Advisory on CARBONATO Botnet Campaign Targeting Exposed Docker Daemons
Published Sources: SingCERT
What is affected, what to do
Security researchers have identified a botnet campaign known as CARBONATO targeting Docker hosts with unauthenticated Docker Remote APIs exposed to the Internet. Organisations operating Docker environments are advised to review their configurations and assess potentially exposed systems for signs of compromise.
The available sources name no fixed version. Check the vendor guidance in the references below.
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CVSS v3
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Priority (0–325)
The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?
Read in glossary- 29.86 Methodology
Exploit maturity
An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.
Read in glossary- no public PoC known
KEV status
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- —
- Published
Classification under NIS2 and CRA
Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.
NIS2
NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.
Read in glossary- Handle the vulnerability in regular vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2.
CRA
The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.
Read in glossary- From 11.12.2027, Annex I Part II CRA requires manufacturers of affected products with digital elements to handle vulnerabilities without delay and provide security updates.
ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.
Read in glossary- Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.
Description
Security researchers have identified a botnet campaign known as CARBONATO targeting Docker hosts with unauthenticated Docker Remote APIs exposed to the Internet. Organisations operating Docker environments are advised to review their configurations and assess potentially exposed systems for signs of compromise. Background Security researchers have identified a botnet campaign known as CARBONATO targeting Docker hosts with unauthenticated Docker Remote APIs exposed to the Internet, typically over TCP port 2375. After identifying an exposed Docker API, CARBONATO uses legitimate Docker functionality to create a privileged container with access to the host filesystem, processes and network. This allows the attacker to execute commands on the underlying host. Following successful compromise, the botnet establishes persistent remote access, steals credentials and other sensitive information, and scans connected networks for additional exposed Docker hosts. CARBONATO also periodically scans networks accessible from compromised hosts for other Docker daemons exposed on port 2375 and attempts to compromise them, allowing the botnet to propagate across affected environments. Affected Systems Docker hosts may be at risk where the Docker Remote API is accessible from the Internet or other untrusted networks without authentication, particularly where the Docker daemon is listening on port 2375. Indicators of Compromise Known indicators of compromise associated with the CARBONATO campaign are available at: https://www.threatdown.com/blog/carbonato/ Recommendations Users and administrators are advised to: Restrict access to the Docker Remote API. Do not expose the Docker daemon directly to the Internet or other untrusted networks. Where remote access is not required, disable network access to the Docker daemon. Secure required remote access. Where remote access to the Docker daemon is necessary, use secure mechanisms such as SSH or TLS with client authentication, and restrict access to authorised systems and users. Assess potentially exposed systems for compromise. Review Docker hosts that have exposed unauthenticated Docker APIs for unexpected privileged containers, suspicious processes, persistence mechanisms, unauthorised SSH configurations and the indicators of compromise. Review and rotate potentially exposed credentials. If compromise is suspected or confirmed, organisations should identify and rotate credentials accessible from affected systems, including API keys, access tokens, SSH keys and other secrets. Monitor for lateral propagation. Review network logs for unusual scanning activity targeting TCP port 2375, particularly from Docker hosts, as compromised systems may attempt to identify and compromise other exposed Docker daemons on connected networks. Organisations that identify signs of compromise should isolate affected systems and conduct further investigation and remediation before restoring them to service. References https://www.threatdown.com/blog/carbonato/ https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/protect-access/
Source: CSA/SingCERT