Highpwn_watch:artex-ai-pentest-backdoored-docker-image-tomicdd

    Backdoored ARTEX Docker image (tomicdd/artex) gives anyone an unauthenticated root shell

    Published Sources: pwn.watch

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    What is affected, what to do

    After the author of ARTEX, an open-source AI penetration-testing console abused in attacks on banks, took the GitHub repository down on Oct 8 2026, a copycat repository (trhhubsd/ARTEX, the most-starred copy) changed one line in docker-compose.yml to pull a Docker Hub image, tomicdd/artex, pushed the same day. BadByte found that the image's binary, unlike the clean GitHub source, adds a hidden verifyCaptcha() function to the login handler: if the CAPTCHA field starts with a secret marker, the rest runs through sh -c as root and the output is returned, before any credential check.

    The available sources name no fixed version. Check the vendor guidance in the references below.

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    Metrics

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    Priority

    No value is available for this vulnerability.

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    CVSS v3

    No value is available for this vulnerability.

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    EPSS score

    No value is available for this vulnerability.

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    Severity
    High
    Priority (0–325)

    The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?

    Read in glossary
    29.89 Methodology
    Exploit maturity

    An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.

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    no public PoC known
    KEV status

    The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.

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    Published

    Classification under NIS2 and CRA

    Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.

    NIS2

    NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.

    Read in glossary
    High technical severity: assess and remediate the vulnerability in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2 and document the decision.
    CRA

    The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.

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    From 11.12.2027, Annex I Part II CRA requires manufacturers of affected products with digital elements to handle vulnerabilities without delay and provide security updates.
    ISO/IEC 27001

    ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.

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    Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.

    Description

    After the author of ARTEX, an open-source AI penetration-testing console abused in attacks on banks, took the GitHub repository down on Oct 8 2026, a copycat repository (trhhubsd/ARTEX, the most-starred copy) changed one line in docker-compose.yml to pull a Docker Hub image, tomicdd/artex, pushed the same day. BadByte found that the image's binary, unlike the clean GitHub source, adds a hidden verifyCaptcha() function to the login handler: if the CAPTCHA field starts with a secret marker, the rest runs through sh -c as root and the output is returned, before any credential check. The image had 7,946 pulls by Nov 3 (about 9,000 by Nov 5), 637 GitHub repositories still pointed their compose file at it, and 62 internet-facing consoles served the backdoored build between Nov 2 and 4. congdonglinux/artex is a byte-identical re-push. If you ran either image, treat the host and every key in the container (database password, LLM and search API keys, harvested target credentials, JWT signing key) as compromised, rebuild from reviewed source and keep the console off the open internet.

    Source: pwn.watch