Linux Kernel: security vulnerability (CVE-2026-99059)
Published Last modified Sources: Msrc Update Guide, CVE.org, BSI
What is affected, what to do
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wireguard: noise: reject response consumption after intermediate initiation Two threads begin processing the identical response message, received twice. The first thread, A, runs.
Update Linux Kernel to version 6.6.160, Linux Kernel to version 6.12.113, Linux Kernel to version 6.18.57.
- Affected
- Linux Kernel
lt 5.6..6.6.160 - Linux Kernel
lt 6.7..6.12.113 - Linux Kernel
lt 6.13..6.18.57 - Linux Kernel
lt 6.19..7.2.11
- Linux Kernel
- Fixed in
- Linux Kernel
6.6.160 - Linux Kernel
6.12.113 - Linux Kernel
6.18.57 - Linux Kernel
7.2.11 - Linux Kernel
7.3
- Linux Kernel
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Metrics
7.7
Priority
XIEM Effective CVSS: highest available CVSS rating from NVD and vendor data.
Source: Vendor (CNA), CVSS v3
7.7
CVSS v3
Severity High on the scale from 0 to 10.
Source: Msrc Update Guide, CVE.org, BSI
0.4 %
EPSS score
Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.
Source: FIRST EPSS, percentile 38.6
Show all metrics
- Severity
- High
Priority (0–325)
The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?
Read in glossary- 80.41 Methodology
Exploit maturity
An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.
Read in glossary- no public PoC known
XIEM Effective CVSS
XIEM® is the tiered managed-security operating model from NEOSEC and a registered trademark of NEOSEC GmbH. It extends classic SIEM — the central collection, normalisation and correlation of security-relevant events — with endpoint forensics, network visibility and deception technology, and consolidates them into three building tiers: Sentry, Orchestrate and Command.
Read in glossary- 7.7 Methodology
CVSS v3
CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.
Read in glossary- 7.7
EPSS score
The EPSS score is the absolute model output for an individual vulnerability: the estimated probability of real-world exploitation within the next 30 days, expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 % to 100 %). A score of 0.42 means „the model estimates a 42 % chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days“.
Read in glossary- 0.4 %
- Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.
EPSS percentile
The EPSS percentile is the relative position of a vulnerability within all EPSS-scored CVEs, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A percentile of 0.90 means „this CVE has a higher EPSS score than 90 % of all other scored CVEs“. Unlike the EPSS score, it is not a probability — but a positioning within a ranking.
Read in glossary- 38.6
- High — this CVE ranks above the median of all CVEs scored today (rank ≥ 36%).
KEV status
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- —
- Published
Detection rules
No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.
Classification under NIS2 and CRA
Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.
NIS2
NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.
Read in glossary- High technical severity: assess and remediate the vulnerability in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2 and document the decision.
CRA
The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.
Read in glossary- From 11.12.2027, Annex I Part II CRA requires manufacturers of affected products with digital elements to handle vulnerabilities without delay and provide security updates.
ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.
Read in glossary- Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wireguard: noise: reject response consumption after intermediate initiation Two threads begin processing the identical response message, received twice. The first thread, A, runs. While it's running, the second one, B, gets partway through, and during that slow calculation, or even while blocking on down_write(), A completes and then also a handshake initiation that's already been queued up runs in thread C, which itself takes that same down_write(). The handshake initiation creation succeeds, and sets the state back to waiting-for-response, and calls up_write(), at which point thread B resumes, because either its finished its calculations or was finally allowed to acquire down_write(). Thread B then copies the state back to the peer, and begins a new session, using that state, which is the same session as the one made in thread A. Thread A Thread B Thread C down_read() sA = handshake->state memcpy(cA, handshake->crypto) up_read() if (sA != 1) goto fail slow_crypto(cA) down_read() sB = handshake->state memcpy(cB, handshake->crypto) up_read() if (sB != 1) goto fail slow_crypto(cB) down_write() if (sA != handshake->state) goto fail memcpy(handshake->crypto, cA) handshake->state = 2 up_write() down_write() if (handshake->state != 2) goto fail derive_session(handshake->crypto) up_write() down_write() slow_crypto(handshake->crypto) handshake->state = 1 up_write() down_write() if (sB != handshake->state) goto fail memcpy(handshake->crypto, cB) handshake->state = 2 up_write() down_write() if (handshake->state != 2) goto fail derive_session(handshake->crypto) up_write() This seems basically impossible to hit in a meaningful way in practice, but ensure that it absolutely cannot happen by comparing the ephemeral private key that's on the stack with the latest one that the peer's handshake state has.
Source: Microsoft Security Update Guide, cvelistv5, NVD (NIST), BSI CSAF, BSI WID Portal
Affected products
The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.
| Affected versions | Fixed in | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
|
|
Vendors and products
References & sources
- git.kernel.orgstable/c/3bec3d32c2a3afd164fc87f95457df2cf9049c20
- git.kernel.orgstable/c/4d64a3d6e96aa78619c9c29ffde309794974588a
- git.kernel.orgstable/c/c76a80db593096edf2b3b3972f58b6342a8c6c04
- git.kernel.orgstable/c/d0305f8d90029556260c6824b61c493c424eba9e
- git.kernel.orgstable/c/fb5ce4c7790c3eeec820302d08d70ecf46af4295
Changes to this CVE
Who changed this CVE and when: NVD (analysis, affected products, CVSS), the CVE publisher (CNA) and additional providers such as CISA (ADP).
Record modifiedLinux
CVSS V3.1: AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
Show the original change
Individual changes of this event as published by NVD Type Action Before After CVSS added —AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:LSource identifier: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
ReceivedLinux
Description added or changed
New references:- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3bec3d32c2a3afd164fc87f95457df2cf9049c20
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d64a3d6e96aa78619c9c29ffde309794974588a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c76a80db593096edf2b3b3972f58b6342a8c6c04
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0305f8d90029556260c6824b61c493c424eba9e
and 1 more reference
Show 7 original changes
Individual changes of this event as published by NVD Type Action Before After Description added —In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wireguard: noise: reject response consumption after intermediate initiation Two threads begin processing the identical response message, received twice. The first thread, A, runs. While it's running, the second one, B, gets partway through, and during that slow calculation, or even while blocking on down_write(), A completes and then also a handshake initiation that's already been queued up runs in thread C, which itself takes that same down_write(). The handshake initiation creation succeeds, and sets the state back to waiting-for-response, and calls up_write(), at which point thread B resumes, because either its finished its calculations or was finally allowed to acquire down_write(). Thread B then copies the state back to the peer, and begins a new session, using that state, which is the same session as the one made in thread A. Thread A Thread B Thread C down_read() sA = handshake->state memcpy(cA, handshake->crypto) up_read() if (sA != 1) goto fail slow_crypto(cA) down_read() sB = handshake->state memcpy(cB, handshake->crypto) up_read() if (sB != 1) goto fail slow_crypto(cB) down_write() if (sA != handshake->state) goto fail memcpy(handshake->crypto, cA) handshake->state = 2 up_write() down_write() if (handshake->state != 2) goto fail derive_session(handshake->crypto) up_write() down_write() slow_crypto(handshake->crypto) handshake->state = 1 up_write() down_write() if (sB != handshake->state) goto fail memcpy(handshake->crypto, cB) handshake->state = 2 up_write() down_write() if (handshake->state != 2) goto fail derive_session(handshake->crypto) up_write() This seems basically impossible to hit in a meaningful way in practice, but ensure that it absolutely cannot happen by comparing the ephemeral private key that's on the stack with the latest one that the peer's handshake state has.Affected versions (publisher) added —New affected value received. <a href="https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/99xxx/CVE-2026-99059.json">CVE-2026-99059</a>Reference added —https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3bec3d32c2a3afd164fc87f95457df2cf9049c20Reference added —https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d64a3d6e96aa78619c9c29ffde309794974588aReference added —https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c76a80db593096edf2b3b3972f58b6342a8c6c04Reference added —https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0305f8d90029556260c6824b61c493c424eba9eReference added —https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb5ce4c7790c3eeec820302d08d70ecf46af4295Source identifier: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
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<a href="https://intel.neosec.eu/en/cve/CVE-2026-99059"><img src="https://intel.neosec.eu/badge/cve/CVE-2026-99059.svg?lang=en" alt="CVE-2026-99059 – NEOSEC Intel" height="20"></a>