CriticalCVE-2026-41091

    Microsoft Defender Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (CVE-2026-41091)

    Published In CISA KEV since Sources: BSI, Msrc Update Guide, CVE.org, EUVD, pwn.watch

    What is affected, what to do

    Improper link resolution before file access ('link following') in Microsoft Defender allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

    The vulnerability is being actively exploited; treat it as a priority. Update Microsoft Malware Protection Engine to version 1.1.26040.8. Immediate actions, mitigation and detection rules are in the runbook below.

    Affected
    • Microsoft Malware Protection Engine lt 1.1.0.0..1.1.26040.8
    Fixed in
    • Microsoft Malware Protection Engine 1.1.26040.8

    Not sure whether and how you are affected? Ask a question about this vulnerability

    Metrics

    7.8

    Priority

    XIEM Effective CVSS: highest available CVSS rating from NVD and vendor data.

    Source: NVD, CVSS v3

    7.8

    CVSS v3

    Severity High on the scale from 0 to 10.

    Source: BSI, Msrc Update Guide, CVE.org, EUVD, pwn.watch

    8.2 %

    EPSS score

    Moderate — model estimates 1-10% exploitation likelihood.

    Source: FIRST EPSS, percentile 94.8

    Show all metrics
    Severity
    Critical
    Priority (0–325)

    The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?

    Read in glossary
    228.75 Methodology
    Exploit maturity

    An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.

    Read in glossary
    actively exploitedSource: VulnCheck KEV (opens in a new tab) How we classify
    XIEM Effective CVSS

    XIEM® is the tiered managed-security operating model from NEOSEC and a registered trademark of NEOSEC GmbH. It extends classic SIEM — the central collection, normalisation and correlation of security-relevant events — with endpoint forensics, network visibility and deception technology, and consolidates them into three building tiers: Sentry, Orchestrate and Command.

    Read in glossary
    7.8 Methodology
    CVSS v3

    CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.

    Read in glossary
    7.8
    EPSS score

    The EPSS score is the absolute model output for an individual vulnerability: the estimated probability of real-world exploitation within the next 30 days, expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 % to 100 %). A score of 0.42 means „the model estimates a 42 % chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days“.

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    8.2 %
    Moderate — model estimates 1-10% exploitation likelihood.
    EPSS percentile

    The EPSS percentile is the relative position of a vulnerability within all EPSS-scored CVEs, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A percentile of 0.90 means „this CVE has a higher EPSS score than 90 % of all other scored CVEs“. Unlike the EPSS score, it is not a probability — but a positioning within a ranking.

    Read in glossary
    94.8
    Critical — this CVE ranks in the top fifth of all CVEs scored today (rank ≥ 80%).
    KEV status

    The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.

    Read in glossary
    Actively exploited
    Published
    In CISA KEV since

    The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.

    Read in glossary
    CWE

    CWE is a catalogue of typical weakness types in software and hardware — such as flawed input validation, unsafe memory handling or poor authentication. Where a CVE names a concrete vulnerability in a concrete product, a CWE describes the underlying class of defect.

    Read in glossary
    CWE-59

    Response and mitigation

    Why act now?

    Prioritisation rationale

    This is a local privilege escalation that needs only a low-privileged foothold and no user interaction. Successful exploitation yields full SYSTEM-level compromise, making it a typical post-exploitation step after phishing or credential theft. Statistical exploitation likelihood is only moderate, and the vendor initially rated exploit maturity as unproven, but KEV inclusion confirms real-world use. CISA does not flag known ransomware use. Because the fix is a no-reboot engine update delivered through the normal Defender channel, remediation cost is low. Treat it as high priority for multi-user hosts and anything with delayed update delivery; for fully current clients, verifying the engine version is sufficient.

    1. Runbook step 1

      Immediate response (0-24 h)

      • Verify engine version fleet-wide: The fix ships in Microsoft Malware Protection Engine 1.1.26040.8 and later. Check with Get-MpComputerStatus | Select-Object AMEngineVersion, AMProductVersion, AntivirusSignatureLastUpdated or via MDE/Intune reporting. Treat anything below 1.1.26040.8 as vulnerable.
      • Force the update: On lagging hosts, run "%ProgramFiles%\Windows Defender\MpCmdRun.exe" -SignatureUpdate or Update-MpSignature. Engine updates ride along with security intelligence updates. Check WSUS, ConfigMgr and Intune approval rules so that a stalled approval queue is not holding the update back.
      • Chase the stragglers: Offline and air-gapped systems, OT jump hosts, golden images, VDI masters and machines running Defender in passive mode behind a third-party AV are the usual laggards. Apply the offline update package manually, then re-verify the engine version.
      • Start with multi-user hosts: Prioritise RDS/Citrix/AVD session hosts, developer workstations and shared kiosks. Any low-privileged local logon is enough to attempt exploitation.
      • Compromise assessment on stale hosts: Where a host ran a vulnerable engine for an extended period and has known initial-access indicators (phishing, stolen credentials), hunt for privilege-escalation artefacts (see Detection rules).
    2. Runbook step 2

      Mitigation layers

      • Configuration / integrity: Enforce Tamper Protection centrally. Alert on Defender configuration changes (Event ID 5007) and prevent update disablement via GPO. Disable "local admin merge" so local admins cannot add exclusions.
      • Endpoint hardening / application control: Use WDAC or AppLocker to block known junction, symlink and oplock abuse tooling (e.g. symboliclink-testing-tools binaries such as CreateSymlink.exe, CreateMountPoint.exe, SetOpLock.exe). Restrict execution from user-writable paths (%TEMP%, %APPDATA%, C:\Users\Public).
      • IAM / least privilege: Limit interactive and RDP logon on servers to administrative roles. Rotate local admin passwords with Windows LAPS so a successful SYSTEM escalation cannot be replayed laterally via shared local accounts.
      • Network segmentation: The attack vector is local, so segmentation only limits blast radius. Block client VLANs from reaching management ports (SMB 445, RDP 3389, WinRM 5985/5986) on servers and Tier-0 assets.
      • Update governance: Auto-approve Defender engine updates without a manual gate. Flag any host whose signature or engine age exceeds 72 h as a deviation in asset monitoring.
    3. Runbook step 3

      Detection rules

      • Junction/symlink creation by standard users (Sysmon EID 1 / MDE): DeviceProcessEvents | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("mklink /J","mklink /D","mklink /H") and AccountName !endswith "$". Also hunt for unknown binaries in %TEMP% that create mount-point reparse points.
      • Unusual file operations by MsMpEng.exe: DeviceFileEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "MsMpEng.exe" and ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileRenamed","FileDeleted") and FolderPath startswith @"C:\Windows\System32". Sysmon EID 11/23/26 with Image = MsMpEng.exe targeting paths outside ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender is highly suspicious.
      • Bait file followed by remediation: Look in the Windows Defender Operational log for Event ID 1116 (detection) or 1117 (action taken) on files in user directories (e.g. EICAR test files), quickly followed by new NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM processes linked to the same user session. This pattern indicates Defender is being deliberately triggered to remediate.
      • Escalation in process ancestry (EDR): Watch for SYSTEM-integrity shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) whose lineage traces back to a low-privileged session. Also watch for new services (Event ID 7045, 4697) or new files in C:\Windows\System32 shortly after Defender actions. Sigma shape: logsource: windows/process_creation, selection: IntegrityLevel: System, ParentUser|contains: <non-admin>.
      • Update-chain tampering: Correlate Event IDs 5007 (config change), 5001 (real-time protection disabled), and 2001 or 2003 (signature or engine update failed) to catch attackers actively blocking the fix.

    Detection rules

    No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.

    Classification under NIS2 and CRA

    Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.

    NIS2

    NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.

    Read in glossary
    Actively exploited: treat the vulnerability as a priority in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2. If it is exploited in your environment, check the reporting obligation under Art. 23 (early warning within 24 hours).
    CRA

    The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.

    Read in glossary
    Since 11.09.2026, manufacturers of affected products with digital elements must report actively exploited vulnerabilities under Art. 14 CRA, with an early warning within 24 hours via ENISA's single reporting platform.
    ISO/IEC 27001

    ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.

    Read in glossary
    Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.

    Description

    Improper link resolution before file access ('link following') in Microsoft Defender allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

    Source: BSI CSAF, BSI WID Portal, Microsoft Security Update Guide, cvelistv5, ENISA EUVD, pwn.watch, CISA KEV Catalog, NVD (NIST), CVE.org (MITRE)

    Affected products

    The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.

    Affected products
    Affected versionsFixed in
    MicrosoftMicrosoft Malware Protection Engine
    • 1.1.0.0 – < 1.1.26040.8
    • 1.1.26040.8
    microsoftmalware_protection_engine
    • 1.1.26030.3008 – < 1.1.26040.8
    • 1.1.26040.8
    MicrosoftMalware Protection Engine
    • < 1.1.26040.8
    • 1.1.26040.8

    Vendors and products

    Weakness classes (CWE)

    • CWE-59Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')

      Base

      The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource.

      Entry at MITRE CWE-59

    Public exploit references

    Publicly reported proof-of-concepts, exploit modules and detection templates for this vulnerability. NEOSEC links to the original sources only and does not provide any exploit code.

    Public exploit references
    CISA KEV CatalogCISA Known Exploited Vulnerability (opens in a new tab)cisa.govactively exploited
    PoC-in-GitHub (nomi-sec)RedSun- (opens in a new tab)github.comPoC (publicly reported)reported, not verified
    PoC-in-GitHub (nomi-sec)CVE-2026-41091-PoC-Exploit (opens in a new tab)github.comPoC (publicly reported)reported, not verified
    PoC-in-GitHub (nomi-sec)defender-vulnerability-scanner (opens in a new tab)github.comPoC (publicly reported)reported, not verified
    PoC-in-GitHub (nomi-sec)CVE-2026-41091 (opens in a new tab)github.comPoC (publicly reported)reported, not verified

    References & sources

    Linked advisories

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    Badge preview for CVE-2026-41091
    <a href="https://intel.neosec.eu/en/cve/CVE-2026-41091"><img src="https://intel.neosec.eu/badge/cve/CVE-2026-41091.svg?lang=en" alt="CVE-2026-41091 – NEOSEC Intel" height="20"></a>