Linux Kernel: security vulnerability (CVE-2026-99248)
Published Last modified Sources: BSI, CVE.org
What is affected, what to do
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: xiic: restore non-managed runtime PM to fix clk WARN flood The devres conversion replaced manual pm_runtime_enable()/disable() with devm_pm_runtime_set_active_enabled() and dropped the remove-time runtime PM teardown. The managed release tears runtime PM down in the wrong order: it calls pm_runtime_dont_use_autosuspend() before pm_runtime_disable(), i.e. while runtime PM is still enabled, and devres is LIFO so the devm_clk_get_enabled() release runs afterwards.
Update Linux Kernel to version 7.2.13, Linux Kernel to version 7.3.
- Affected
- Linux Kernel
lt 7.1..7.2.13
- Linux Kernel
- Fixed in
- Linux Kernel
7.2.13 - Linux Kernel
7.3
- Linux Kernel
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Metrics
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Priority
No value is available for this vulnerability.
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CVSS v3
No value is available for this vulnerability.
0.1 %
EPSS score
Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.
Source: FIRST EPSS, percentile 3.8
Show all metrics
- Severity
- Not rated
Priority (0–325)
The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?
Read in glossary- 30.12 Methodology
Exploit maturity
An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.
Read in glossary- no public PoC known
EPSS score
The EPSS score is the absolute model output for an individual vulnerability: the estimated probability of real-world exploitation within the next 30 days, expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 % to 100 %). A score of 0.42 means „the model estimates a 42 % chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days“.
Read in glossary- 0.1 %
- Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.
EPSS percentile
The EPSS percentile is the relative position of a vulnerability within all EPSS-scored CVEs, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A percentile of 0.90 means „this CVE has a higher EPSS score than 90 % of all other scored CVEs“. Unlike the EPSS score, it is not a probability — but a positioning within a ranking.
Read in glossary- 3.8
- Low — this CVE sits in the lower 10% of all CVEs scored today.
KEV status
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- —
- Published
Detection rules
No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.
Classification under NIS2 and CRA
Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.
NIS2
NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.
Read in glossary- Handle the vulnerability in regular vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2.
CRA
The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.
Read in glossary- From 11.12.2027, Annex I Part II CRA requires manufacturers of affected products with digital elements to handle vulnerabilities without delay and provide security updates.
ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.
Read in glossary- Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: xiic: restore non-managed runtime PM to fix clk WARN flood The devres conversion replaced manual pm_runtime_enable()/disable() with devm_pm_runtime_set_active_enabled() and dropped the remove-time runtime PM teardown. The managed release tears runtime PM down in the wrong order: it calls pm_runtime_dont_use_autosuspend() before pm_runtime_disable(), i.e. while runtime PM is still enabled, and devres is LIFO so the devm_clk_get_enabled() release runs afterwards. At remove(), pm_runtime_put_sync() leaves the device active with the autosuspend timer armed. Clearing use_autosuspend then makes rpm_idle() suspend immediately, and xiic_i2c_runtime_suspend() clk_disable()s the clock. The later devm_clk_get_enabled() release clk_disable_unprepare()s the already-disabled clock, so clk_core_disable() WARNs ("clkN already disabled") on every teardown. Drop the managed helper and restore the non-managed runtime PM setup and teardown, so runtime PM is enabled once in probe and disabled once in remove and the clock enable count stays balanced. Order the remove teardown so runtime PM is disabled before the usage count is dropped: pm_runtime_disable() followed by pm_runtime_put_noidle() instead of pm_runtime_put_sync(). Dropping the count first with autosuspend still enabled arms the autosuspend timer, and a preemption before pm_runtime_disable() lets it expire, suspend the device and clk_disable() the clock, which the devm release then disables again - the same WARN. Restore the non-managed IRQ request as well. The probe error paths now unwind runtime PM by hand via goto, and a devm-registered handler is only freed later during devres unwind, so it would stay live across the manual teardown (and across any future failing step added after it). Request the IRQ with request_threaded_irq() and free it explicitly in the probe error path and in remove. The probe error path also clears use_autosuspend, to match the teardown in remove().
Source: BSI WID Portal, BSI CSAF, cvelistv5, NVD (NIST)
Affected products
The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.
| Affected versions | Fixed in | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
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Vendors and products
References & sources
- git.kernel.orgstable/c/47e105bdc863f2b320f9c05c80a63d3b83312700
- git.kernel.orgstable/c/d33373c565af9c8a28776af02bd20ba6e5724211
Changes to this CVE
Who changed this CVE and when: NVD (analysis, affected products, CVSS), the CVE publisher (CNA) and additional providers such as CISA (ADP).
ReceivedLinux
Description added or changed
Show 4 original changes
Individual changes of this event as published by NVD Type Action Before After Description added —In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: xiic: restore non-managed runtime PM to fix clk WARN flood The devres conversion replaced manual pm_runtime_enable()/disable() with devm_pm_runtime_set_active_enabled() and dropped the remove-time runtime PM teardown. The managed release tears runtime PM down in the wrong order: it calls pm_runtime_dont_use_autosuspend() before pm_runtime_disable(), i.e. while runtime PM is still enabled, and devres is LIFO so the devm_clk_get_enabled() release runs afterwards. At remove(), pm_runtime_put_sync() leaves the device active with the autosuspend timer armed. Clearing use_autosuspend then makes rpm_idle() suspend immediately, and xiic_i2c_runtime_suspend() clk_disable()s the clock. The later devm_clk_get_enabled() release clk_disable_unprepare()s the already-disabled clock, so clk_core_disable() WARNs ("clkN already disabled") on every teardown. Drop the managed helper and restore the non-managed runtime PM setup and teardown, so runtime PM is enabled once in probe and disabled once in remove and the clock enable count stays balanced. Order the remove teardown so runtime PM is disabled before the usage count is dropped: pm_runtime_disable() followed by pm_runtime_put_noidle() instead of pm_runtime_put_sync(). Dropping the count first with autosuspend still enabled arms the autosuspend timer, and a preemption before pm_runtime_disable() lets it expire, suspend the device and clk_disable() the clock, which the devm release then disables again - the same WARN. Restore the non-managed IRQ request as well. The probe error paths now unwind runtime PM by hand via goto, and a devm-registered handler is only freed later during devres unwind, so it would stay live across the manual teardown (and across any future failing step added after it). Request the IRQ with request_threaded_irq() and free it explicitly in the probe error path and in remove. The probe error path also clears use_autosuspend, to match the teardown in remove().Affected versions (publisher) added —New affected value received. <a href="https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/99xxx/CVE-2026-99248.json">CVE-2026-99248</a>Reference added —https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47e105bdc863f2b320f9c05c80a63d3b83312700Reference added —https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d33373c565af9c8a28776af02bd20ba6e5724211Source identifier: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
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<a href="https://intel.neosec.eu/en/cve/CVE-2026-99248"><img src="https://intel.neosec.eu/badge/cve/CVE-2026-99248.svg?lang=en" alt="CVE-2026-99248 – NEOSEC Intel" height="20"></a>