CriticalCVE-2020-11652

    SaltStack Salt Path Traversal Vulnerability (CVE-2020-11652)

    Published In CISA KEV since Sources: SingCERT, CVE.org, OSV

    What is affected, what to do

    An issue was discovered in SaltStack Salt before 2019.2.4 and 3000 before 3000.2. The salt-master process ClearFuncs class allows access to some methods that improperly sanitize paths.

    The vulnerability is being actively exploited; treat it as a priority. Update Salt to version 2019.2.4, Salt to version 3000.2. Immediate actions, mitigation and detection rules are in the runbook below.

    Affected
    • Salt lt *..2019.2.4
    • Salt lt 3000..3000.2
    • openSUSE Leap eq 15.1..15.1
    • Debian Linux eq 8.0..8.0
    • Debian Linux eq 9.0..9.0
    • Debian Linux eq 10.0..10.0
    • Canonical Ubuntu Linux eq 16.04..16.04
    • Canonical Ubuntu Linux eq 18.04..18.04
    • BlackBerry Workspaces Server lte *..7.1.3
    • BlackBerry Workspaces Server lte 8.0.0..8.2.6
    • BlackBerry Workspaces Server eq 9.1.0..9.1.0
    • VMware Application Remote Collector eq 7.5.0..7.5.0
    • VMware Application Remote Collector eq 8.0.0..8.0.0
    Fixed in
    • Salt 2019.2.4
    • Salt 3000.2

    Not sure whether and how you are affected? Ask a question about this vulnerability

    Metrics

    6.5

    Priority

    XIEM Effective CVSS: highest available CVSS rating from NVD and vendor data.

    Source: NVD, CVSS v3

    6.5

    CVSS v3

    Severity Medium on the scale from 0 to 10.

    Source: SingCERT, CVE.org, OSV

    86.2 %

    EPSS score

    High — model estimates ≥ 50% chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days.

    Source: FIRST EPSS, percentile 99.73

    Show all metrics
    Severity
    Critical
    Priority (0–325)

    The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?

    Read in glossary
    212.07 Methodology
    Exploit maturity

    An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.

    Read in glossary
    actively exploitedSource: ANSSI / CERT-FR How we classify
    XIEM Effective CVSS

    XIEM® is the tiered managed-security operating model from NEOSEC and a registered trademark of NEOSEC GmbH. It extends classic SIEM — the central collection, normalisation and correlation of security-relevant events — with endpoint forensics, network visibility and deception technology, and consolidates them into three building tiers: Sentry, Orchestrate and Command.

    Read in glossary
    6.5 Methodology
    CVSS v3

    CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.

    Read in glossary
    6.5
    EPSS score

    The EPSS score is the absolute model output for an individual vulnerability: the estimated probability of real-world exploitation within the next 30 days, expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 % to 100 %). A score of 0.42 means „the model estimates a 42 % chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days“.

    Read in glossary
    86.2 %
    High — model estimates ≥ 50% chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days.
    EPSS percentile

    The EPSS percentile is the relative position of a vulnerability within all EPSS-scored CVEs, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A percentile of 0.90 means „this CVE has a higher EPSS score than 90 % of all other scored CVEs“. Unlike the EPSS score, it is not a probability — but a positioning within a ranking.

    Read in glossary
    99.73
    Critical — this CVE ranks in the top fifth of all CVEs scored today (rank ≥ 80%).
    KEV status

    The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.

    Read in glossary
    Actively exploited
    Published
    In CISA KEV since

    The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.

    Read in glossary
    CISA assessment (SSVC)
    Exploitation: active · not automatable · Technical impact: partial
    Source: CISA Vulnrichment, as of 4 February 2025
    CWE

    CWE is a catalogue of typical weakness types in software and hardware — such as flawed input validation, unsafe memory handling or poor authentication. Where a CVE names a concrete vulnerability in a concrete product, a CWE describes the underlying class of defect.

    Read in glossary
    CWE-22

    Response and mitigation

    Why act now?

    Prioritisation rationale

    On its own this is a medium-severity flaw: it is network-reachable but requires authentication and mainly impacts confidentiality. In practice, however, attackers chain it with CVE-2020-11651, which removes the authentication requirement entirely. The result is unauthenticated read/write on the master and therefore root code execution across the whole managed fleet. Mass exploitation of internet-exposed masters followed within days of disclosure, mostly to drop cryptominers and backdoors. Exploitation likelihood is among the highest of any CVE, while CISA lists no known ransomware use. Treat any master reachable from the internet or from untrusted segments as critical and act now. Rate well-segmented internal deployments as high and patch them in the next maintenance window, because a Salt master is a single point of compromise for everything it manages, which matters particularly in KRITIS environments.

    1. Runbook step 1

      Immediate response (0-24 h)

      • Find exposed Salt masters: Check external reachability of TCP 4505 (publisher) and TCP 4506 (request server), using an external nmap -p4505,4506 scan or Shodan/Censys queries against your own ranges. Treat any internet-reachable master as compromised until proven otherwise.
      • Patch: Upgrade Salt to 2019.2.4 or 3000.2 or later. On Debian 8/9/10 and Ubuntu 16.04/18.04, install the patched distro packages; look up the exact package version in the relevant DSA/USN. For BlackBerry Workspaces Server (7.1.3, 8.0.0–8.2.6, 9.1.0), a patch is available from the vendor — check the vendor advisory for the fixed version.
      • Lock down immediately if you cannot patch: Use host firewall rules (iptables/nftables) to restrict inbound 4505/4506 to known minion subnets. If you suspect compromise, stop the service (systemctl stop salt-master).
      • Compromise assessment: On every master, check for reads of /var/cache/salt/master/.root_key, unknown files in file_roots (default /srv/salt) and /tmp, rogue cron jobs, and new SSH keys. This CVE is almost always exploited alongside CVE-2020-11651 (authentication bypass), so a compromised master means root on every connected minion.
      • Rotate keys and secrets: If you find indicators, regenerate the master keypair (/etc/salt/pki/master), renew .root_key, and re-accept all minion keys. Rotate every secret stored in pillar data, including passwords, API tokens and cloud credentials.
      • Rebuild, don't clean: Restore affected masters and their minions from known-good images rather than cleaning them in place.

    2. Runbook step 2

      Mitigation layers

      • Network segmentation: Run Salt masters only in a management VLAN. Allow 4505/4506 solely from defined minion networks and drop both ports at the perimeter. Connect remote minions via VPN or a dedicated syndic.
      • IPS/IDS: Deploy Suricata/Snort rules on TCP 4506 that match ClearFuncs abuse: _prep_auth_info, _send_pub, wheel combined with file_roots, and traversal sequences ../ or ..%2f. Enable the ET Open signatures for CVE-2020-11651/11652.
      • Configuration hardening: In /etc/salt/master, set auto_accept: False and remove autosign_file. Tighten permissions on file_roots and pillar_roots. Block unused wheel and runner modules via client_acl_blacklist / publisher_acl_blacklist.
      • IAM / least privilege: Minimise salt-api (rest_cherrypy) and eAuth accounts, with no shared accounts. Expose the API only behind a reverse proxy that enforces client certificates.
      • Endpoint hardening: Use auditd or FIM (AIDE, Wazuh) to monitor .root_key, /etc/salt/ and /srv/salt/. Mount /tmp and /var/tmp with noexec.

    3. Runbook step 3

      Detection rules

      • auditd: Add -w /var/cache/salt/master/.root_key -p r -k salt_rootkey and -w /srv/salt -p wa -k salt_fileroots. Alert on any read outside normal service start and on any state change without a matching change ticket.
      • EDR process ancestry: Look for salt-master or salt-minion spawning sh/bash, followed by curl, wget, chmod +x, or execution from /tmp. Known campaign artefacts include cryptominer binaries such as /tmp/salt-store and salt-minions. Sigma shape: ParentImage|endswith: '/salt-minion' AND Image|endswith: ['/curl','/wget'] AND CommandLine|contains: '/tmp/'.
      • Salt master log (/var/log/salt/master): Hunt for ../ in path arguments, file_roots.write, get_token, _prep_auth_info, and authentications from unknown minion IDs. SPL: index=linux source="/var/log/salt/master" ("../" OR "file_roots.write" OR "_prep_auth_info").
      • Network telemetry (Zeek/NetFlow): Flag connections to 4505/4506 from source IPs not in the minion inventory. Also flag minions connecting outbound to mining pools (Stratum, commonly ports 3333/4444/5555) or to unfamiliar download hosts shortly after a Salt job.
      • Host anomalies: Watch for fleet-wide CPU spikes on minions, disabled security agents (e.g. auditd/apparmor stopped), and modified crontabs, especially when they appear in close succession after a Salt job.

    Detection rules

    No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.

    Classification under NIS2 and CRA

    Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.

    NIS2

    NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.

    Read in glossary
    Actively exploited: treat the vulnerability as a priority in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2. If it is exploited in your environment, check the reporting obligation under Art. 23 (early warning within 24 hours).
    CRA

    The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.

    Read in glossary
    Since 11.09.2026, manufacturers of affected products with digital elements must report actively exploited vulnerabilities under Art. 14 CRA, with an early warning within 24 hours via ENISA's single reporting platform.
    ISO/IEC 27001

    ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.

    Read in glossary
    Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.

    Description

    An issue was discovered in SaltStack Salt before 2019.2.4 and 3000 before 3000.2. The salt-master process ClearFuncs class allows access to some methods that improperly sanitize paths. These methods allow arbitrary directory access to authenticated users.

    Source: CSA/SingCERT, NVD (NIST), OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities), cvelistv5, CISA KEV Catalog

    Affected products

    The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.

    Affected products
    Affected versionsFixed in
    blackberryworkspaces_server
    • 9.1.0
    • ≤ 7.1.3
    • 8.0.0 – ≤ 8.2.6
    • —
    • —
    • —
    saltstacksalt
    • 3000 – < 3000.2
    • < 2019.2.4
    • 3000.2
    • 2019.2.4
    vmwareapplication_remote_collector
    • 8.0.0
    • 7.5.0
    • —
    • —
    pypisalt
    • 2015.8.13
    • 2015.5.7
    • 2015.5.6
    • 0.16.4
    • 2016.11.0rc2
    • 2014.1.2
    • 2016.3.5
    • 0.10.2
    • 2014.7.5
    • 2015.8.0rc1
    • 2017.7.6
    • 2015.8.4
    • 2014.7.0rc3
    • 2014.1.0rc3
    • 2015.8.0rc4
    • 2015.2.0rc2
    • 2014.1.13
    • 0.9.0
    • 2014.7.0rc2
    • 3000.1
    • 0.16.1
    • 0.15.0
    • 0.17.0rc1
    • 2016.11.0rc1
    • 0.10.0
    • 2015.5.10
    • 2018.3.0rc1
    • 2016.11.2
    • 2016.11.10
    • 2015.5.1
    • 2015.5.11
    • 0.17.5
    • 2017.7.0
    • 0.17.0
    • 2016.3.0
    • 2014.1.3
    • 0.9.8
    • 2014.7.4
    • 2014.1.8
    • 3000
    • 2014.7.1
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    Vendors and products

    Affected operating systems

    Affected operating systems
    Linuxdebiandebian_linux10.0
    Linuxdebiandebian_linux8.0
    Linuxdebiandebian_linux9.0
    Linuxopensuseleap15.1
    Linuxcanonicalubuntu_linux16.04
    Linuxcanonicalubuntu_linux18.04

    Weakness classes (CWE)

    • CWE-22Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

      Base

      The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.

      Entry at MITRE CWE-22

    Public exploit references

    Publicly reported proof-of-concepts, exploit modules and detection templates for this vulnerability. NEOSEC links to the original sources only and does not provide any exploit code.

    Public exploit references
    CISA KEV CatalogCISA Known Exploited Vulnerability (opens in a new tab)cisa.govactively exploited
    ANSSI / CERT-FRLicence Ouverte 2.0, as of CERTFR-2020-ALE-012 – Multiples vulnérabilités dans SaltStack (clôturée 2020-07-31) (opens in a new tab)cert.cyber.gouv.fractively exploited
    Packet StormSaltstack 3000.1 Remote Code Execution (opens in a new tab)packetstormsecurity.comPoC (publicly reported)reported, not verified—
    Packet StormSaltStack Salt Master Minion Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (opens in a new tab)packetstormsecurity.comPoC (publicly reported)reported, not verified—

    References & sources

    • docs.saltstack.comen/latest/topics/releases/2019.2.4.htmlweb, x_refsource_MISC, Vendor advisory
    • github.comsaltstack/salt/blob/v3000.2_docs/doc/topics/releases/3000.2.rstweb, x_refsource_MISC, Third-party advisory
    • lists.opensuse.orgopenSUSE-SU-2020:0564web, Vendor advisory, x_refsource_SUSE, Mailing list, Third-party advisory
    • packetstormsecurity.comfiles/157560/Saltstack-3000.1-Remote-Code-Execution.htmlweb, x_refsource_MISC, Third-party advisory, Vulnerability database
    • debian.orgDSA-4676advisory, Vendor advisory, x_refsource_DEBIAN, Third-party advisory
    • vmware.comsecurity/advisories/VMSA-2020-0009.htmladvisory, x_refsource_CONFIRM, Third-party advisory
    • packetstormsecurity.comfiles/157678/SaltStack-Salt-Master-Minion-Unauthenticated-Remot…web, x_refsource_MISC, Exploit, Third-party advisory, Vulnerability database
    • tools.cisco.com20200528 SaltStack FrameWork Vulnerabilities Affecting Cisco Productsweb, Vendor advisory, x_refsource_CISCO, Third-party advisory
    • lists.debian.org[debian-lts-announce] 20200530 [SECURITY] [DLA 2223-1] salt security updateweb, Mailing list, x_refsource_MLIST, Mailing list, Third-party advisory
    • support.blackberry.comkb/articleDetail?articleNumber=000063758web, x_refsource_MISC, Third-party advisory
    • lists.opensuse.orgopenSUSE-SU-2020:1074web, Vendor advisory, x_refsource_SUSE, Mailing list, Third-party advisory
    • usn.ubuntu.comUSN-4459-1web, Vendor advisory, x_refsource_UBUNTU, Third-party advisory
    • GitHub Security Advisoriesadvisories/GHSA-vp49-2g4r-m3x3advisory
    • cisa.govknown-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2020-11652government-resource, US government resource
    • NVD (NIST)vuln/detail/CVE-2020-11652advisory
    • github.compypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/salt/PYSEC-2020-103.yamlweb
    • github.comsaltstack/saltpackage
    • usn.ubuntu.com4459-1web
    • cert.cyber.gouv.frANSSI / CERT-FR: CERTFR-2020-ALE-012 – Multiples vulnérabilités dans SaltStack (clôturée 2020-07-31)cert-fr
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