n8n Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Expression Injection (CVE-2025-68613)

What is affected, what to do

n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. Versions starting with 0.211.0 and prior to 1.120.4, 1.121.1, and 1.122.0 contain a critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in their workflow expression evaluation system.

The vulnerability is being actively exploited; treat it as a priority. Update n8n to version 1.120.4. Immediate actions, mitigation and detection rules are in the runbook below.

Affected

• N8n gte 0.211.0, < 1.120.4..*
• N8n eq 1.121.0..1.121.0

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Metrics

Response and mitigation

1. 01

   Runbook step 1

   Immediate response (0-24 h)

   • Patch now: Upgrade every n8n instance from 0.211.0 onward to a fixed release: 1.120.4, 1.121.1 or 1.122.0 (or later). For Docker deployments pin the image tag explicitly (e.g. n8nio/n8n:1.122.0) rather than trusting latest, then recreate the container.
   • Find every instance: Include shadow IT in business units, dev VMs and self-hosted containers. Scan for port 5678/tcp (default) and HTTP paths such as /rest/login or /signin. Confirm the running version via n8n --version or the UI ("About n8n").
   • Cut exposure: Until patched, put internet-facing instances behind VPN or an authenticating reverse proxy, or take them offline. Disable public self-registration and outstanding invites.
   • Restrict privileges: Limit workflow create/edit rights to fully trusted admins immediately; disable unused accounts and invalidate active sessions.
   • Assume breach if exposed: If a vulnerable instance was multi-user or internet-reachable, rotate every credential stored in n8n (API keys, OAuth tokens, DB passwords, cloud credentials) and regenerate N8N_ENCRYPTION_KEY. The n8n process can read all decrypted credentials.
   • Preserve evidence before upgrading: Snapshot the database (SQLite ~/.n8n/database.sqlite or PostgreSQL tables workflow_entity, execution_entity), container logs and reverse-proxy logs before rebuilding.
2. 02

   Runbook step 2

   Mitigation layers

   • Network segmentation: Place n8n in a dedicated segment with an egress allowlist covering only the APIs it actually integrates with. Explicitly block cloud metadata (169.254.169.254) and internal management networks.
   • Runtime hardening: Run n8n as an unprivileged user (node, never root). Use a read_only root filesystem, no-new-privileges, cap_drop: ALL, and never mount the Docker socket.
   • Configuration changes: Set N8N_BLOCK_ENV_ACCESS_IN_NODE=true and disable risky nodes via NODES_EXCLUDE (e.g. n8n-nodes-base.executeCommand) to narrow post-exploitation paths. This does not stop exploitation of the expression engine itself.
   • IAM / least privilege: Enforce SSO with MFA and keep editor rights away from users who only consume workflows. Scope integration service accounts minimally to limit blast radius if n8n falls.
   • WAF / reverse-proxy rule (compensating): Inspect POST/PATCH/PUT to /rest/workflows and /api/v1/workflows for process.mainModule, child_process, constructor.constructor or require( inside {{ … }} expressions, and block or alert. String concatenation can bypass this, so treat it as an extra layer only.
3. 03

   Runbook step 3

   Detection rules

   • EDR/Sysmon process ancestry: Sysmon EID 1 or EDR telemetry where parent node (n8n) spawns sh, bash, curl, wget, python, nc or base64. Sigma shape: ParentImage|endswith: '/node' AND Image|endswith: ['/sh','/bash','/curl','/wget','/nc']. Baseline against legitimate Execute Command workflows.
   • Linux auditd: Add -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F uid=<n8n-uid> -k n8n_exec. Alert on unexpected binaries and on reads of /etc/passwd, ~/.n8n/config or /proc/self/environ.
   • Workflow content in the database: Hunt stored workflows and execution data, e.g. SELECT id,name,"updatedAt" FROM workflow_entity WHERE nodes LIKE '%mainModule%' OR nodes LIKE '%child_process%' OR nodes LIKE '%constructor.constructor%';. Prioritise newly created workflows and ones deleted shortly after creation.
   • Reverse-proxy/access logs: Look for login → POST/PATCH /rest/workflows → immediate /rest/workflows/*/run from rare users or new source IPs. SPL idea: index=proxy uri_path="/rest/workflows*" method IN (POST,PATCH) | stats count by user, src_ip.
   • Network telemetry (Zeek/Suricata): Flag new outbound connections from the n8n host to unknown destinations, reverse-shell patterns (long-lived TCP on unusual ports), requests to 169.254.169.254 and DNS lookups for newly registered domains.

Detection rules

No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.

Classification under NIS2 and CRA

Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.

NIS2

NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.

Read in glossary

Actively exploited: treat the vulnerability as a priority in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2. If it is exploited in your environment, check the reporting obligation under Art. 23 (early warning within 24 hours).

CRA

The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.

Read in glossary

Since 11.09.2026, manufacturers of affected products with digital elements must report actively exploited vulnerabilities under Art. 14 CRA, with an early warning within 24 hours via ENISA's single reporting platform.

ISO/IEC 27001

ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.

Read in glossary

Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.

Description

n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. Versions starting with 0.211.0 and prior to 1.120.4, 1.121.1, and 1.122.0 contain a critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in their workflow expression evaluation system. Under certain conditions, expressions supplied by authenticated users during workflow configuration may be evaluated in an execution context that is not sufficiently isolated from the underlying runtime. An authenticated attacker could abuse this behavior to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the n8n process. Successful exploitation may lead to full compromise of the affected instance, including unauthorized access to sensitive data, modification of workflows, and execution of system-level operations. This issue has been fixed in versions 1.120.4, 1.121.1, and 1.122.0. Users are strongly advised to upgrade to a patched version, which introduces additional safeguards to restrict expression evaluation. If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: Limit workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only; and/or deploy n8n in a hardened environment with restricted operating system privileges and network access to reduce the impact of potential exploitation. These workarounds do not fully eliminate the risk and should only be used as short-term measures.

Source: NVD (NIST), CISA KEV Catalog, CVE.org (MITRE), OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities), cvelistv5

Vendors and products

• N8n n8n
• N8n-io N8n

Weakness classes (CWE)

• CWE-913Improper Control of Dynamically-Managed Code Resources

  Class

  The product does not properly restrict reading from or writing to dynamically-managed code resources such as variables, objects, classes, attributes, functions, or executable instructions or statements.

  Entry at MITRE CWE-913

References & sources

• github.comn8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-v98v-ff95-f3cpweb, x_refsource_CONFIRM
• NVD (NIST)vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68613advisory
• github.comn8n-io/n8n/commit/08f332015153decdda3c37ad4fcb9f7ba13a7c79web, x_refsource_MISC
• github.comn8n-io/n8n/commit/1c933358acef527ff61466e53268b41a04be1000web, x_refsource_MISC
• github.comn8n-io/n8n/commit/39a2d1d60edde89674ca96dcbb3eb076ffff6316web, x_refsource_MISC
• github.comn8n-io/n8npackage
• akamai.comblog/security-research/2026/feb/zerobot-malware-targets-n8n-aut…web, Third-party advisory
• cisa.govknown-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2025-68613web, government-resource

Changes to this CVE

Who changed this CVE and when: NVD (analysis, affected products, CVSS), the CVE publisher (CNA) and additional providers such as CISA (ADP).

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