CriticalCVE-2015-1769

    Microsoft Windows Mount Manager Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2015-1769)

    Published In CISA KEV since Sources: CVE.org

    What is affected, what to do

    Mount Manager in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT Gold and 8.1, and Windows 10 mishandles symlinks, which allows physically proximate attackers to execute arbitrary code by connecting a crafted USB device, aka "Mount Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability."

    The vulnerability is being actively exploited; treat it as a priority. The available sources name no fixed version. Check the vendor guidance in the references below. Immediate actions, mitigation and detection rules are in the runbook below.

    Affected
    • Microsoft Windows Server 2008 eq r2..r2
    • Microsoft Windows Server 2012 eq r2..r2

    Not sure whether and how you are affected? Ask a question about this vulnerability

    Metrics

    6.6

    Priority

    XIEM Effective CVSS: highest available CVSS rating from NVD and vendor data.

    Source: Vendor (CNA), CVSS v3

    6.6

    CVSS v3

    Severity Medium on the scale from 0 to 10.

    Source: CVE.org

    4.1 %

    EPSS score

    Moderate — model estimates 1-10% exploitation likelihood.

    Source: FIRST EPSS, percentile 90.7

    Show all metrics
    Severity
    Critical
    Priority (0–325)

    The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?

    Read in glossary
    198.75 Methodology
    Exploit maturity

    An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.

    Read in glossary
    actively exploited
    XIEM Effective CVSS

    XIEM® is the tiered managed-security operating model from NEOSEC and a registered trademark of NEOSEC GmbH. It extends classic SIEM — the central collection, normalisation and correlation of security-relevant events — with endpoint forensics, network visibility and deception technology, and consolidates them into three building tiers: Sentry, Orchestrate and Command.

    Read in glossary
    6.6 Methodology
    CVSS v3

    CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.

    Read in glossary
    6.6
    EPSS score

    The EPSS score is the absolute model output for an individual vulnerability: the estimated probability of real-world exploitation within the next 30 days, expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 % to 100 %). A score of 0.42 means „the model estimates a 42 % chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days“.

    Read in glossary
    4.1 %
    Moderate — model estimates 1-10% exploitation likelihood.
    EPSS percentile

    The EPSS percentile is the relative position of a vulnerability within all EPSS-scored CVEs, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A percentile of 0.90 means „this CVE has a higher EPSS score than 90 % of all other scored CVEs“. Unlike the EPSS score, it is not a probability — but a positioning within a ranking.

    Read in glossary
    90.7
    Critical — this CVE ranks in the top fifth of all CVEs scored today (rank ≥ 80%).
    KEV status

    The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.

    Read in glossary
    Actively exploited
    Published
    In CISA KEV since

    The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.

    Read in glossary
    CISA assessment (SSVC)
    Exploitation: active · not automatable · Technical impact: total
    Source: CISA Vulnrichment, as of 10 February 2025

    Response and mitigation

    Why act now?

    Prioritisation rationale

    This flaw is on KEV because crafted USB devices can abuse Mount Manager's broken symlink handling to run code with elevated privileges — a classic vector for targeted intrusions against physically accessible or air-gapped systems. Exploitation needs physical proximity and a low-privileged local session, but then yields full compromise of confidentiality, integrity and availability; exploitation likelihood is notably high for a physical-vector bug, and CISA does not flag known ransomware use. For most patched office estates this rates medium priority; it becomes high to critical for unpatched legacy hosts, publicly accessible workstations, and OT/critical-infrastructure sites where USB is the primary data transfer path.

    1. Runbook step 1

      Immediate response (0-24 h)

      • Verify patch status: Microsoft has released a security update for this Mount Manager flaw. Patch available from the vendor — look up the KB number and build in the vendor advisory for CVE-2015-1769. Reconcile installation status via WSUS/ConfigMgr/Intune compliance reports across all Windows clients and servers.
      • Hunt down legacy systems: Windows Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, RT/RT 8.1 and Server 2008/2008 R2 are end-of-life. Flag any host lacking the update or ESU coverage as high-risk in the asset inventory and patch or replace it first.
      • Physically exposed systems first: kiosks, reception PCs, control-room and HMI workstations, meeting-room PCs, branch-office and shop-floor machines — anywhere third parties can reach USB ports unattended — go into the first patch wave.
      • Block USB mass storage now wherever operations allow: GPO "Prevent installation of devices not described by other policy settings" or EDR device control (e.g. Defender for Endpoint Device Control) set to Deny for removable storage.
      • Triage suspected hosts: on physically accessible machines, review HKLM\SYSTEM\MountedDevices and USB history (HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR) for unknown devices.
    2. Runbook step 2

      Mitigation layers

      • Physical security: USB port locks/blockers on unattended endpoints, chassis seals, access control for server rooms and cabinets; password-protect BIOS/UEFI and disable USB boot.
      • Device control (GPO/MDM): allowlist by hardware/instance ID for approved devices (keyboard, mouse, managed encrypted drives); block the Disk Drives class {53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b} and WPD otherwise. Also enforce "Removable Disks: Deny execute access".
      • Disable AutoRun/AutoPlay: enforce HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\NoDriveTypeAutoRun = 0xFF and NoAutorun = 1 via GPO.
      • Endpoint hardening: application control (WDAC/AppLocker) denying execution from removable media; enable the ASR rule "Block untrusted and unsigned processes that run from USB".
      • Least privilege: keep local accounts on kiosk/shared systems minimally privileged, avoid auto-logon, enforce short screen-lock timeouts — exploitation requires a low-privileged session on the device.
      • OT/critical infrastructure: where patching is impossible, route all media through a scanning kiosk as the only permitted data path and disable USB on HMIs entirely.
    3. Runbook step 3

      Detection rules

      • Windows Security Event ID 6416 (enable Audit PNP Activity): new external device recognised. Sigma shape: EventID: 6416 AND ClassName: DiskDrive, weighted by host criticality; alert on kiosk/HMI/server assets.
      • Mount Manager registry writes: Sysmon EID 13 on TargetObject|startswith: 'HKLM\System\MountedDevices\' outside maintenance windows. KQL: DeviceRegistryEvents | where RegistryKey has "MountedDevices" | summarize count() by DeviceName, bin(Timestamp,1h).
      • Execution from removable media: Sysmon EID 1 / Event 4688 where Image resides on a non-system drive (e.g. E:\, F:\), or processes at IntegrityLevel: System with an unusual parent shortly after a USB mount (e.g. Explorer child → SYSTEM shell).
      • Removable storage auditing: Event ID 4663 (Audit Removable Storage) for write/execute access, plus Microsoft-Windows-Partition/Diagnostic Event 1006 to capture serial numbers of attached media.
      • EDR correlation: Defender DeviceEvents | where ActionType == "UsbDriveMounted" followed within 10 minutes by ProcessCreated with AccountName == "SYSTEM" and an unknown hash.

    Detection rules

    No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.

    Classification under NIS2 and CRA

    Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.

    NIS2

    NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.

    Read in glossary
    Actively exploited: treat the vulnerability as a priority in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2. If it is exploited in your environment, check the reporting obligation under Art. 23 (early warning within 24 hours).
    CRA

    The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.

    Read in glossary
    Since 11.09.2026, manufacturers of affected products with digital elements must report actively exploited vulnerabilities under Art. 14 CRA, with an early warning within 24 hours via ENISA's single reporting platform.
    ISO/IEC 27001

    ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.

    Read in glossary
    Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.

    Description

    Mount Manager in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT Gold and 8.1, and Windows 10 mishandles symlinks, which allows physically proximate attackers to execute arbitrary code by connecting a crafted USB device, aka "Mount Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability."

    Source: NVD (NIST), cvelistv5, CISA KEV Catalog, CVE.org (MITRE)

    Vendors and products

    Affected operating systems

    Affected operating systems
    Windowsmicrosoftwindows_10—
    Windowsmicrosoftwindows_7—
    Windowsmicrosoftwindows_8—
    Windowsmicrosoftwindows_8.1—
    Windowsmicrosoftwindows_rt—
    Windowsmicrosoftwindows_rt_8.1—
    Windowsmicrosoftwindows_server_2008r2
    Windowsmicrosoftwindows_server_2008—
    Windowsmicrosoftwindows_server_2012r2
    Windowsmicrosoftwindows_server_2012—
    Windowsmicrosoftwindows_vista—

    Public exploit references

    Publicly reported proof-of-concepts, exploit modules and detection templates for this vulnerability. NEOSEC links to the original sources only and does not provide any exploit code.

    Public exploit references
    CISA KEV CatalogCISA Known Exploited Vulnerability (opens in a new tab)cisa.govactively exploited

    References & sources

    • blogs.technet.comb/srd/archive/2015/08/11/defending-against-cve-2015-1769-a-logi…x_refsource_CONFIRM, Vendor advisory
    • docs.microsoft.comMS15-085Vendor advisory, x_refsource_MS, Patch, Vendor advisory
    • securitytracker.com1033244Vulnerability database, x_refsource_SECTRACK, Third-party advisory, Vulnerability database
    • cisa.govknown-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2015-1769government-resource, US government resource
    Embed badge

    Show the severity and KEV status of this vulnerability on your site – with a link back here. The image is updated hourly.

    Badge preview for CVE-2015-1769
    <a href="https://intel.neosec.eu/en/cve/CVE-2015-1769"><img src="https://intel.neosec.eu/badge/cve/CVE-2015-1769.svg?lang=en" alt="CVE-2015-1769 – NEOSEC Intel" height="20"></a>