Microsoft Windows Kernel Exception Handler Vulnerability (CVE-2010-0232)
Published In CISA KEV since Sources: CVE.org
What is affected, what to do
The kernel in Microsoft Windows NT 3.1 through Windows 7, including Windows 2000 SP4, Windows XP SP2 and SP3, Windows Server 2003 SP2, Windows Vista Gold, SP1, and SP2, and Windows Server 2008 Gold and SP2, when access to 16-bit applications is enabled on a 32-bit x86 platform, does not properly validate certain BIOS calls, which allows local users to gain privileges by crafting a VDM_TIB data structure in the Thread Environment Block (TEB), and then calling the NtVdmControl function to start the Windows Virtual DOS Machine (aka NTVDM) subsystem, leading to improperly handled exceptions involving the #GP trap handler (nt!KiTrap0D), aka "Windows Kernel Exception Handler Vulnerability."
The vulnerability is being actively exploited; treat it as a priority. The available sources name no fixed version. Check the vendor guidance in the references below. Immediate actions, mitigation and detection rules are in the runbook below.
Not sure whether and how you are affected? Ask a question about this vulnerability
Metrics
7.8
Priority
XIEM Effective CVSS: highest available CVSS rating from NVD and vendor data.
Source: NVD, CVSS v3
7.8
CVSS v3
Severity High on the scale from 0 to 10.
Source: CVE.org
28.7 %
EPSS score
Elevated — model estimates 10-50% exploitation likelihood.
Source: FIRST EPSS, percentile 98.1
Show all metrics
- Severity
- Critical
Priority (0–325)
The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?
Read in glossary- 216.05 Methodology
Exploit maturity
An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.
Read in glossary- actively exploited
XIEM Effective CVSS
XIEM® is the tiered managed-security operating model from NEOSEC and a registered trademark of NEOSEC GmbH. It extends classic SIEM — the central collection, normalisation and correlation of security-relevant events — with endpoint forensics, network visibility and deception technology, and consolidates them into three building tiers: Sentry, Orchestrate and Command.
Read in glossary- 7.8 Methodology
CVSS v3
CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.
Read in glossary- 7.8
EPSS score
The EPSS score is the absolute model output for an individual vulnerability: the estimated probability of real-world exploitation within the next 30 days, expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 % to 100 %). A score of 0.42 means „the model estimates a 42 % chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days“.
Read in glossary- 28.7 %
- Elevated — model estimates 10-50% exploitation likelihood.
EPSS percentile
The EPSS percentile is the relative position of a vulnerability within all EPSS-scored CVEs, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A percentile of 0.90 means „this CVE has a higher EPSS score than 90 % of all other scored CVEs“. Unlike the EPSS score, it is not a probability — but a positioning within a ranking.
Read in glossary- 98.1
- Critical — this CVE ranks in the top fifth of all CVEs scored today (rank ≥ 80%).
KEV status
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- Actively exploited
- Published
In CISA KEV since
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- CISA assessment (SSVC)
- Exploitation: active · not automatable · Technical impact: total
- Source: CISA Vulnrichment, as of 4 February 2025
Response and mitigation
Why act now?
Prioritisation rationale
This CVE sits on KEV because working exploit code (Tavis Ormandy, January 2010) has been public for well over a decade and is bundled into standard post-exploitation toolkits such as Metasploit — any attacker with a local user shell uses it as a reliable SYSTEM-escalation primitive on 32-bit legacy Windows. The CVSS vector profile (local, low complexity, low privileges required) makes it the canonical second step after phishing-based initial access, and its EPSS signal places it among the CVEs most likely to be exploited anywhere in the catalogue. Prioritise by exposure: 32-bit legacy terminal servers, production OT workstations and multi-user developer VMs before single-user office endpoints, because concurrent local access is what makes the vector realistic. 64-bit systems are not affected and can be adjusted downward in your risk scoring.
Runbook step 1
Immediate response (0-24 h)
- Deploy Microsoft patch MS10-015 (KB977165) across every 32-bit x86 host running Windows 2000, XP, Server 2003, Vista, Server 2008 or Windows 7 — this is the only full fix for the nt!KiTrap0D #GP-trap-handler flaw.
- Inventory first: use SCCM/Intune, WMI or PowerShell (
Get-HotFix -Id KB977165) to identify unpatched systems. 64-bit installations are unaffected and can be deprioritised. - For systems that cannot be patched immediately, disable the NTVDM subsystem via Group Policy
Computer Configuration → Administrative Templates → Windows Components → Application Compatibility → Prevent access to 16-bit applications = Enabledor registryHKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatibility\VDMDisallowed = 1. - Audit local accounts on affected hosts — the exploit requires authenticated local access. Reduce interactive logon rights to the minimum; treat shared workstations and terminal/RDS servers with the highest urgency.
- Move out-of-support legacy systems (NT 3.1-2000, XP SP2) into isolated VLANs, cut internet egress and open a migration ticket — one patch does not remove the long tail of further unpatchable kernel bugs.
Runbook step 2
Mitigation layers
- Configuration hardening: push the "disable 16-bit applications" GPO estate-wide; the NtVdmControl attack path becomes unreachable even though the kernel defect itself remains.
- Least privilege: enforce standard-user baseline, configure AppLocker / SRP so users cannot execute unknown binaries from
%TEMP%,%APPDATA%or removable media. The exploit requires running a local binary. - Endpoint hardening: enable EDR kernel-exploit telemetry (Defender for Endpoint, CrowdStrike, Elastic); set child-process policies for
ntvdm.exeto alert or block. - Network segmentation: place legacy hosts in dedicated VLANs behind jump hosts, no outbound internet, no SMB shares into production. Local privilege escalation itself is network-independent, but this breaks the payload delivery chain.
- IAM: audit service accounts on legacy hosts, strip interactive logon rights, individualise local admin passwords via LAPS so a successful LPE does not pivot laterally through pass-the-hash.
- Patch-monitoring SLA: report legacy patch compliance on a separate dashboard so it is not hidden behind modern-OS metrics; monthly KPI review at CISO level.
Runbook step 3
Detection rules
- Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create) with
Imageendingntvdm.exeas a baseline alert. In a modern estate NTVDM should essentially never start; each instance warrants triage. KQL:DeviceProcessEvents | where FileName =~ "ntvdm.exe" | project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, AccountName. - Windows Security Event ID 4688 with parent-child chain
cmd.exe → ntvdm.exeor a user-launched 16-bit binary (.com, MZ-header executable without PE signature). Especially suspicious: parent is an Office process or a browser-downloaded file. - Sysmon Event ID 11 (File Create) in
%TEMP%or user-writable paths followed within seconds byntvdm.exeexecution from the same path — classic exploit-dropper signature. - Windows Event ID 1001 (Windows Error Reporting) or Event ID 41 (unexpected reboot) on the same host shortly after NTVDM launch indicates a failed exploit attempt that triggered a kernel panic in the nt!KiTrap0D path.
- Sigma shape:
detection: selection: EventID: 1 Image|endswith: '\ntvdm.exe' condition: selection, enriched withUser != 'SYSTEM'and correlated against a subsequent EID 4672 (Special Privileges Assigned) within 60 seconds.
- Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create) with
Detection rules
No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.
Classification under NIS2 and CRA
Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.
NIS2
NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.
Read in glossary- Actively exploited: treat the vulnerability as a priority in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2. If it is exploited in your environment, check the reporting obligation under Art. 23 (early warning within 24 hours).
CRA
The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.
Read in glossary- Since 11.09.2026, manufacturers of affected products with digital elements must report actively exploited vulnerabilities under Art. 14 CRA, with an early warning within 24 hours via ENISA's single reporting platform.
ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.
Read in glossary- Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.
Description
The kernel in Microsoft Windows NT 3.1 through Windows 7, including Windows 2000 SP4, Windows XP SP2 and SP3, Windows Server 2003 SP2, Windows Vista Gold, SP1, and SP2, and Windows Server 2008 Gold and SP2, when access to 16-bit applications is enabled on a 32-bit x86 platform, does not properly validate certain BIOS calls, which allows local users to gain privileges by crafting a VDM_TIB data structure in the Thread Environment Block (TEB), and then calling the NtVdmControl function to start the Windows Virtual DOS Machine (aka NTVDM) subsystem, leading to improperly handled exceptions involving the #GP trap handler (nt!KiTrap0D), aka "Windows Kernel Exception Handler Vulnerability."
Source: NVD (NIST), cvelistv5, CISA KEV Catalog, CVE.org (MITRE)
Vendors and products
Affected operating systems
| Windows | microsoft | windows_2000 | — |
| Windows | microsoft | windows_7 | — |
| Windows | microsoft | windows_xp | — |
Public exploit references
Publicly reported proof-of-concepts, exploit modules and detection templates for this vulnerability. NEOSEC links to the original sources only and does not provide any exploit code.
| CISA KEV Catalog | CISA Known Exploited Vulnerability (opens in a new tab)cisa.gov | actively exploited | |
| Reference tagged as exploit | seclists.org (opens in a new tab) | PoC (publicly reported)reported, not verified | — |
References & sources
- lists.immunitysec.com[dailydave] 20100119 We hold these axioms to be self evidentMailing list, x_refsource_MLIST, Broken link
- lock.cmpxchg8b.comc0af0967d904cef2ad4db766a00bc6af/KiTrap0D.zipx_refsource_MISC, Broken link, Exploit
- blogs.technet.commsrc/archive/2010/01/20/security-advisory-979682-released.aspxx_refsource_CONFIRM, Broken link
- docs.microsoft.comMS10-015Vendor advisory, x_refsource_MS, Patch, Vendor advisory
- microsoft.comtechnet/security/advisory/979682.mspxx_refsource_CONFIRM, Broken link, Patch, Vendor advisory
- us-cert.govTA10-040AThird-party advisory, x_refsource_CERT, Third-party advisory, US government resource
- securitytracker.com1023471Vulnerability database, x_refsource_SECTRACK, Broken link, Third-party advisory, Vulnerability database
- seclists.org20100119 Microsoft Windows NT #GP Trap Handler Allows Users to Switch Kernel StackMailing list, x_refsource_FULLDISC, Exploit, Mailing list, Third-party advisory
- vupen.comADV-2010-0179Vulnerability database, x_refsource_VUPEN, Broken link, Vendor advisory
- securityfocus.com37864Vulnerability database, x_refsource_BID, Broken link, Exploit, Third-party advisory, Vulnerability database
- secunia.com38265Third-party advisory, x_refsource_SECUNIA, Broken link, Vendor advisory
- securityfocus.com20100119 Microsoft Windows NT #GP Trap Handler Allows Users to Switch Kernel StackMailing list, x_refsource_BUGTRAQ, Broken link, Third-party advisory, Vulnerability database
- exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.comms-win-gptrap-privilege-escalation(55742)Vulnerability database, x_refsource_XF, Third-party advisory, Vulnerability database
- oval.cisecurity.orgoval:org.mitre.oval:def:8344Vulnerability database, signature, x_refsource_OVAL, Broken link
- cisa.govknown-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2010-0232government-resource, US government resource
Embed badge
Show the severity and KEV status of this vulnerability on your site – with a link back here. The image is updated hourly.
<a href="https://intel.neosec.eu/en/cve/CVE-2010-0232"><img src="https://intel.neosec.eu/badge/cve/CVE-2010-0232.svg?lang=en" alt="CVE-2010-0232 – NEOSEC Intel" height="20"></a>