Linux Kernel: security vulnerability (CVE-2026-98654)
Published Last modified Sources: BSI, CVE.org
What is affected, what to do
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Atomize IRQ register read/modify/write ops [Why] The OTG_GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS register controls various HW IRQ sources for the output timing generator (OTG). VUPDATE_NO_LOCK is one of them.
Update Linux Kernel to version 7.3-rc4.
- Affected
- Linux Kernel
lt 7.3-rc1..7.3-rc4
- Linux Kernel
- Fixed in
- Linux Kernel
7.3-rc4
- Linux Kernel
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Metrics
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Priority
No value is available for this vulnerability.
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CVSS v3
No value is available for this vulnerability.
0.2 %
EPSS score
Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.
Source: FIRST EPSS, percentile 3.7
Show all metrics
- Severity
- Not rated
Priority (0–325)
The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?
Read in glossary- 30.11 Methodology
Exploit maturity
An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.
Read in glossary- no public PoC known
EPSS score
The EPSS score is the absolute model output for an individual vulnerability: the estimated probability of real-world exploitation within the next 30 days, expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 % to 100 %). A score of 0.42 means „the model estimates a 42 % chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days“.
Read in glossary- 0.2 %
- Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.
EPSS percentile
The EPSS percentile is the relative position of a vulnerability within all EPSS-scored CVEs, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A percentile of 0.90 means „this CVE has a higher EPSS score than 90 % of all other scored CVEs“. Unlike the EPSS score, it is not a probability — but a positioning within a ranking.
Read in glossary- 3.7
- Low — this CVE sits in the lower 10% of all CVEs scored today.
KEV status
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- —
- Published
Detection rules
No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.
Classification under NIS2 and CRA
Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.
NIS2
NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.
Read in glossary- Handle the vulnerability in regular vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2.
CRA
The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.
Read in glossary- From 11.12.2027, Annex I Part II CRA requires manufacturers of affected products with digital elements to handle vulnerabilities without delay and provide security updates.
ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.
Read in glossary- Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Atomize IRQ register read/modify/write ops [Why] The OTG_GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS register controls various HW IRQ sources for the output timing generator (OTG). VUPDATE_NO_LOCK is one of them. To enable the IRQ, driver sets the VUPDATE_NO_LOCK_EN bit in the GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS register. To ack the IRQ after it fires, the driver sets the VUPDATE_NO_LOCK_CLEAR bit in the same GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS register. The bit sets are done through read/modify/write operations, which are not atomic. Thus, the following race is possible: Thread A: IRQ handler: *HW IRQ fires* # IRQ disable val = read(GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS) unset(val, VUPDATE_NO_LOCK_EN) write(val, GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS) # ACK reads VUPDATE_NO_LOCK_EN unset val1 = read(GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS) set(val1, VUPDATE_NO_LOCK_CLEAR) # IRQ enable val = read(GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS) set(val, VUPDATE_NO_LOCK_EN) write(val, GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS) # BAD! clears VUPDATE_NO_LOCK_EN write(val1, GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS) Regarding the tagged Fixes: change, it appears the change made this race more likely to occur. Since VUPDATE_NO_LOCK is now the sole IRQ source for vblank handling, a single race on high refresh panels can lead to a time out. [How] The GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS register is only one example, other IRQ control registers also share the same scheme. On top of GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS, let's clean up those as well. To keep things simple, Let's atomize the IRQ rmw ops via a single driver-wide spinlock. Due to the small scope of this lock, it is unlikely to cause noticeable overhead on top of all the existing locking within the IRQ set/handle paths. Since DM is responsible for locking, wrap dc_interrupt_set/ack with the spinlock in the new amdgpu_dm_irq_set/ack functions. Migrate/drop all references in DM to dc_interrupt_set/ack to use amdgpu_dm_irq_set/ack instead. (cherry picked from commit 70de0a0216583a53c946155f8c8adedfdca6b4e7)
Source: BSI WID Portal, BSI CSAF, cvelistv5, NVD (NIST)
Affected products
The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.
| Affected versions | Fixed in | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
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Vendors and products
References & sources
- git.kernel.orgstable/c/63e19ef3ddab806c472748c825f4dc88dcd994e8
Changes to this CVE
Who changed this CVE and when: NVD (analysis, affected products, CVSS), the CVE publisher (CNA) and additional providers such as CISA (ADP).
RejectedLinux
Record modifiedLinux
Description added or changed
Show 3 original changes
Individual changes of this event as published by NVD Type Action Before After Description changed In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Atomize IRQ register read/modify/write ops [Why] The OTG_GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS register controls various HW IRQ sources for the output timing generator (OTG). VUPDATE_NO_LOCK is one of them. To enable the IRQ, driver sets the VUPDATE_NO_LOCK_EN bit in the GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS register. To ack the IRQ after it fires, the driver sets the VUPDATE_NO_LOCK_CLEAR bit in the same GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS register. The bit sets are done through read/modify/write operations, which are not atomic. Thus, the following race is possible: Thread A: IRQ handler: *HW IRQ fires* # IRQ disable val = read(GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS) unset(val, VUPDATE_NO_LOCK_EN) write(val, GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS) # ACK reads VUPDATE_NO_LOCK_EN unset val1 = read(GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS) set(val1, VUPDATE_NO_LOCK_CLEAR) # IRQ enable val = read(GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS) set(val, VUPDATE_NO_LOCK_EN) write(val, GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS) # BAD! clears VUPDATE_NO_LOCK_EN write(val1, GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS) Regarding the tagged Fixes: change, it appears the change made this race more likely to occur. Since VUPDATE_NO_LOCK is now the sole IRQ source for vblank handling, a single race on high refresh panels can lead to a time out. [How] The GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS register is only one example, other IRQ control registers also share the same scheme. On top of GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS, let's clean up those as well. To keep things simple, Let's atomize the IRQ rmw ops via a single driver-wide spinlock. Due to the small scope of this lock, it is unlikely to cause noticeable overhead on top of all the existing locking within the IRQ set/handle paths. Since DM is responsible for locking, wrap dc_interrupt_set/ack with the spinlock in the new amdgpu_dm_irq_set/ack functions. Migrate/drop all references in DM to dc_interrupt_set/ack to use amdgpu_dm_irq_set/ack instead. (cherry picked from commit 70de0a0216583a53c946155f8c8adedfdca6b4e7)Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.Affected versions (publisher) added —Affected value removed. <a href="https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/98xxx/CVE-2026-98654.json">CVE-2026-98654</a>Reference removed kernel.org: https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/63e19ef3ddab806c472748c825f4dc88dcd994e8—Source identifier: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
ReceivedLinux
Description added or changed
Show 3 original changes
Individual changes of this event as published by NVD Type Action Before After Description added —In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Atomize IRQ register read/modify/write ops [Why] The OTG_GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS register controls various HW IRQ sources for the output timing generator (OTG). VUPDATE_NO_LOCK is one of them. To enable the IRQ, driver sets the VUPDATE_NO_LOCK_EN bit in the GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS register. To ack the IRQ after it fires, the driver sets the VUPDATE_NO_LOCK_CLEAR bit in the same GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS register. The bit sets are done through read/modify/write operations, which are not atomic. Thus, the following race is possible: Thread A: IRQ handler: *HW IRQ fires* # IRQ disable val = read(GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS) unset(val, VUPDATE_NO_LOCK_EN) write(val, GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS) # ACK reads VUPDATE_NO_LOCK_EN unset val1 = read(GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS) set(val1, VUPDATE_NO_LOCK_CLEAR) # IRQ enable val = read(GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS) set(val, VUPDATE_NO_LOCK_EN) write(val, GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS) # BAD! clears VUPDATE_NO_LOCK_EN write(val1, GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS) Regarding the tagged Fixes: change, it appears the change made this race more likely to occur. Since VUPDATE_NO_LOCK is now the sole IRQ source for vblank handling, a single race on high refresh panels can lead to a time out. [How] The GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS register is only one example, other IRQ control registers also share the same scheme. On top of GLOBAL_SYNC_STATUS, let's clean up those as well. To keep things simple, Let's atomize the IRQ rmw ops via a single driver-wide spinlock. Due to the small scope of this lock, it is unlikely to cause noticeable overhead on top of all the existing locking within the IRQ set/handle paths. Since DM is responsible for locking, wrap dc_interrupt_set/ack with the spinlock in the new amdgpu_dm_irq_set/ack functions. Migrate/drop all references in DM to dc_interrupt_set/ack to use amdgpu_dm_irq_set/ack instead. (cherry picked from commit 70de0a0216583a53c946155f8c8adedfdca6b4e7)Affected versions (publisher) added —New affected value received. <a href="https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/98xxx/CVE-2026-98654.json">CVE-2026-98654</a>Reference added —https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/63e19ef3ddab806c472748c825f4dc88dcd994e8Source identifier: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
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<a href="https://intel.neosec.eu/en/cve/CVE-2026-98654"><img src="https://intel.neosec.eu/badge/cve/CVE-2026-98654.svg?lang=en" alt="CVE-2026-98654 – NEOSEC Intel" height="20"></a>