Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX Insecure Direct Object Reference Vulnerability (CVE-2017-11357)
Published In CISA KEV since Sources: CVE.org
What is affected, what to do
Progress Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX before R2 2017 SP2 does not properly restrict user input to RadAsyncUpload, which allows remote attackers to perform arbitrary file uploads or execute arbitrary code.
The vulnerability is being actively exploited; treat it as a priority. CISA lists it as used in ransomware campaigns. Update Progress Software Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX to version 2020.1.114. Immediate actions, mitigation and detection rules are in the runbook below.
- Affected
- Progress Software Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX
lt *..2020.1.114
- Progress Software Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX
- Fixed in
- Progress Software Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX
2020.1.114
- Progress Software Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX
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Metrics
9.8
Priority
XIEM Effective CVSS: highest available CVSS rating from NVD and vendor data.
Source: NVD, CVSS v3
9.8
CVSS v3
Severity Critical on the scale from 0 to 10.
Source: CVE.org
77.7 %
EPSS score
High — model estimates ≥ 50% chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days.
Source: FIRST EPSS, percentile 99.56
Show all metrics
- Severity
- Critical
Priority (0–325)
The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?
Read in glossary- 253.30 Methodology
Exploit maturity
An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.
Read in glossary- actively exploited
XIEM Effective CVSS
XIEM® is the tiered managed-security operating model from NEOSEC and a registered trademark of NEOSEC GmbH. It extends classic SIEM — the central collection, normalisation and correlation of security-relevant events — with endpoint forensics, network visibility and deception technology, and consolidates them into three building tiers: Sentry, Orchestrate and Command.
Read in glossary- 9.8 Methodology
CVSS v3
CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.
Read in glossary- 9.8
EPSS score
The EPSS score is the absolute model output for an individual vulnerability: the estimated probability of real-world exploitation within the next 30 days, expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 % to 100 %). A score of 0.42 means „the model estimates a 42 % chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days“.
Read in glossary- 77.7 %
- High — model estimates ≥ 50% chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days.
EPSS percentile
The EPSS percentile is the relative position of a vulnerability within all EPSS-scored CVEs, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A percentile of 0.90 means „this CVE has a higher EPSS score than 90 % of all other scored CVEs“. Unlike the EPSS score, it is not a probability — but a positioning within a ranking.
Read in glossary- 99.56
- Critical — this CVE ranks in the top fifth of all CVEs scored today (rank ≥ 80%).
KEV status
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- Actively exploited
- Published
In CISA KEV since
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary
Response and mitigation
Why act now?
Prioritisation rationale
The flaw is exploitable over the network with no authentication and no user interaction. Public exploit code has circulated for years. Telerik RAU abuse is a recurring entry vector against IIS-hosted .NET applications, and CISA flags it as used in ransomware campaigns. Typical targets are internet-facing .NET web apps at public bodies, utilities and mid-market firms, often legacy or third-party applications where nobody knows Telerik is present. Exploitation likelihood is very high. Treat every externally reachable instance as critical and patch or disable it within 24 hours. Internal-only instances can follow in the current maintenance window.
Runbook step 1
Immediate response (0-24 h)
- Inventory Telerik assemblies: Search all IIS servers and build artefacts for
Telerik.Web.UI.dlland read the file version, e.g.Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Filter Telerik.Web.UI.dll | % { $_.VersionInfo.FileVersion }. Include third-party products (CMS, line-of-business apps, vendor portals). Telerik is frequently bundled without anyone noticing. - Patch: Every build before R2 2017 SP2 is vulnerable. Move to a current, supported Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX release; take the exact target version from the Progress vendor advisory. Version 2020.1.114 is also listed as affected in the context. Stopping at R2 2017 SP2 is not enough, because RadAsyncUpload has follow-on flaws (e.g. CVE-2019-18935).
- Disable RadAsyncUpload if unused: Add
<add key="Telerik.Web.DisableAsyncUploadHandler" value="true" />under<appSettings>inweb.config. This immediately disables theTelerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=rauhandler. - Rotate cryptographic keys: Set unique random values for
Telerik.AsyncUpload.ConfigurationEncryptionKey,Telerik.Upload.ConfigurationHashKeyandTelerik.Web.UI.DialogParametersEncryptionKey. Also regenerate the ASP.NETmachineKey. - Compromise assessment on internet-facing hosts: Check upload temp locations (
App_Data\RadUploadTemp,%WINDIR%\Temp, the app pool account's%TEMP%) for unexpected.dll,.aspxor.ashxfiles. If you find any, isolate the host and trigger incident handling, including the NIS2 reporting assessment.
- Inventory Telerik assemblies: Search all IIS servers and build artefacts for
Runbook step 2
Mitigation layers
- Network segmentation: Put Telerik-based apps that don't need public exposure behind VPN or a pre-authenticating reverse proxy. Apply default-deny egress on IIS servers to break reverse shells and second-stage downloads.
- WAF/IPS: Block or tightly inspect POST requests to
Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axdwithtype=raufrom untrusted sources. Also block multipart bodies containingrauPostDatatogether with executable extensions (.dll,.aspx,.exe). Public Suricata and Snort signatures exist for Telerik RAU exploitation. Update your ruleset and switch those rules from alert to drop. - Endpoint hardening: Use AppLocker or WDAC to stop
w3wp.exefrom loading unsigned DLLs from temp and upload directories. Enable your EDR's policy blocking child processes of web server workers. - Least privilege: Run the IIS app pool as a dedicated
ApplicationPoolIdentitywithout local admin rights. Restrict write access to the upload temp folder and deny execute on it via NTFS. - Configuration: Explicitly set
AllowedFileExtensionsandTemporaryFolderon RadAsyncUpload, and cap the maximum upload size.
Runbook step 3
Detection rules
- IIS access logs: Look for POST to
/Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axdwithcs-uri-querycontainingtype=raufrom external IPs, especially with status 200 and unusual user agents. SPL:index=iis cs_method=POST cs_uri_stem="*Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd" cs_uri_query="*type=rau*" | stats count by c_ip, s_ip - Sysmon EID 11 (FileCreate):
Imageends with\w3wp.exeandTargetFilenameends with.dll,.aspxor.ashxunder\Temp\or\RadUploadTemp\. - Sysmon EID 7 (ImageLoad):
w3wp.exeloads a DLL fromC:\Windows\Temp\or a user temp path. This is a high-fidelity indicator of RadAsyncUpload deserialisation exploitation. - EDR process ancestry / Sysmon EID 1 / Security EID 4688: Alert on
w3wp.exe→cmd.exe/powershell.exe/rundll32.exe/certutil.exe. KQL:DeviceProcessEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "w3wp.exe" and FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","rundll32.exe","certutil.exe") - Network telemetry (Zeek/Suricata): Flag new outbound connections from IIS hosts to unknown external destinations within 5 minutes of a
type=rauPOST, correlated viaconn.log.
- IIS access logs: Look for POST to
Detection rules
No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.
Classification under NIS2 and CRA
Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.
NIS2
NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.
Read in glossary- Actively exploited: treat the vulnerability as a priority in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2. If it is exploited in your environment, check the reporting obligation under Art. 23 (early warning within 24 hours).
CRA
The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.
Read in glossary- Since 11.09.2026, manufacturers of affected products with digital elements must report actively exploited vulnerabilities under Art. 14 CRA, with an early warning within 24 hours via ENISA's single reporting platform.
ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.
Read in glossary- Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.
Description
Progress Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX before R2 2017 SP2 does not properly restrict user input to RadAsyncUpload, which allows remote attackers to perform arbitrary file uploads or execute arbitrary code.
Source: CISA KEV Catalog, cvelistv5, NVD (NIST), CVE.org (MITRE)
Affected products
The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.
| Affected versions | Fixed in | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| progress | telerik_ui_for_asp.net_ajax |
|
|
Vendors and products
Public exploit references
Publicly reported proof-of-concepts, exploit modules and detection templates for this vulnerability. NEOSEC links to the original sources only and does not provide any exploit code.
| CISA KEV Catalog | CISA Known Exploited Vulnerability (opens in a new tab)cisa.gov | actively exploited | |
| Exploit-DB | EDB-ID 43874 (opens in a new tab)exploit-db.com | PoC (publicly reported)reported, not verified | — |
References & sources
- exploit-db.com43874Exploit, x_refsource_EXPLOIT-DB
- telerik.comsupport/kb/aspnet-ajax/upload-(async)/details/insecure-direct-o…x_refsource_CONFIRM
- cisa.govknown-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2017-11357government-resource
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<a href="https://intel.neosec.eu/en/cve/CVE-2017-11357"><img src="https://intel.neosec.eu/badge/cve/CVE-2017-11357.svg?lang=en" alt="CVE-2017-11357 – NEOSEC Intel" height="20"></a>