcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE‐2026‐71887Vendor advisory
github.combcgit/bc-java/commit/b51452fa48ccb578fc16b8222fce9eedf92c94d6Patch

Changes to this CVE

Who changed this CVE and when: NVD (analysis, affected products, CVSS), the CVE publisher (CNA) and additional providers such as CISA (ADP).

05.10.2026Record modifiedCISA ADP

CISA assessment (SSVC): exploitation: none known, automatable: no

Show the original change

Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
Type	Action	Before	After
SSVC assessment	added	—	{"id":"CVE-2026-71887","role":"CISA Coordinator","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"version":"2.0.3","timestamp":"2026-10-05T16:04:02.766987Z"}

Source identifier: 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0

03.10.2026Receivedbcorg

CVSS V4.0: AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Amber

Weakness type: CWE-345, CWE-347

Description added or changed

New references:

Show 7 original changes

Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
Type	Action	Before	After
Description	added	—	In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP API accepted a data signature made by a signing subkey whose Subkey Binding signature carried no embedded Primary Key Binding (cross-certification) signature, in the case where that binding omits a Key Flags subpacket. RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.1.8 and sec. 10.1.3 require the embedded Primary Key Binding signature on any subkey that can issue signatures; it is the subkey's own statement that it belongs to the primary key it is bound under. OpenPGPCertificate resolved the subkey's key flags two different ways. isSigningKey() goes through getKeyFlags() and getApplyingSubpacket(), which falls back to the primary key's direct-key or primary User ID self-signature when the binding signature omits the subpacket, so the subkey inherited the primary's SIGN_DATA and counted as signing-capable; verifyEmbeddedPrimaryKeyBinding(), which enforces the requirement, reads the binding signature's own hashed subpackets, found no SIGN_DATA there, and returned early as a non-signing key without ever demanding the back signature. The same subkey was therefore signing-capable - so its signatures were attributed to the certificate and OpenPGPSignature.OpenPGPDocumentSignature.isValid() returned true - while being exempt from cross-certification, where GnuPG refuses the identical certificate and message. An attacker needs only the victim's public signing subkey, which is public material: they bind it to their own primary key with a Subkey Binding signature they are able to make, carrying no Key Flags and no embedded Primary Key Binding signature, which they cannot make without the subkey's private key, and a relying party verifying one of the victim's genuinely signed messages against that certificate is told the signature is valid and given the attacker's certificate as its issuer. Because a certificate's User IDs are self-asserted, a verifier that pins on the subkey's fingerprint or key ID while taking the identity from the enclosing certificate reports a real signature under an attacker-chosen identity. This is misattribution of a genuine signature rather than forgery of a new one: no private key is recovered, and the signature must be one the grafted subkey actually made. The low-level PGPSignature / PGPPublicKeyRing API performs no binding checks by design and is unaffected. Key Flags are a statement about the key the carrying signature refers to (RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29), so a subkey no longer inherits them from the certificate-wide signatures of the primary key: a Subkey Binding signature that omits the subpacket now leaves the subkey with no capabilities rather than the primary's, which makes the flags the cross-certification check consults the same flags every other decision consults. Preferences and the other subpackets a direct-key signature carries are inherited as before, and the primary key itself, whose flags legitimately come from its own direct-key or User ID self-signature, is unaffected.
CVSS	added	—	AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Amber
Weakness type (CWE)	added	—	CWE-345
Weakness type (CWE)	added	—	CWE-347
Affected versions (publisher)	added	—	New affected value received. <a href="https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/71xxx/CVE-2026-71887.json">CVE-2026-71887</a>
Reference	added	—	https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/commit/b51452fa48ccb578fc16b8222fce9eedf92c94d6
Reference	added	—	https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE%E2%80%902026%E2%80%9071887

Source identifier: 91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630

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