MediumCVE-2026-71892

    CMS key-transport recipient key-size validation never runs for RFC 9709 HKDF-derived keys (CVE-2026-71892)

    Published Last modified Sources: BSI, SUSE, CVE.org

    What is affected, what to do

    In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the opt-in key-size validation on CMS key-transport recipients, org.bouncycastle.cms.jcajce.JceKeyTransRecipient.setKeySizeValidation(true), never ran for a message using RFC 9709 content-encryption key derivation (id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256). The branch that should have selected the actual content-encryption algorithm carried in the key derivation AlgorithmIdentifier's parameters compared the encrypted-key byte array against the id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 object identifier, a comparison between a byte array and an ASN1ObjectIdentifier that is false for every possible input, so the check fell through to a key-size lookup on the outer wrapper OID.

    Update Legion of the Bouncy Castle BC-JAVA to version 1.86, Legion of the Bouncy Castle BC-FJA to version 2.0.13, Legion of the Bouncy Castle BC-FJA to version 2.1.13.

    Affected
    • Legion of the Bouncy Castle BC-JAVA lt 1.78..1.86
    • Legion of the Bouncy Castle BC-FJA lt 2.0.7..2.0.13
    • Legion of the Bouncy Castle BC-FJA lt 2.1.0..2.1.13
    Fixed in
    • Legion of the Bouncy Castle BC-JAVA 1.86
    • Legion of the Bouncy Castle BC-FJA 2.0.13
    • Legion of the Bouncy Castle BC-FJA 2.1.13

    Not sure whether and how you are affected? Ask a question about this vulnerability

    Metrics

    6.9

    Priority

    XIEM Effective CVSS: highest available CVSS rating from NVD and vendor data.

    Source: Vendor (CNA), CVSS v4

    6.9

    CVSS v4

    Severity Medium on the scale from 0 to 10.

    Source: BSI, SUSE, CVE.org

    0.2 %

    EPSS score

    Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.

    Source: FIRST EPSS, percentile 6.8

    Show all metrics
    Severity
    Medium
    Priority (0–325)

    The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?

    Read in glossary
    64.86 Methodology
    Exploit maturity

    An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.

    Read in glossary
    no public PoC known
    XIEM Effective CVSS

    XIEM® is the tiered managed-security operating model from NEOSEC and a registered trademark of NEOSEC GmbH. It extends classic SIEM — the central collection, normalisation and correlation of security-relevant events — with endpoint forensics, network visibility and deception technology, and consolidates them into three building tiers: Sentry, Orchestrate and Command.

    Read in glossary
    6.9 Methodology
    CVSS v4

    CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.

    Read in glossary
    6.9
    EPSS score

    The EPSS score is the absolute model output for an individual vulnerability: the estimated probability of real-world exploitation within the next 30 days, expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 % to 100 %). A score of 0.42 means „the model estimates a 42 % chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days“.

    Read in glossary
    0.2 %
    Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.
    EPSS percentile

    The EPSS percentile is the relative position of a vulnerability within all EPSS-scored CVEs, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A percentile of 0.90 means „this CVE has a higher EPSS score than 90 % of all other scored CVEs“. Unlike the EPSS score, it is not a probability — but a positioning within a ranking.

    Read in glossary
    6.8
    Low — this CVE sits in the lower 10% of all CVEs scored today.
    KEV status

    The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.

    Read in glossary
    —
    Published
    CISA assessment (SSVC)
    Exploitation: none known · automatable · Technical impact: partial
    Source: CISA Vulnrichment, as of 5 October 2026
    CWE

    CWE is a catalogue of typical weakness types in software and hardware — such as flawed input validation, unsafe memory handling or poor authentication. Where a CVE names a concrete vulnerability in a concrete product, a CWE describes the underlying class of defect.

    Read in glossary
    CWE-697

    Detection rules

    No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.

    Classification under NIS2 and CRA

    Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.

    NIS2

    NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.

    Read in glossary
    Handle the vulnerability in regular vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2.
    CRA

    The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.

    Read in glossary
    From 11.12.2027, Annex I Part II CRA requires manufacturers of affected products with digital elements to handle vulnerabilities without delay and provide security updates.
    ISO/IEC 27001

    ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.

    Read in glossary
    Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.

    Description

    In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the opt-in key-size validation on CMS key-transport recipients, org.bouncycastle.cms.jcajce.JceKeyTransRecipient.setKeySizeValidation(true), never ran for a message using RFC 9709 content-encryption key derivation (id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256). The branch that should have selected the actual content-encryption algorithm carried in the key derivation AlgorithmIdentifier's parameters compared the encrypted-key byte array against the id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 object identifier, a comparison between a byte array and an ASN1ObjectIdentifier that is false for every possible input, so the check fell through to a key-size lookup on the outer wrapper OID. That OID identifies a key-derivation construction rather than a cipher and has no registered key size, so the size comparison was skipped entirely. A key-transport EnvelopedData or AuthEnvelopedData whose transported, HKDF-derived content-encryption key did not match the key size of the advertised content-encryption algorithm was therefore accepted even with validation explicitly enabled, silently defeating the only mechanism the API offers for enforcing recovered key size. The recipient now dispatches on the content-encryption AlgorithmIdentifier's algorithm OID, so validation checks the recovered key against the inner content-encryption algorithm. Messages with a matching key size, non-HKDF messages, and recipients that do not enable validation are unaffected. This issue also affects Bouncy Castle for Java FIPS (BC-FJA) before bcpkix-fips 2.0.13 (2.0.X series) and 2.1.13 (2.1.X series).

    Source: BSI WID Portal, BSI CSAF, suse_csaf, NVD (NIST), cvelistv5

    Affected products

    The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.

    Affected products
    Affected versionsFixed in
    Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc.BC-FJA
    • 2.1.0 – < 2.1.13
    • 2.0.7 – < 2.0.13
    • 2.1.13
    • 2.0.13
    Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc.BC-JAVA
    • 1.78 – < 1.86
    • 1.86
    Open SourceBouncy Castle Java
    • < 1.86
    • 1.86
    Open SourceBouncy Castle Java LTS
    • < 2.73.13
    • 2.73.13

    Vendors and products

    Weakness classes (CWE)

    • CWE-697Incorrect Comparison

      Pillar

      The product compares two entities in a security-relevant context, but the comparison is incorrect.

      Entry at MITRE CWE-697

    References & sources

    • github.combcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE‐2026‐71892Vendor advisory
    • github.combcgit/bc-java/commit/be0a7d925c818ef2f338bcec55178b9b6336dfc3Patch

    Changes to this CVE

    Who changed this CVE and when: NVD (analysis, affected products, CVSS), the CVE publisher (CNA) and additional providers such as CISA (ADP).

    1. Record modifiedCISA ADP

      CISA assessment (SSVC): exploitation: none known, automatable: yes

      Show the original change
      Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
      TypeActionBeforeAfter
      SSVC assessmentadded
      —
      {"id":"CVE-2026-71892","role":"CISA Coordinator","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"yes"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"version":"2.0.3","timestamp":"2026-10-05T16:58:15.636238Z"}

      Source identifier: 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0

    2. Receivedbcorg

      CVSS V4.0: AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Amber

      Weakness type: CWE-697

      Description added or changed

      Show 6 original changes
      Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
      TypeActionBeforeAfter
      Descriptionadded
      —
      In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the opt-in key-size validation on CMS key-transport recipients, org.bouncycastle.cms.jcajce.JceKeyTransRecipient.setKeySizeValidation(true), never ran for a message using RFC 9709 content-encryption key derivation (id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256). The branch that should have selected the actual content-encryption algorithm carried in the key derivation AlgorithmIdentifier's parameters compared the encrypted-key byte array against the id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 object identifier, a comparison between a byte array and an ASN1ObjectIdentifier that is false for every possible input, so the check fell through to a key-size lookup on the outer wrapper OID. That OID identifies a key-derivation construction rather than a cipher and has no registered key size, so the size comparison was skipped entirely. A key-transport EnvelopedData or AuthEnvelopedData whose transported, HKDF-derived content-encryption key did not match the key size of the advertised content-encryption algorithm was therefore accepted even with validation explicitly enabled, silently defeating the only mechanism the API offers for enforcing recovered key size. The recipient now dispatches on the content-encryption AlgorithmIdentifier's algorithm OID, so validation checks the recovered key against the inner content-encryption algorithm. Messages with a matching key size, non-HKDF messages, and recipients that do not enable validation are unaffected. This issue also affects Bouncy Castle for Java FIPS (BC-FJA) before bcpkix-fips 2.0.13 (2.0.X series) and 2.1.13 (2.1.X series).
      CVSSadded
      —
      AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Amber
      Weakness type (CWE)added
      —
      CWE-697
      Affected versions (publisher)added
      —
      New affected value received. <a href="https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/71xxx/CVE-2026-71892.json">CVE-2026-71892</a>
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/commit/be0a7d925c818ef2f338bcec55178b9b6336dfc3
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE%E2%80%902026%E2%80%9071892

      Source identifier: 91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630

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