HighCVE-2026-104795

    Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform: Execution with Unnecessary Privileges (CVE-2026-104795)

    Published Last modified Sources: Red Hat, CVE.org

    What is affected, what to do

    Update Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.19 to version 1792771524, Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.20 to version 1792849665, Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21 to version 1792008935.

    Affected
    • Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.19 lt *..1792771524
    • Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.20 lt *..1792849665
    • Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21 lt *..1792008935
    • Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.22 lt *..1792844435
    Fixed in
    • Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.19 1792771524
    • Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.20 1792849665
    • Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21 1792008935
    • Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.22 1792844435

    Not sure whether and how you are affected? Ask a question about this vulnerability

    Metrics

    8.8

    Priority

    XIEM Effective CVSS: highest available CVSS rating from NVD and vendor data.

    Source: NVD, CVSS v3

    8.8

    CVSS v3

    Severity High on the scale from 0 to 10.

    Source: Red Hat, CVE.org

    0.2 %

    EPSS score

    Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.

    Source: FIRST EPSS, percentile 5.0

    Show all metrics
    Severity
    High
    Priority (0–325)

    The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?

    Read in glossary
    74.20 Methodology
    Exploit maturity

    An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.

    Read in glossary
    no public PoC known
    XIEM Effective CVSS

    XIEM® is the tiered managed-security operating model from NEOSEC and a registered trademark of NEOSEC GmbH. It extends classic SIEM — the central collection, normalisation and correlation of security-relevant events — with endpoint forensics, network visibility and deception technology, and consolidates them into three building tiers: Sentry, Orchestrate and Command.

    Read in glossary
    8.8 Methodology
    CVSS v3

    CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.

    Read in glossary
    8.8
    EPSS score

    The EPSS score is the absolute model output for an individual vulnerability: the estimated probability of real-world exploitation within the next 30 days, expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 % to 100 %). A score of 0.42 means „the model estimates a 42 % chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days“.

    Read in glossary
    0.2 %
    Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.
    EPSS percentile

    The EPSS percentile is the relative position of a vulnerability within all EPSS-scored CVEs, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A percentile of 0.90 means „this CVE has a higher EPSS score than 90 % of all other scored CVEs“. Unlike the EPSS score, it is not a probability — but a positioning within a ranking.

    Read in glossary
    5.0
    Low — this CVE sits in the lower 10% of all CVEs scored today.
    KEV status

    The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.

    Read in glossary
    —
    Published
    CISA assessment (SSVC)
    Exploitation: none known · not automatable · Technical impact: total
    Source: CISA Vulnrichment, as of 14 October 2026
    CWE

    CWE is a catalogue of typical weakness types in software and hardware — such as flawed input validation, unsafe memory handling or poor authentication. Where a CVE names a concrete vulnerability in a concrete product, a CWE describes the underlying class of defect.

    Read in glossary
    CWE-250

    Detection rules

    No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.

    Classification under NIS2 and CRA

    Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.

    NIS2

    NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.

    Read in glossary
    High technical severity: assess and remediate the vulnerability in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2 and document the decision.
    CRA

    The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.

    Read in glossary
    From 11.12.2027, Annex I Part II CRA requires manufacturers of affected products with digital elements to handle vulnerabilities without delay and provide security updates.
    ISO/IEC 27001

    ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.

    Read in glossary
    Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.

    Description

    The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (hostPID: true) that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a container, the coordinator:

    1. fork()s a child process
    2. setns() into the target container's PID and mount namespaces
    3. fchdir() back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root filesystem (where /crio.sock is hostPath-mounted)
    4. Calls only seteuid(target_uid) — changing the effective UID but leaving the real UID and saved-set-UID at 0 and retaining the permitted capability set
    5. The check_no_privileged_perms() guard inspects only the Effective capability set (so it passes), and is skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0
    6. The VersionExecutable fingerprint invokes fpr_kind_executable with process.command_line[0] — the target's argv[0], read from /proc/<pid>/cmdline and fully controlled by the workload
    7. fpr_kind_executable calls exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output() — executing the workload's own binary inside the workload's mount namespace while ruid=0 in the host user namespace

    The executed process can call setuid(0) to restore full root with CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor container's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket.

    Affected Code

    1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator)

    File: extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs

    // Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers
join_process_namespaces(process.pid)?;
change_dir(current_dir);
switch_user(*process.uid)?;
if *process.uid != 0 {
    perms::check_no_privileged_perms()
        .expect("Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints");
}
fingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process);

    // Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0
fn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> {
    debug!("... Becoming user: {uid}");
    seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e))
}

    2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint)

    File: fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go

    // Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0]
func GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) {
    out, err := exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()
    if err != nil {
        return "", err
    }
    return string(out), nil
}

    3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable)

    File: version_executable.rs

    // Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint
return Some(vec![
    fpr_kind_executable,
    out_dir.to_string(),
    String::from(&process.command_line[0]),
    String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name),
]);

    Attack Pattern

    Attacker: Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace) Victim: The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet Trigger: Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node

    Attack sequence:

    1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured versioned-executable pattern (node, python, python3, MainThread, or contains java)
    2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious executable that calls setuid(0) to restore root
    3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0
    4. The attacker's code regains full root with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the host user namespace
    5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise

    Source: redhat_csaf, cvelistv5, NVD (NIST)

    Affected products

    The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.

    Affected products
    Affected versionsFixed in
    Red HatRed Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.19
    • < 1792771524
    • 1792771524
    Red HatRed Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.20
    • < 1792849665
    • 1792849665
    Red HatRed Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21
    • < 1792008935
    • 1792008935
    Red HatRed Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.22
    • < 1792844435
    • 1792844435
    Red HatRed Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5
    • —
    • —

    Vendors and products

    Weakness classes (CWE)

    • CWE-250Execution with Unnecessary Privileges

      Base

      The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses.

      Entry at MITRE CWE-250

    References & sources

    Changes to this CVE

    Who changed this CVE and when: NVD (analysis, affected products, CVSS), the CVE publisher (CNA) and additional providers such as CISA (ADP).

    1. Record modifiedRed Hat

      1 individual change: Affected versions (publisher)

      Show the original change
      Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
      TypeActionBeforeAfter
      Affected versions (publisher)added
      —
      Affected value modified. <a href="https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/104xxx/CVE-2026-104795.json">CVE-2026-104795</a>

      Source identifier: secalert@redhat.com

    2. Record modifiedRed Hat

      Show 4 original changes
      Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
      TypeActionBeforeAfter
      Affected versions (publisher)added
      —
      Affected value modified. <a href="https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/104xxx/CVE-2026-104795.json">CVE-2026-104795</a>
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:89198
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:89341
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:89655

      Source identifier: secalert@redhat.com

    3. Record modifiedRed Hat

      Show 2 original changes
      Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
      TypeActionBeforeAfter
      Affected versions (publisher)added
      —
      Affected value modified. <a href="https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/104xxx/CVE-2026-104795.json">CVE-2026-104795</a>
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:83702

      Source identifier: secalert@redhat.com

    4. Record modifiedCISA ADP

      CISA assessment (SSVC): exploitation: none known, automatable: no

      Show the original change
      Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
      TypeActionBeforeAfter
      SSVC assessmentadded
      —
      {"id":"CVE-2026-104795","role":"CISA Coordinator","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"total"}],"version":"2.0.3","timestamp":"2026-10-14T15:25:50.103511Z"}

      Source identifier: 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0

    5. ReceivedRed Hat

      CVSS V3.1: AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

      Weakness type: CWE-250

      Description added or changed

      Show 6 original changes
      Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
      TypeActionBeforeAfter
      Descriptionadded
      —
      The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`) that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a container, the coordinator: 1. **fork()s** a child process 2. **setns()** into the target container's PID and mount namespaces 3. **fchdir()** back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root filesystem (where `/crio.sock` is hostPath-mounted) 4. Calls **only `seteuid(target_uid)`** — changing the effective UID but leaving the **real UID and saved-set-UID at 0** and **retaining the permitted capability set** 5. The `check_no_privileged_perms()` guard inspects only the Effective capability set (so it passes), and is **skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0** 6. The `VersionExecutable` fingerprint invokes `fpr_kind_executable` with `process.command_line[0]` — the target's argv[0], read from `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and **fully controlled by the workload** 7. `fpr_kind_executable` calls `exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()` — executing the **workload's own binary** inside the workload's mount namespace while **ruid=0 in the host user namespace** The executed process can call `setuid(0)` to restore full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor container's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket. ## Affected Code ### 1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator) **File:** `extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs` ```rust // Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers join_process_namespaces(process.pid)?; change_dir(current_dir); switch_user(*process.uid)?; if *process.uid != 0 { perms::check_no_privileged_perms() .expect("Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints"); } fingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process); ``` ```rust // Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0 fn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> { debug!("... Becoming user: {uid}"); seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e)) } ``` ### 2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint) **File:** `fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go` ```go // Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0] func GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) { out, err := exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output() if err != nil { return "", err } return string(out), nil } ``` ### 3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable) **File:** `version_executable.rs` ```rust // Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint return Some(vec![ fpr_kind_executable, out_dir.to_string(), String::from(&process.command_line[0]), String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name), ]); ``` ## Attack Pattern **Attacker:** Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace) **Victim:** The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet **Trigger:** Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node **Attack sequence:** 1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured versioned-executable pattern (`node`, `python`, `python3`, `MainThread`, or contains `java`) 2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious executable that calls `setuid(0)` to restore root 3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0 4. The attacker's code regains full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` in the host user namespace 5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise
      CVSSadded
      —
      AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
      Weakness type (CWE)added
      —
      CWE-250
      Affected versions (publisher)added
      —
      New affected value received. <a href="https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/104xxx/CVE-2026-104795.json">CVE-2026-104795</a>
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-104795
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2543917

      Source identifier: secalert@redhat.com

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