openremote: Missing Authorization (CVE-2026-104885)
Published Last modified Sources: CVE.org, EUVD, Hersteller
What is affected, what to do
Update openremote to version 1.31.0, io.openremote:openremote-manager to version 1.31.0.
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Metrics
6.3
XIEM Effective CVSS
Highest available CVSS rating from NVD and vendor data.
Source: Vendor (CNA), CVSS v4
6.3
CVSS v4
Severity Medium on the scale from 0 to 10.
Source: CVE.org, EUVD, Hersteller
—
EPSS score
No value is available for this vulnerability.
Show all metrics
- Severity
- Medium
Priority (0–325)
The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?
Read in glossary- 61.50 Methodology
Exploit maturity
An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.
Read in glossary- no public PoC known
XIEM Effective CVSS
XIEM® is the tiered managed-security operating model from NEOSEC and a registered trademark of NEOSEC GmbH. It extends classic SIEM — the central collection, normalisation and correlation of security-relevant events — with endpoint forensics, network visibility and deception technology, and consolidates them into three building tiers: Sentry, Orchestrate and Command.
Read in glossary- 6.3 Methodology
CVSS v4
CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.
Read in glossary- 6.3
KEV status
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- —
- Published
CWE
CWE is a catalogue of typical weakness types in software and hardware — such as flawed input validation, unsafe memory handling or poor authentication. Where a CVE names a concrete vulnerability in a concrete product, a CWE describes the underlying class of defect.
Read in glossary- CWE-862
Detection rules
No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.
Classification under NIS2 and CRA
Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.
NIS2
NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.
Read in glossary- Handle the vulnerability in regular vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2.
CRA
The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.
Read in glossary- From 11.12.2027, Annex I Part II CRA requires manufacturers of affected products with digital elements to handle vulnerabilities without delay and provide security updates.
ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.
Read in glossary- Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.
Description
Summary
Cross-realm MQTT session disconnect without authorization
Vulnerability
The disconnectUserSession endpoint in UserResourceImpl.java (line 443) accepts a realm path parameter but ignores it entirely, performing no authorization or realm-boundary check before force-disconnecting an MQTT session. Any authenticated user from any realm can disconnect MQTT broker sessions belonging to users in other realms by supplying the target session ID.
File: manager/src/main/java/org/openremote/manager/security/UserResourceImpl.java, lines 443-447
@Override
public void disconnectUserSession(RequestParams requestParams, String realm, String sessionID) {
if (!mqttBrokerService.disconnectSession(sessionID)) {
throw new NotFoundException("User session not found");
}
}
The REST interface at model/src/main/java/org/openremote/model/security/UserResource.java (line 201-204) maps this to GET {realm}/disconnect/{sessionID} with no @RolesAllowed annotation, so any authenticated user (not just admins) can call it.
Root Cause
CVE-2026-54641 (commit de89b8d) fixed cross-realm information disclosure in three read methods of the same file (get(), getUserClientRoles(), getUserRealmRoles()) and also added a realm check to getClientRoles(). The fix added throwIfCannotReadUserInRealm() and throwIfCannotAdminRealm() guards. However, disconnectUserSession was not patched and remains unprotected. Every other mutating method in this class has either a @RolesAllowed annotation on the interface or an explicit realm check in the implementation. This one has neither.
Proof of Concept
Given two realms, "master" and "building":
- User A authenticates in the "building" realm (any role, no admin needed).
- User B has an active MQTT session in the "master" realm with session ID
S. - User A sends:
GET /api/master/user/master/disconnect/Swith their building-realm bearer token. - The handler ignores the realm path segments, looks up session
Sin the globalconnectionIDConnectionMap, and callsdoForceDisconnect(). User B's MQTT connection is terminated.
Session IDs use the Netty ChannelId.asLongText() format (deterministic, partially sequential). While not trivially brute-forceable, IDs can leak through monitoring, logs, or correlated API calls. Within the same realm, any user (not just admins) can also disconnect sessions they should not have access to.
Impact
In a multi-tenant IoT deployment, an attacker authenticated in any realm can disrupt MQTT device connectivity in other realms. Since OpenRemote is used for building management, energy monitoring, and industrial IoT, forcibly disconnecting MQTT sessions can:
- Knock IoT sensors and actuators offline across tenant boundaries
- Disrupt safety-critical alarm monitoring (compounding the alarm IDOR fixed in CVE-2026-57168)
- Cause denial of service against other tenants' device fleets
The method also uses HTTP GET for a destructive operation, making it susceptible to CSRF via image tags or link prefetch.
Suggested Fix
Add a realm administration check consistent with the pattern used elsewhere in this file:
@Override
public void disconnectUserSession(RequestParams requestParams, String realm, String sessionID) {
throwIfCannotAdminRealm(realm);
RemotingConnection connection = mqttBrokerService.getConnectionByID(sessionID);
if (connection == null) {
throw new NotFoundException("User session not found");
}
// Verify the session belongs to a user in the requested realm
// before disconnecting
if (!mqttBrokerService.disconnectSession(sessionID)) {
throw new NotFoundException("User session not found");
}
}
At minimum, add throwIfCannotAdminRealm(realm) as the first line, and consider adding a @RolesAllowed(Constants.WRITE_ADMIN_ROLE) annotation to the interface method. The HTTP method should also be changed from GET to DELETE.
AI tooling
AI assistance was used for the code audit and for drafting this report. The finding against the project's source at the location cited above was manually verified before reporting it, and the severity and impact assessment are the reporter's own.
Source: cvelistv5, ENISA EUVD, CVE.org (MITRE), NVD (NIST), GitHub Security Advisories
Affected products
The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.
| Affected versions | Fixed in | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| openremote | openremote |
|
|
| maven | io.openremote:openremote-manager |
|
|
Vendors and products
Weakness classes (CWE)
CWE-862Missing Authorization
Class
The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
Entry at MITRE CWE-862
References & sources
- github.comopenremote/core/commit/51dce18d9e00d671a5e032d942ece186bdada560x_refsource_MISC, euvd
- github.comopenremote/core/releases/tag/1.31.0x_refsource_MISC, euvd
- github.comopenremote/core/security/advisories/GHSA-3h6w-xcw3-9xjjx_refsource_CONFIRM, euvd
Changes to this CVE
Who changed this CVE and when: NVD (analysis, affected products, CVSS), the CVE publisher (CNA) and additional providers such as CISA (ADP).
ReceivedGitHub
CVSS V4.0: AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Weakness type: CWE-862
Description added or changed
Show 7 original changes
Individual changes of this event as published by NVD Type Action Before After Description added —OpenRemote is an open-source internet-of-things platform. Prior to 1.31.0, an authenticated user who obtains another user's MQTT session ID can disconnect that session across realm boundaries through the GET route GET {realm}/disconnect/{sessionID}. In manager/src/main/java/org/openremote/manager/security/UserResourceImpl.java, disconnectUserSession ignores the requested realm and calls mqttBrokerService.disconnectSession(sessionID) without checking session ownership; model/src/main/java/org/openremote/model/security/UserResource.java exposes the route without an @RolesAllowed restriction. The earlier cross-realm read-method guards did not cover this disconnect method, and same-realm users can also disconnect sessions they do not own. Session IDs are not trivially brute-forceable but may be exposed through monitoring, logs, or correlated API calls, and the unauthorized disconnect can disrupt MQTT connectivity across tenant boundaries without directly disclosing session data. This issue is fixed in 1.31.0.CVSS added —AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:XWeakness type (CWE) added —CWE-862Affected versions (publisher) added —New affected value received. <a href="https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/104xxx/CVE-2026-104885.json">CVE-2026-104885</a>Reference added —https://github.com/openremote/core/commit/51dce18d9e00d671a5e032d942ece186bdada560Reference added —https://github.com/openremote/core/releases/tag/1.31.0Reference added —https://github.com/openremote/core/security/advisories/GHSA-3h6w-xcw3-9xjjSource identifier: security-advisories@github.com
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<a href="https://intel.neosec.eu/en/cve/CVE-2026-104885"><img src="https://intel.neosec.eu/badge/cve/CVE-2026-104885.svg?lang=en" alt="CVE-2026-104885 – NEOSEC Intel" height="20"></a>