Not ratedCVE-2026-110985

    Apache Kafka: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature (CVE-2026-110985)

    Published Last modified Sources: BSI, CVE.org

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    What is affected, what to do

    A Kafka broker using SASL/OAUTHBEARER with the default validator (sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class=DefaultJwtValidator) selects its implementation from configuration. When sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url is set, the validator verifies the JWT signature.

    Update Kafka to version 4.3.2.

    Affected
    • Apache Kafka lte 4.1.0..4.1.2
    • Apache Kafka lte 4.2.0..4.2.1
    • Apache Kafka eq 4.3.0..4.3.0

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    Metrics

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    Priority

    No value is available for this vulnerability.

    —

    CVSS v3

    No value is available for this vulnerability.

    0.1 %

    EPSS score

    Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.

    Source: FIRST EPSS, percentile 2.3

    Show all metrics
    Severity
    Not rated
    Priority (0–325)

    The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?

    Read in glossary
    30.04 Methodology
    Exploit maturity

    An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.

    Read in glossary
    no public PoC known
    EPSS score

    The EPSS score is the absolute model output for an individual vulnerability: the estimated probability of real-world exploitation within the next 30 days, expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 % to 100 %). A score of 0.42 means „the model estimates a 42 % chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days“.

    Read in glossary
    0.1 %
    Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.
    EPSS percentile

    The EPSS percentile is the relative position of a vulnerability within all EPSS-scored CVEs, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A percentile of 0.90 means „this CVE has a higher EPSS score than 90 % of all other scored CVEs“. Unlike the EPSS score, it is not a probability — but a positioning within a ranking.

    Read in glossary
    2.3
    Low — this CVE sits in the lower 10% of all CVEs scored today.
    KEV status

    The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.

    Read in glossary
    —
    Published
    CWE

    CWE is a catalogue of typical weakness types in software and hardware — such as flawed input validation, unsafe memory handling or poor authentication. Where a CVE names a concrete vulnerability in a concrete product, a CWE describes the underlying class of defect.

    Read in glossary
    CWE-345, CWE-347, CWE-636, CWE-1287

    Detection rules

    No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.

    Classification under NIS2 and CRA

    Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.

    NIS2

    NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.

    Read in glossary
    Handle the vulnerability in regular vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2.
    CRA

    The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.

    Read in glossary
    From 11.12.2027, Annex I Part II CRA requires manufacturers of affected products with digital elements to handle vulnerabilities without delay and provide security updates.
    ISO/IEC 27001

    ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.

    Read in glossary
    Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.

    Description

    A Kafka broker using SASL/OAUTHBEARER with the default validator (sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class=DefaultJwtValidator) selects its implementation from configuration. When sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url is set, the validator verifies the JWT signature. When that URL is unset (the default) and no verification key resolver is supplied, DefaultJwtValidator silently falls back to ClientJwtValidator, which does not verify the JWT signature, algorithm, or issuer - and the broker starts with no warning or error. This is the residual of CVE-2026-33557, whose fix restored signature verification only on the path where the JWKS endpoint URL is set. Impact: A broker in this state accepts any structurally valid JWT, including "alg":"none" tokens. An unauthenticated remote attacker who can reach the listener can forge a token asserting any principal - including configured superusers - and gain full access to the cluster. Only brokers that enable SASL/OAUTHBEARER validation without a JWKS endpoint URL (and without a custom verification key resolver) are affected; brokers that set the URL verify signatures and are not affected. Unlike CVE-2026-110952 (issuer/audience not enforced by default), here no signature is verified at all. Mitigation (all affected versions, no upgrade required): Set sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url for every listener/mechanism that uses OAuthBearerValidatorCallbackHandler, or configure a signature-verifying sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class. Resolution: From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.1, and 4.4.0: a broker that would fall back to the non-verifying ClientJwtValidator fails to start with a ConfigException instead of running without signature verification (secure by default).

    Source: BSI CSAF, BSI WID Portal, NVD (NIST), cvelistv5

    Affected products

    The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.

    Affected products
    Affected versionsFixed in
    Apache Software FoundationApache Kafka
    • 4.3.0
    • 4.2.0 – ≤ 4.2.1
    • 4.1.0 – ≤ 4.1.2
    • —
    • —
    • —
    ApacheKafka
    • < 4.3.2
    • < 4.2.2
    • < 4.4.0
    • 4.3.2
    • 4.2.2
    • 4.4.0

    Vendors and products

    Weakness classes (CWE)

    • CWE-345Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

      Class

      The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.

      Entry at MITRE CWE-345
    • CWE-347Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

      Base

      The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data.

      Entry at MITRE CWE-347
    • CWE-636Not Failing Securely ('Failing Open')

      Class

      When the product encounters an error condition or failure, its design requires it to fall back to a state that is less secure than other options that are available, such as selecting the weakest encryption algorithm or using the most permissive access control restrictions.

      Entry at MITRE CWE-636
    • CWE-1287Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input

      Base

      The product receives input that is expected to be of a certain type, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input is actually of the expected type.

      Entry at MITRE CWE-1287

    References & sources

    Changes to this CVE

    Who changed this CVE and when: NVD (analysis, affected products, CVSS), the CVE publisher (CNA) and additional providers such as CISA (ADP).

    1. ReceivedApache

      Weakness type: CWE-345, CWE-347, CWE-636, CWE-1287

      Description added or changed

      Show 7 original changes
      Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
      TypeActionBeforeAfter
      Descriptionadded
      —
      A Kafka broker using SASL/OAUTHBEARER with the default validator (sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class=DefaultJwtValidator) selects its implementation from configuration. When sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url is set, the validator verifies the JWT signature. When that URL is unset (the default) and no verification key resolver is supplied, DefaultJwtValidator silently falls back to ClientJwtValidator, which does not verify the JWT signature, algorithm, or issuer - and the broker starts with no warning or error. This is the residual of CVE-2026-33557, whose fix restored signature verification only on the path where the JWKS endpoint URL is set. Impact: A broker in this state accepts any structurally valid JWT, including "alg":"none" tokens. An unauthenticated remote attacker who can reach the listener can forge a token asserting any principal - including configured superusers - and gain full access to the cluster. Only brokers that enable SASL/OAUTHBEARER validation without a JWKS endpoint URL (and without a custom verification key resolver) are affected; brokers that set the URL verify signatures and are not affected. Unlike CVE-2026-110952 (issuer/audience not enforced by default), here no signature is verified at all. Mitigation (all affected versions, no upgrade required): Set sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url for every listener/mechanism that uses OAuthBearerValidatorCallbackHandler, or configure a signature-verifying sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class. Resolution: From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.1, and 4.4.0: a broker that would fall back to the non-verifying ClientJwtValidator fails to start with a ConfigException instead of running without signature verification (secure by default).
      Weakness type (CWE)added
      —
      CWE-345
      Weakness type (CWE)added
      —
      CWE-347
      Weakness type (CWE)added
      —
      CWE-636
      Weakness type (CWE)added
      —
      CWE-1287
      Affected versions (publisher)added
      —
      New affected value received. <a href="https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/110xxx/CVE-2026-110985.json">CVE-2026-110985</a>
      Referenceadded
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      https://kafka.apache.org/cve-list

      Source identifier: security@apache.org

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