MediumCVE-2026-54887

    DTLS server cookie bypass during startup window due to empty initial cookie secret (CVE-2026-54887)

    Published Last modified Sources: SUSE, Debian, BSI, CVE.org, Msrc Update Guide, OSV

    What is affected, what to do

    Use of Default Cryptographic Key vulnerability in Erlang/OTP ssl (DTLS server) allows predictable DTLS cookie computation during the startup window, enabling source address verification bypass. On DTLS server startup, dtls_server_connection:initial_hello/3 initializes previous_cookie_secret to the empty binary (<<>>) instead of a random value.

    Update erlang\/otp to version 28.5.0.3, erlang\/ssl to version 11.7.3, Erlang/OTP to version 29.0.3.

    Affected
    • Erlang OTP gte 8.2..*
    • Erlang OTP gte 20.0..*

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    Metrics

    6.3

    Priority

    XIEM Effective CVSS: highest available CVSS rating from NVD and vendor data.

    Source: NVD, CVSS v4

    4.8

    CVSS v3

    Severity Medium on the scale from 0 to 10.

    Source: SUSE, Debian, BSI, CVE.org, Msrc Update Guide, OSV

    0.2 %

    EPSS score

    Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.

    Source: FIRST EPSS, percentile 15.6

    Show all metrics
    Severity
    Medium
    Priority (0–325)

    The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?

    Read in glossary
    53.22 Methodology
    Exploit maturity

    An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.

    Read in glossary
    no public PoC known
    XIEM Effective CVSS

    XIEM® is the tiered managed-security operating model from NEOSEC and a registered trademark of NEOSEC GmbH. It extends classic SIEM — the central collection, normalisation and correlation of security-relevant events — with endpoint forensics, network visibility and deception technology, and consolidates them into three building tiers: Sentry, Orchestrate and Command.

    Read in glossary
    6.3 Methodology
    CVSS v3

    CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.

    Read in glossary
    4.8
    CVSS v4

    CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.

    Read in glossary
    6.3
    EPSS score

    The EPSS score is the absolute model output for an individual vulnerability: the estimated probability of real-world exploitation within the next 30 days, expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 % to 100 %). A score of 0.42 means „the model estimates a 42 % chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days“.

    Read in glossary
    0.2 %
    Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.
    EPSS percentile

    The EPSS percentile is the relative position of a vulnerability within all EPSS-scored CVEs, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A percentile of 0.90 means „this CVE has a higher EPSS score than 90 % of all other scored CVEs“. Unlike the EPSS score, it is not a probability — but a positioning within a ranking.

    Read in glossary
    15.6
    Elevated — this CVE ranks above at least 10% of all CVEs scored today.
    KEV status

    The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.

    Read in glossary
    —
    Published
    CISA assessment (SSVC)
    Exploitation: none known · not automatable · Technical impact: partial
    Source: CISA Vulnrichment, as of 2 July 2026
    CWE

    CWE is a catalogue of typical weakness types in software and hardware — such as flawed input validation, unsafe memory handling or poor authentication. Where a CVE names a concrete vulnerability in a concrete product, a CWE describes the underlying class of defect.

    Read in glossary
    CWE-1394

    Detection rules

    No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.

    Classification under NIS2 and CRA

    Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.

    NIS2

    NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.

    Read in glossary
    Handle the vulnerability in regular vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2.
    CRA

    The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.

    Read in glossary
    From 11.12.2027, Annex I Part II CRA requires manufacturers of affected products with digital elements to handle vulnerabilities without delay and provide security updates.
    ISO/IEC 27001

    ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.

    Read in glossary
    Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.

    Description

    Use of Default Cryptographic Key vulnerability in Erlang/OTP ssl (DTLS server) allows predictable DTLS cookie computation during the startup window, enabling source address verification bypass. On DTLS server startup, dtls_server_connection:initial_hello/3 initializes previous_cookie_secret to the empty binary (<<>>) instead of a random value. Because HMAC with an empty key is deterministic, anyone who observes the plaintext ClientHello can compute dtls_handshake:cookie(<<>>, IP, Port, Hello) and forge a valid DTLS cookie before the first rotation of the cookie secret. The DTLS cookie (RFC 6347 §4.2.1) is a denial-of-service mitigation that prevents spoofed source IPs from forcing the server to allocate state and perform expensive cryptographic operations; it is not an authentication mechanism. During the window from server startup until the first secret rotation (0 to 15 seconds), an attacker who can observe the plaintext ClientHello can bypass the source address verification, enabling DTLS handshake amplification with spoofed source addresses. This vulnerability is associated with program file lib/ssl/src/dtls_server_connection.erl and program routine dtls_server_connection:initial_hello/3. This issue affects OTP from OTP 20.0 before OTP 29.0.3, OTP 28.5.0.3 and OTP 27.3.4.14, corresponding to ssl from 8.2 before 11.7.3, 11.6.0.3 and 11.2.12.10.

    Source: suse_csaf, Debian Security Advisories, BSI WID Portal, BSI CSAF, NVD (NIST), Microsoft Security Update Guide, OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities), cvelistv5

    Affected products

    The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.

    Affected products
    Affected versionsFixed in
    ErlangOTP
    • ≥ 8.2
    • ≥ 20.0
    • —
    • —
    erlangerlang\/otp
    • 28.0 – < 28.5.0.3
    • 20.0 – < 27.3.4.14
    • 29.0 – < 29.0.3
    • 28.5.0.3
    • 27.3.4.14
    • 29.0.3
    erlangerlang\/ssl
    • 11.7 – < 11.7.3
    • 8.2 – < 11.2.12.10
    • 11.3 – < 11.6.0.3
    • 11.7.3
    • 11.2.12.10
    • 11.6.0.3
    Open SourceErlang/OTP
    • < 29.0.3
    • < 28.5.0.3
    • < 27.3.4.14
    • 29.0.3
    • 28.5.0.3
    • 27.3.4.14

    Vendors and products

    Affected operating systems

    Affected operating systems
    Linuxdebianerlangtrixie

    Weakness classes (CWE)

    • CWE-1394Use of Default Cryptographic Key

      Base

      The product uses a default cryptographic key for potentially critical functionality.

      Entry at MITRE CWE-1394

    References & sources

    • github.comerlang/otp/security/advisories/GHSA-p2m2-3c2w-8jp8advisory, Vendor advisory, related, Vendor advisory
    • cna.erlef.orgcves/CVE-2026-54887.htmlweb, related, Vendor advisory
    • erlang.orgdoc/system/versions.htmlweb, x_version-scheme, Release notes
    • github.comerlang/otp/commit/888e3bcd72d5406016b9e0de741026bc2a6f114dfix, Patch, Patch
    • OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-54887related, Third-party advisory

    Changes to this CVE

    Who changed this CVE and when: NVD (analysis, affected products, CVSS), the CVE publisher (CNA) and additional providers such as CISA (ADP).

    1. Record modifiedEEF

      Description added or changed

      Show the original change
      Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
      TypeActionBeforeAfter
      Descriptionchanged
      Use of Default Cryptographic Key vulnerability in Erlang/OTP ssl (DTLS server) allows predictable DTLS cookie computation during the startup window, enabling source address verification bypass. On DTLS server startup, dtls_server_connection:initial_hello/3 initializes previous_cookie_secret to the empty binary (<<>>) instead of a random value. Because HMAC with an empty key is deterministic, anyone who observes the plaintext ClientHello can compute dtls_handshake:cookie(<<>>, IP, Port, Hello) and forge a valid DTLS cookie before the first rotation of the cookie secret. The DTLS cookie (RFC 6347 §4.2.1) is a denial-of-service mitigation that prevents spoofed source IPs from forcing the server to allocate state and perform expensive cryptographic operations; it is not an authentication mechanism. During the window from server startup until the first secret rotation (0 to 15 seconds), an attacker who can observe the plaintext ClientHello can bypass the source address verification, enabling DTLS handshake amplification with spoofed source addresses. This vulnerability is associated with program file lib/ssl/src/dtls_server_connection.erl and program routine dtls_server_connection:initial_hello/3. This issue affects OTP from OTP 20.0 before 29.0.3, 28.5.0.3 and 27.3.4.14 corresponding to ssl from 8.2 before 11.7.3, 11.6.0.3 and 11.2.12.10.
      Use of Default Cryptographic Key vulnerability in Erlang/OTP ssl (DTLS server) allows predictable DTLS cookie computation during the startup window, enabling source address verification bypass. On DTLS server startup, dtls_server_connection:initial_hello/3 initializes previous_cookie_secret to the empty binary (<<>>) instead of a random value. Because HMAC with an empty key is deterministic, anyone who observes the plaintext ClientHello can compute dtls_handshake:cookie(<<>>, IP, Port, Hello) and forge a valid DTLS cookie before the first rotation of the cookie secret. The DTLS cookie (RFC 6347 §4.2.1) is a denial-of-service mitigation that prevents spoofed source IPs from forcing the server to allocate state and perform expensive cryptographic operations; it is not an authentication mechanism. During the window from server startup until the first secret rotation (0 to 15 seconds), an attacker who can observe the plaintext ClientHello can bypass the source address verification, enabling DTLS handshake amplification with spoofed source addresses. This vulnerability is associated with program file lib/ssl/src/dtls_server_connection.erl and program routine dtls_server_connection:initial_hello/3. This issue affects OTP from OTP 20.0 before OTP 29.0.3, OTP 28.5.0.3 and OTP 27.3.4.14, corresponding to ssl from 8.2 before 11.7.3, 11.6.0.3 and 11.2.12.10.

      Source identifier: 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db

    2. Record modifiedCISA ADP

      CISA assessment (SSVC): exploitation: none known, automatable: no

      Show the original change
      Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
      TypeActionBeforeAfter
      SSVC assessmentadded
      —
      {"id":"CVE-2026-54887","role":"CISA Coordinator","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"version":"2.0.3","timestamp":"2026-07-02T17:28:36.936306Z"}

      Source identifier: 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0

    3. ReceivedEEF

      Show 9 original changes
      Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
      TypeActionBeforeAfter
      Affected versions (publisher)added
      —
      OTP, OTP
      Descriptionadded
      —
      Use of Default Cryptographic Key vulnerability in Erlang/OTP ssl (DTLS server) allows predictable DTLS cookie computation during the startup window, enabling source address verification bypass. On DTLS server startup, dtls_server_connection:initial_hello/3 initializes previous_cookie_secret to the empty binary (<<>>) instead of a random value. Because HMAC with an empty key is deterministic, anyone who observes the plaintext ClientHello can compute dtls_handshake:cookie(<<>>, IP, Port, Hello) and forge a valid DTLS cookie before the first rotation of the cookie secret. The DTLS cookie (RFC 6347 §4.2.1) is a denial-of-service mitigation that prevents spoofed source IPs from forcing the server to allocate state and perform expensive cryptographic operations; it is not an authentication mechanism. During the window from server startup until the first secret rotation (0 to 15 seconds), an attacker who can observe the plaintext ClientHello can bypass the source address verification, enabling DTLS handshake amplification with spoofed source addresses. This vulnerability is associated with program file lib/ssl/src/dtls_server_connection.erl and program routine dtls_server_connection:initial_hello/3. This issue affects OTP from OTP 20.0 before 29.0.3, 28.5.0.3 and 27.3.4.14 corresponding to ssl from 8.2 before 11.7.3, 11.6.0.3 and 11.2.12.10.
      CVSSadded
      —
      AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
      Weakness type (CWE)added
      —
      CWE-1394
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-54887.html
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://github.com/erlang/otp/commit/888e3bcd72d5406016b9e0de741026bc2a6f114d
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://github.com/erlang/otp/security/advisories/GHSA-p2m2-3c2w-8jp8
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-54887
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://www.erlang.org/doc/system/versions.html#order-of-versions

      Source identifier: 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db

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