Highosv:MAL-2026-16476

    Malicious code in @memtensor/memos-cloud-openclaw-plugin (npm)

    Published Sources: OSV (Schadpakete)

    • Malicious package
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    What is affected, what to do

    Uninstall the package, isolate affected environments and rotate credentials that were available during installation.

    Not sure whether and how you are affected? Ask a question about this vulnerability

    Malicious package

    npm@memtensor/memos-cloud-openclaw-plugin

    “@memtensor/memos-cloud-openclaw-plugin” is registered as malicious in the npm repository. Anyone who installed the package should uninstall it immediately, isolate affected environments and rotate credentials that were present during installation.

    Affected versions (3)

    • 0.1.21
    • 0.1.23
    • 0.1.25

    purl: pkg:npm/%40memtensor/memos-cloud-openclaw-plugin

    Sources (4)

    • ghsa-malwareGHSA-mhjf-v53x-7p87

      Versions from this source: 0.1.25, 0.1.23, 0.1.21

      sha256: 392fa28fd3caee9373f574a4e84e36f01d87d366eeb463993b189b95416cec62

    • amazon-inspectorIN-MAL-2026-020489

      Versions from this source: 0.1.21

      sha256: 1c533046b0b10308e2664ad7b6322eca047056161df3a4977972ccb1ffe3e349

    • amazon-inspectorIN-MAL-2026-020487

      Versions from this source: 0.1.25

      sha256: b4ef709ed47c3b300afd873971841152d3cb44147003df0d5833345d911582cb

    • amazon-inspectorIN-MAL-2026-020488

      Versions from this source: 0.1.23

      sha256: f867f0bafb2f347bab89385b0f72fc05881673bca7eb1e8e735771d5352dba20

    The OSSF `malicious-packages` namespace lists packages flagged as malicious by static analysis or sandbox detonation. An entry here is a confirmed finding, not a suspicion.

    Metrics

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    XIEM Effective CVSS

    No value is available for this vulnerability.

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    CVSS v3

    No value is available for this vulnerability.

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    EPSS score

    No value is available for this vulnerability.

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    Severity
    High
    Priority (0–325)

    The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?

    Read in glossary
    25.00 Methodology
    Exploit maturity

    An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.

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    no public PoC known
    KEV status

    The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.

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    —
    Published

    Classification under NIS2 and CRA

    Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.

    NIS2

    NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.

    Read in glossary
    High technical severity: assess and remediate the vulnerability in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2 and document the decision.
    CRA

    The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.

    Read in glossary
    From 11.12.2027, Annex I Part II CRA requires manufacturers of affected products with digital elements to handle vulnerabilities without delay and provide security updates.
    ISO/IEC 27001

    ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.

    Read in glossary
    Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.

    Description

    On September 23, 2026, an attacker published malicious versions of two MemTensor packages. The affected packages are the OpenClaw plugin @memtensor/memos-cloud-openclaw-plugin on npm and the MemOS Python library MemoryOS on PyPI. Both versions contain the same Go implant, sckit. The binary runs in the background each time the package loads. It collects credentials from the home directory and sends them to servers under skyleen[.]fr. It also includes the code it needs to copy itself into other repositories and packages that the stolen credentials can reach.

    Credential collection: the implant's credentialPaths, readCredentialFile and extractJSONCredentials functions target .npmrc, .pypirc, .git-credentials, .netrc, id_rsa, id_ecdsa, id_ed25519, .vault-token, msal_token_cache, access_tokens.json and access_tokens.db. Two regular expressions pick out secrets: one matches secret-like variable names (token, secret, password, api_key, database_url), the other matches known token formats.

    C2 protocol: the internal/wire package uses CBOR, X25519 key exchange and XChaCha20-Poly1305 (sckit/xchacha/v1), and handles signed leases, manifests and modules. The server delivers the modules at run time, so their contents were not observed. scheduleSelfDelete and deleteExecutable remove the binary after it runs.

    C2 paths: /<24 hex>/config (control), /status (preflight), /batch (results).

    Package archive SHA-256 digests:

    • memos-cloud-openclaw-plugin-0.1.21.tgz: 995a208944176c437a023f4a5c11baad2eb77a91847893c82e5866eaabedb810
    • memos-cloud-openclaw-plugin-0.1.23.tgz: 6caf89b059e9b6c82bb4ac4727816d516753c4d26833434dea0ecda44a346eb3
    • memos-cloud-openclaw-plugin-0.1.25.tgz: a6870826cd7c7ec8d32af227252efcdcdca03ac956d4702cdc2157ca82641673

    The npm package advertises itself as a memory plugin but bundles a Go-compiled binary at.sckit//sckit for six OS/arch targets whose build path is 'supplychain.local/campaign/cmd/implant'. index.js imports lib/sckit.js, whose launchStageZero() detach-spawns the bundled binary as 'stage0 --config64 ' with stdio ignored and unref()'d, so simply loading the plugin runs the implant in the background. The base64 CONFIG constant in lib/sckit.js decodes to a runtime configuration naming campaign_id 'cloud-openclaw-semi-nuclear', inventory_roots ['$HOME'], state_dir '$HOME/.openclaw/.cache/runtime', and three control/preflight/result fronts at 8a8acaf167b3.skyleen.fr, 0b48fafd6fbe.skyleen.fr, and 266297c6df27.skyleen.fr with UUID-shaped /config, /status, /batch paths — destinations that are not present in cleartext anywhere in the JavaScript source. The configuration's 'channel' field is 'exact-ref-one-use-NPM_TOKEN,@memtensor/memos-cloud-openclaw-plugin', and a companion collectStageZero() invokes the same binary synchronously with '--require-credential-receipt', targeting the installer's npm publishing token as it appears in ~/.npmrc or in CI environment variables. The combination of a bundled native implant auto-executed on plugin load, obfuscated hardcoded C2 fronts, whole-$HOME inventory, and explicit NPM_TOKEN capture is credential theft and host exfiltration against the installer, not the plugin functionality the package name advertises. Binary strings such as 'supplychain.local/campaign' and the 'semi-nuclear' profile label suggest a red-team or research framing, but the published artifact acts on installers of a memory plugin rather than on an operator-chosen target, so the offensive-tool framing does not apply.

    Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

    Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)