MediumCVE-2026-17350

    pgAdmin 4: Tool permission bypass via backend routes and Socket.IO handlers (CVE-2026-17350)

    Published Last modified Sources: BSI, CVE.org

    What is affected, what to do

    The per-tool permission system (custom roles / role-based tool permissions, introduced in pgAdmin 4 9.3) did not enforce its permission check consistently. In SERVER mode, pgAdmin 4 gates each tool behind a per-tool Flask-Security permission, but the permission decorator (permissions_required) was applied only to a single "front door" route per tool.

    Update Pgadmin.org pgAdmin 4 to version 9.17.

    Affected
    • Pgadmin.org pgAdmin 4 lt 9.3..9.17
    Fixed in
    • Pgadmin.org pgAdmin 4 9.17

    Not sure whether and how you are affected? Ask a question about this vulnerability

    Metrics

    5.4

    Priority

    XIEM Effective CVSS: highest available CVSS rating from NVD and vendor data.

    Source: NVD, CVSS v3

    5.4

    CVSS v3

    Severity Medium on the scale from 0 to 10.

    Source: BSI, CVE.org

    0.4 %

    EPSS score

    Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.

    Source: FIRST EPSS, percentile 31.5

    Show all metrics
    Severity
    Medium
    Priority (0–325)

    The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?

    Read in glossary
    56.91 Methodology
    Exploit maturity

    An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.

    Read in glossary
    no public PoC known
    XIEM Effective CVSS

    XIEM® is the tiered managed-security operating model from NEOSEC and a registered trademark of NEOSEC GmbH. It extends classic SIEM — the central collection, normalisation and correlation of security-relevant events — with endpoint forensics, network visibility and deception technology, and consolidates them into three building tiers: Sentry, Orchestrate and Command.

    Read in glossary
    5.4 Methodology
    CVSS v3

    CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.

    Read in glossary
    5.4
    CVSS v4

    CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.

    Read in glossary
    5.3
    EPSS score

    The EPSS score is the absolute model output for an individual vulnerability: the estimated probability of real-world exploitation within the next 30 days, expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 % to 100 %). A score of 0.42 means „the model estimates a 42 % chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days“.

    Read in glossary
    0.4 %
    Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.
    EPSS percentile

    The EPSS percentile is the relative position of a vulnerability within all EPSS-scored CVEs, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A percentile of 0.90 means „this CVE has a higher EPSS score than 90 % of all other scored CVEs“. Unlike the EPSS score, it is not a probability — but a positioning within a ranking.

    Read in glossary
    31.5
    Elevated — this CVE ranks above at least 10% of all CVEs scored today.
    KEV status

    The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.

    Read in glossary
    —
    Published
    CISA assessment (SSVC)
    Exploitation: none known · not automatable · Technical impact: partial
    Source: CISA Vulnrichment, as of 31 July 2026
    CWE

    CWE is a catalogue of typical weakness types in software and hardware — such as flawed input validation, unsafe memory handling or poor authentication. Where a CVE names a concrete vulnerability in a concrete product, a CWE describes the underlying class of defect.

    Read in glossary
    CWE-862

    Detection rules

    No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.

    Classification under NIS2 and CRA

    Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.

    NIS2

    NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.

    Read in glossary
    Handle the vulnerability in regular vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2.
    CRA

    The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.

    Read in glossary
    From 11.12.2027, Annex I Part II CRA requires manufacturers of affected products with digital elements to handle vulnerabilities without delay and provide security updates.
    ISO/IEC 27001

    ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.

    Read in glossary
    Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.

    Description

    The per-tool permission system (custom roles / role-based tool permissions, introduced in pgAdmin 4 9.3) did not enforce its permission check consistently. In SERVER mode, pgAdmin 4 gates each tool behind a per-tool Flask-Security permission, but the permission decorator (permissions_required) was applied only to a single "front door" route per tool. Every other backend route and Socket.IO handler in that tool's workflow relied solely on pga_login_required/socket_login_required, which check authentication but not the tool permission. The reporter verified three cases against a test build: (1) a user without tools_query_tool permission received 403 on the protected sqleditor initialization route, but the same session went on to connect the server, initialize the viewdata backend chain, and retrieve real table row content; (2) a user without tools_grant_wizard received 403 on the protected acl route, but the same session still enumerated grantable objects, generated GRANT SQL, and successfully applied it -- confirmed database-side via has_table_privilege(); (3) a user without tools_schema_diff received 403 on the protected panel route, but the same session initialized schema diff, enumerated and connected databases, and obtained real DDL differences via the compare_database Socket.IO handler. The reporter also confirmed a related but distinct issue: a non-owner triggering /misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server against an administrator-owned shared server caused pgAdmin to persist a new server row still owned by the administrator (user_id/shared unchanged from the source), even though the connection attempt itself reported failure. During remediation, the same front-door-only permission gap was found to also affect the ERD, PSQL, and Debugger tools, and the Backup, Restore, Maintenance, and Import/Export blueprints, none of which were part of the original report; these were fixed using the same pattern as an extension of the reported defect class. An authenticated user who had valid pgAdmin login and a stored, working database connection, but had been explicitly denied a specific tool's permission by an administrator, could therefore still drive that tool end-to-end through its other routes and sockets, including obtaining an interactive psql session over the /pty Socket.IO namespace and invoking backup/restore/maintenance/import-export jobs. Because the bypass only restores access to tools operating over the user's own already-authenticated database connection, it does not grant the user any database privilege they did not already hold; it circumvents pgAdmin's own tool-level access-control policy (an organisational segregation-of-duties control, separate from database-level authorization), letting a user reach a pgAdmin feature an administrator intended to withhold from them, using capabilities their existing database role already permits through other means. Socket.IO event handlers had no permission-aware equivalent of permissions_required; only socket_login_required existed, checking authentication but not the tool permission. Fix adds a socket_permissions_required decorator (mirroring permissions_required, honouring the Administrator bypass, reading permissions via has_permission()) and applies it, alongside permissions_required, as the outermost decorator on every backend route and Socket.IO handler for the affected tools. Regression tests assert 403 on every gated route and socket handler for a permission-less user. This issue affects pgAdmin 4 in SERVER mode: from 9.3 before 9.17.

    Source: BSI WID Portal, BSI CSAF, NVD (NIST), cvelistv5

    Affected products

    The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.

    Affected products
    Affected versionsFixed in
    pgadmin.orgpgAdmin 4
    • 9.3 – < 9.17
    • 9.17
    pgadminpgadmin_4
    • 9.3 – < 9.17
    • 9.17
    Open SourcepgAdmin
    • < 9.17
    • 9.17

    Vendors and products

    Weakness classes (CWE)

    • CWE-862Missing Authorization

      Class

      The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

      Entry at MITRE CWE-862

    References & sources

    • github.compgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10190Issue tracking, Issue tracking, Patch, Vendor advisory
    • github.compgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/461c3afba92baad37c70a6fbd52d205d13a…Patch, Patch
    • github.compgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/d36bd8dc96812c716664feac533d240544e…Patch, Patch
    • github.compgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/ba1984718ad703011740ad48cb9b82402b8…Patch, Patch
    • github.compgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/64a9cdbd6a240a962144f84418beaf9e664…Patch, Patch

    Changes to this CVE

    Who changed this CVE and when: NVD (analysis, affected products, CVSS), the CVE publisher (CNA) and additional providers such as CISA (ADP).

    1. Initial analysis by NVDNVD

      Newly listed as affected:
      Show 6 original changes
      Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
      TypeActionBeforeAfter
      Product configurationadded
      —
      OR *cpe:2.3:a:pgadmin:pgadmin_4:*:*:*:*:*:postgresql:*:* versions from (including) 9.3 up to (excluding) 9.17
      Reference typeadded
      —
      PostgreSQL: https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/461c3afba92baad37c70a6fbd52d205d13a9de53 Types: Patch
      Reference typeadded
      —
      PostgreSQL: https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/64a9cdbd6a240a962144f84418beaf9e66419779 Types: Patch
      Reference typeadded
      —
      PostgreSQL: https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/ba1984718ad703011740ad48cb9b82402b89cc2c Types: Patch
      Reference typeadded
      —
      PostgreSQL: https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/d36bd8dc96812c716664feac533d240544e70adc Types: Patch
      Reference typeadded
      —
      PostgreSQL: https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10190 Types: Issue Tracking, Patch, Vendor Advisory

      Source identifier: nvd@nist.gov

    2. Record modifiedCISA ADP

      CISA assessment (SSVC): exploitation: none known, automatable: no

      Show the original change
      Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
      TypeActionBeforeAfter
      SSVC assessmentadded
      —
      {"id":"CVE-2026-17350","role":"CISA Coordinator","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"version":"2.0.3","timestamp":"2026-07-31T17:01:15.662893Z"}

      Source identifier: 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0

    3. Receivedf86ef6dc…

      CVSS V4.0: AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

      CVSS V3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

      Weakness type: CWE-862

      Description added or changed

      Show 10 original changes
      Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
      TypeActionBeforeAfter
      Affected versions (publisher)added
      —
      pgAdmin 4
      Descriptionadded
      —
      The per-tool permission system (custom roles / role-based tool permissions, introduced in pgAdmin 4 9.3) did not enforce its permission check consistently. In SERVER mode, pgAdmin 4 gates each tool behind a per-tool Flask-Security permission, but the permission decorator (permissions_required) was applied only to a single "front door" route per tool. Every other backend route and Socket.IO handler in that tool's workflow relied solely on pga_login_required/socket_login_required, which check authentication but not the tool permission. The reporter verified three cases against a test build: (1) a user without tools_query_tool permission received 403 on the protected sqleditor initialization route, but the same session went on to connect the server, initialize the viewdata backend chain, and retrieve real table row content; (2) a user without tools_grant_wizard received 403 on the protected acl route, but the same session still enumerated grantable objects, generated GRANT SQL, and successfully applied it -- confirmed database-side via has_table_privilege(); (3) a user without tools_schema_diff received 403 on the protected panel route, but the same session initialized schema diff, enumerated and connected databases, and obtained real DDL differences via the compare_database Socket.IO handler. The reporter also confirmed a related but distinct issue: a non-owner triggering /misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server against an administrator-owned shared server caused pgAdmin to persist a new server row still owned by the administrator (user_id/shared unchanged from the source), even though the connection attempt itself reported failure. During remediation, the same front-door-only permission gap was found to also affect the ERD, PSQL, and Debugger tools, and the Backup, Restore, Maintenance, and Import/Export blueprints, none of which were part of the original report; these were fixed using the same pattern as an extension of the reported defect class. An authenticated user who had valid pgAdmin login and a stored, working database connection, but had been explicitly denied a specific tool's permission by an administrator, could therefore still drive that tool end-to-end through its other routes and sockets, including obtaining an interactive psql session over the /pty Socket.IO namespace and invoking backup/restore/maintenance/import-export jobs. Because the bypass only restores access to tools operating over the user's own already-authenticated database connection, it does not grant the user any database privilege they did not already hold; it circumvents pgAdmin's own tool-level access-control policy (an organisational segregation-of-duties control, separate from database-level authorization), letting a user reach a pgAdmin feature an administrator intended to withhold from them, using capabilities their existing database role already permits through other means. Socket.IO event handlers had no permission-aware equivalent of permissions_required; only socket_login_required existed, checking authentication but not the tool permission. Fix adds a socket_permissions_required decorator (mirroring permissions_required, honouring the Administrator bypass, reading permissions via has_permission()) and applies it, alongside permissions_required, as the outermost decorator on every backend route and Socket.IO handler for the affected tools. Regression tests assert 403 on every gated route and socket handler for a permission-less user. This issue affects pgAdmin 4 in SERVER mode: from 9.3 before 9.17.
      CVSSadded
      —
      AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
      CVSSadded
      —
      AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
      Weakness type (CWE)added
      —
      CWE-862
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/461c3afba92baad37c70a6fbd52d205d13a9de53
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/64a9cdbd6a240a962144f84418beaf9e66419779
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/ba1984718ad703011740ad48cb9b82402b89cc2c
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/d36bd8dc96812c716664feac533d240544e70adc
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10190

      Source identifier: f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007

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