PRC MSS tradecraft in action
Published Sources: NCSC NZ
What is affected, what to do
PRC MSS tradecraft in action The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has joined the Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC) and other international partners to release an advisory outlining a People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber group, APT40, and the current threat it poses to Australian networks. Authoring agencies include the: ASD’s ACSC, United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), United States National Security Agency (NSA), United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK), Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), German Federal Intelligence Service (BND), Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS), Japan’s National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), and National Police Agency (NPA).
The available sources name no fixed version. Check the vendor guidance and the linked original advisory.
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XIEM Effective CVSS
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CVSS v3
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EPSS score
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- Severity
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Priority (0–325)
The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?
Read in glossary- 5.50 Methodology
Exploit maturity
An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.
Read in glossary- no public PoC known
KEV status
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- —
- Published
Classification under NIS2 and CRA
Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.
NIS2
NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.
Read in glossary- Handle the vulnerability in regular vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2.
CRA
The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.
Read in glossary- From 11.12.2027, Annex I Part II CRA requires manufacturers of affected products with digital elements to handle vulnerabilities without delay and provide security updates.
ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.
Read in glossary- Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.
Description
PRC MSS tradecraft in action The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has joined the Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC) and other international partners to release an advisory outlining a People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber group, APT40, and the current threat it poses to Australian networks. Authoring agencies include the: ASD’s ACSC, United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), United States National Security Agency (NSA), United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK), Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), German Federal Intelligence Service (BND), Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS), Japan’s National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), and National Police Agency (NPA). The advisory draws on the authoring agencies’ shared understanding of the threat and ASD’s ACSC incident response investigations. What's happening Systems affected APT40 is conducting regular reconnaissance against networks of interest in Australia, looking for opportunities to compromise its targets. The group uses compromised infrastructure, including small-office/home-office (SOHO) devices, as operational infrastructure to launch attacks that blend in with legitimate traffic and challenge network defenders. This regular reconnaissance allows them to identify vulnerable, end-of-life, or unmaintained devices on networks of interest, and rapidly deploy exploits. APT40 continues to find success exploiting vulnerabilities where systems remain unpatched. What this means As New Zealand organisations often use similar technology and systems to those used in Australia, the NCSC is alerting local organisations to this type of activity so they can take steps to defend against it. This is not the first time this cyber actor and similar activity have been flagged to New Zealand operators. In March, Minister Collins, the Minister responsible for the GCSB, publicly attributed malicious cyber activity affecting New Zealand Government agencies to this same cyber actor, APT40. The authoring agencies understand this actor is associated with the PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS). What to look for How to tell if you're at risk The NCSC encourages organisations to review the scenarios outlined in the advisory’s case studies to understand how the actor employs their tools and tradecraft, and to take steps to defend against them. What to do Prevention The NCSC encourages organisations to review the tradecraft outlined in the advisory and apply the detection and mitigation recommendations More information If you have any questions about this advisory, contact the NCSC by email: info@ncsc.govt.nz. APT advisory: PRC MSS tradecraft in action [PDF, 2.9 MB]