SonicWall SonicOS SSLVPN Use of Single-factor Authentication Vulnerability (CVE-2026-19868)
Published Last modified In CISA KEV since Sources: CVE.org, pwn.watch
What is affected, what to do
An authentication enforcement vulnerability in SonicOS SSLVPN service may allow a user with valid credentials for an alternate authentication method to bypass SAML authentication controls. Successful exploitation may also bypass SAML-enforced multi-factor authentication (MFA).
The vulnerability is being actively exploited; treat it as a priority. The available sources name no fixed version. Check the vendor guidance in the references below. Immediate actions, mitigation and detection rules are in the runbook below.
- Affected
- SonicWall SonicOS
eq 7.3.3-7015 and older versions..7.3.3-7015 and older versions - SonicWall SonicOS
eq 8.2.2-8015 and older versions..8.2.2-8015 and older versions
- SonicWall SonicOS
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Metrics
7.5
Priority
XIEM Effective CVSS: highest available CVSS rating from NVD and vendor data.
Source: Vendor (CNA), CVSS v3
7.5
CVSS v3
Severity High on the scale from 0 to 10.
Source: CVE.org, pwn.watch
—
EPSS score
No value is available for this vulnerability.
Show all metrics
- Severity
- Critical
Priority (0–325)
The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?
Read in glossary- 167.50 Methodology
Exploit maturity
An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.
Read in glossary- actively exploitedSource: VulnCheck KEV (opens in a new tab) How we classify
XIEM Effective CVSS
XIEM® is the tiered managed-security operating model from NEOSEC and a registered trademark of NEOSEC GmbH. It extends classic SIEM — the central collection, normalisation and correlation of security-relevant events — with endpoint forensics, network visibility and deception technology, and consolidates them into three building tiers: Sentry, Orchestrate and Command.
Read in glossary- 7.5 Methodology
CVSS v3
CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.
Read in glossary- 7.5
KEV status
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- Actively exploited
- Published
In CISA KEV since
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- CISA assessment (SSVC)
- Exploitation: active · not automatable · Technical impact: partial
- Source: CISA Vulnrichment, as of 6 November 2026
CWE
CWE is a catalogue of typical weakness types in software and hardware — such as flawed input validation, unsafe memory handling or poor authentication. Where a CVE names a concrete vulnerability in a concrete product, a CWE describes the underlying class of defect.
Read in glossary- CWE-308
Response and mitigation
Why act now?
Prioritisation rationale
The flaw is reachable over the network without prior authentication to the device. It does require valid credentials for an alternate login method and is rated as complex to exploit. That makes it the perfect bridge between leaked or sprayed AD passwords and MFA-free VPN access, and SonicWall SSLVPN gateways have repeatedly been targeted for initial access. The scope change and high confidentiality impact translate into a foothold on the internal network. CISA does not flag ransomware use, but this access path fits typical pre-ransomware intrusion patterns. Organisations running internet-facing SonicWall SSLVPN with a hybrid SAML/LDAP or local-account setup should treat this as critical and patch within 24-72 h; strictly SAML-only deployments with no local VPN accounts can rank it as moderate once the configuration is verified.
Runbook step 1
Immediate response (0-24 h)
- Upgrade SonicOS on every firewall with SSLVPN enabled. A patch is available from the vendor; look up the fixed version in the SonicWall PSIRT advisory for CVE-2026-19868. Patch internet-facing units first, then HA pairs, then branch devices.
- Inventory every authentication method bound to SSLVPN: the local user database and LDAP/AD or RADIUS alongside SAML. Disable any method you don't strictly need, so that SAML with MFA is the only login path.
- Review local SonicOS user accounts that hold SSLVPN privileges. Disable service, test and legacy accounts. Rotate passwords on the remaining ones and enforce on-box TOTP MFA where supported.
- Reconcile active SSLVPN sessions against your IdP (Entra ID, Okta, ADFS, etc.). Treat any session without a matching SAML assertion as suspicious: kill it and lock the account.
- Force password resets for AD/LDAP accounts that appear in known credential leaks or infostealer dumps. This bug requires valid credentials, and it turns previously harmless leaked passwords into working VPN access.
- If you cannot patch within 24 h, restrict SSLVPN on the WAN interface (default TCP 4433 or your configured port) to known source ranges, or disable it temporarily.
Runbook step 2
Mitigation layers
- Network segmentation: Place the SSLVPN address pool in a dedicated zone. Allow only explicitly required services; do not use a blanket "VPN → LAN any" rule. Block management interfaces (HTTPS admin, SSH) from the VPN pool.
- Perimeter filtering: Enable Geo-IP and botnet filtering on the SSLVPN interface. Add login rate-limiting and an account lockout policy to slow password spraying against non-SAML auth paths.
- IAM / least privilege: Trim VPN group mappings to the minimum. Privileged AD accounts (Domain Admins, Tier-0) must never hold SSLVPN access, including through nested LDAP group membership.
- Configuration hardening: Configure SSLVPN to accept only the SAML authentication partition. Remove any LDAP/RADIUS fallback for VPN users, and re-verify this setting after every firmware upgrade.
- Secondary control plane: Where possible, enforce conditional access or device-posture checks at the resource layer (RDP gateway, application SSO). That way, an MFA bypass at the VPN edge does not translate into direct access to crown-jewel systems.
Runbook step 3
Detection rules
- SonicOS syslog (SSLVPN login events): Flag successful SSLVPN logins whose auth source is not SAML (local, LDAP, RADIUS). In a SAML-only estate, every hit is an alert. SPL sketch:
index=sonicwall sourcetype=sonicwall:syslog "SSL VPN" "login" NOT "SAML" | stats count by user, src_ip - IdP correlation: Join firewall SSLVPN logins against IdP SAML sign-ins. A VPN session with no IdP event within ±2 minutes indicates a likely bypass. KQL approach: join
SigninLogs | where AppDisplayName has "SonicWall"against the firewall custom table in Sentinel. - Behavioural anomalies: Alert on first-seen source IPs, hosting/VPS ASNs, impossible travel and off-hours logins for SSLVPN users. Also watch for spraying patterns, i.e. many usernames from one IP in a short window.
- Network telemetry (Zeek/Suricata): Monitor traffic from the SSLVPN pool to SMB (445), RDP (3389), LDAP (389/636), WinRM (5985/5986) or Kerberos (88) across many hosts. This fan-out points to internal recon and lateral movement after initial access.
- Windows events on DCs/servers: Hunt Event IDs 4624 (logon type 3/10) and 4625 with source IPs from the VPN pool, plus 4768/4769 for accounts that have no SAML session. Add Sysmon EID 3 to catch outbound connections from admin tooling on VPN-connected endpoints.
- SonicOS syslog (SSLVPN login events): Flag successful SSLVPN logins whose auth source is not SAML (local, LDAP, RADIUS). In a SAML-only estate, every hit is an alert. SPL sketch:
Detection rules
No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.
Classification under NIS2 and CRA
Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.
NIS2
NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.
Read in glossary- Actively exploited: treat the vulnerability as a priority in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2. If it is exploited in your environment, check the reporting obligation under Art. 23 (early warning within 24 hours).
CRA
The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.
Read in glossary- Since 11.09.2026, manufacturers of affected products with digital elements must report actively exploited vulnerabilities under Art. 14 CRA, with an early warning within 24 hours via ENISA's single reporting platform.
ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.
Read in glossary- Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.
Description
An authentication enforcement vulnerability in SonicOS SSLVPN service may allow a user with valid credentials for an alternate authentication method to bypass SAML authentication controls. Successful exploitation may also bypass SAML-enforced multi-factor authentication (MFA).
Source: cvelistv5, NVD (NIST), CISA KEV Catalog, pwn.watch
Affected products
The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.
| Affected versions | Fixed in | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| SonicWall | SonicOS |
|
|
Vendors and products
Weakness classes (CWE)
CWE-308Use of Single-factor Authentication
Base
The product uses an authentication algorithm that uses a single factor (e.g., a password) in a security context that should require more than one factor.
Entry at MITRE CWE-308
Public exploit references
Publicly reported proof-of-concepts, exploit modules and detection templates for this vulnerability. NEOSEC links to the original sources only and does not provide any exploit code.
| CISA KEV Catalog | CISA Known Exploited Vulnerability (opens in a new tab)cisa.gov | actively exploited |
References & sources
- psirt.global.sonicwall.comSonicWall PSIRT SNWLID-2026-0014pwn-watch, Vendor advisory
- cisa.govknown-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-19868government-resource
- pwn.watchpwn.watch: SonicWall SonicOS SSLVPN: SAML / MFA bypass via alternate auth (CVE-2026-19868, CISA KEV) — SNWLID-2026-0014 batchpwn-watch
- NVD (NIST)NVD: CVE-2026-19868pwn-watch
- cisa.govCISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalogpwn-watch
- cisa.govCISA KEV JSON feed (catalogVersion 2026.11.06)pwn-watch
- NVD (NIST)NVD: CVE-2026-82308pwn-watch
- NVD (NIST)NVD: CVE-2026-107154pwn-watch
- NVD (NIST)NVD: CVE-2026-107155pwn-watch
- NVD (NIST)NVD: CVE-2026-19703pwn-watch
- NVD (NIST)NVD: CVE-2026-77708pwn-watch
- NVD (NIST)NVD: CVE-2026-77709pwn-watch
- bleepingcomputer.comSonicWall warns of new SSL-VPN MFA bypass flaw exploited in attackspwn-watch
Changes to this CVE
Who changed this CVE and when: NVD (analysis, affected products, CVSS), the CVE publisher (CNA) and additional providers such as CISA (ADP).
Record modifiedCISA ADP
CISA assessment (SSVC): exploitation: active, automatable: no
Show 2 original changes
Individual changes of this event as published by NVD Type Action Before After SSVC assessment removed {"id":"CVE-2026-19868","role":"CISA Coordinator","options":[{"exploitation":"active"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"version":"2.0.3","timestamp":"2026-11-06T20:37:20.602909Z"}—SSVC assessment added —{"id":"CVE-2026-19868","role":"CISA Coordinator","options":[{"exploitation":"active"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"version":"2.0.3","timestamp":"2026-11-06T00:00:00+00:00"}Source identifier: 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
CISA KEV entry updated9119a7d8…
4 individual changes: Date Added, Due Date, Required Action, Vulnerability Name
Show 4 original changes
Individual changes of this event as published by NVD Type Action Before After Date Added added —2026-11-06Due Date added —2026-11-06Required Action added —2026-11-06Vulnerability Name added —2026-11-06Source identifier: 9119a7d8-5eab-497f-8521-727c672e3725
Record modifiedCISA ADP
CVSS V3.1: AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
CISA assessment (SSVC): exploitation: active, automatable: no
Show 3 original changes
Individual changes of this event as published by NVD Type Action Before After CVSS added —AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:NReference added —https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-19868SSVC assessment added —{"id":"CVE-2026-19868","role":"CISA Coordinator","options":[{"exploitation":"active"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"version":"2.0.3","timestamp":"2026-11-06T20:37:20.602909Z"}Source identifier: 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
Receivedsonicwall.com
Weakness type: CWE-308
Description added or changed
Show 4 original changes
Individual changes of this event as published by NVD Type Action Before After Description added —An authentication enforcement vulnerability in SonicOS SSLVPN service may allow a user with valid credentials for an alternate authentication method to bypass SAML authentication controls. Successful exploitation may also bypass SAML-enforced multi-factor authentication (MFA).Weakness type (CWE) added —CWE-308Affected versions (publisher) added —New affected value received. <a href="https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/19xxx/CVE-2026-19868.json">CVE-2026-19868</a>Reference added —https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2026-0014Source identifier: PSIRT@sonicwall.com
Linked advisories
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<a href="https://intel.neosec.eu/en/cve/CVE-2026-19868"><img src="https://intel.neosec.eu/badge/cve/CVE-2026-19868.svg?lang=en" alt="CVE-2026-19868 – NEOSEC Intel" height="20"></a>