Malicious code in seapy-ops (PyPI)
Published Sources: OSV (Schadpakete)
- Malicious package
What is affected, what to do
Uninstall the package, isolate affected environments and rotate credentials that were available during installation.
Not sure whether and how you are affected? Ask a question about this vulnerability
Malicious package
PyPIseapy-ops
“seapy-ops” is registered as malicious in the PyPI repository. Anyone who installed the package should uninstall it immediately, isolate affected environments and rotate credentials that were present during installation.
Affected versions (6)
- 1.0.0
- 1.0.1
- 1.0.2
- 1.1.0
- 1.1.1
- 1.1.2
purl: pkg:pypi/seapy-ops
Sources (6)
amazon-inspector
IN-MAL-2026-021876Versions from this source: 1.0.0
sha256: d8d2daddd9187d69dfdf3f8681bbe2628611f183251bc21a99534824493c1f7c
amazon-inspector
IN-MAL-2026-021875Versions from this source: 1.1.0
sha256: decbcc856ef2954b9b92e52bcd6205a1973d75d32bf9fd8b73dd4b96e6682bb8
amazon-inspector
IN-MAL-2026-021858Versions from this source: 1.1.1
sha256: 43f7e546f4f8d080161c007fcc97c630b09f15d639cbec380a82af52b20cc0aa
amazon-inspector
IN-MAL-2026-021857Versions from this source: 1.1.2
sha256: 883d43013b1f974ba316ad87d630e6c0d4e60139a68dff7b379b38cbb91c82e2
amazon-inspector
IN-MAL-2026-021977Versions from this source: 1.0.2
sha256: b3d00a38eb94b805de42b8e32d3f7d3315001e390c0128254d8fe879f460af28
amazon-inspector
IN-MAL-2026-021862Versions from this source: 1.0.1
sha256: d18aa3db0c7e9503f9c04b40c24de3e940030452b0c13417d2e1157b32b5b70f
The OSSF `malicious-packages` namespace lists packages flagged as malicious by static analysis or sandbox detonation. An entry here is a confirmed finding, not a suspicion.
Metrics
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Priority
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CVSS v3
No value is available for this vulnerability.
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EPSS score
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Show all metrics
- Severity
- High
Priority (0–325)
The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?
Read in glossary- 30.00 Methodology
Exploit maturity
An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.
Read in glossary- no public PoC known
KEV status
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- —
- Published
Classification under NIS2 and CRA
Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.
NIS2
NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.
Read in glossary- High technical severity: assess and remediate the vulnerability in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2 and document the decision.
CRA
The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.
Read in glossary- From 11.12.2027, Annex I Part II CRA requires manufacturers of affected products with digital elements to handle vulnerabilities without delay and provide security updates.
ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.
Read in glossary- Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.
Description
In seapy-ops versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2, 1.1.0, 1.1.1, and 1.1.2, an advertised local file analysis tool conceals folder collection and upload commands behind an unlock gate. Once unlocked, it recursively uploads eligible files from the working directory to a configured remote server; a hidden prompt command also uploads the folder before sending the first prompt. File symlinks can expose content outside that directory. Server-supplied result paths additionally allow files to be written outside the working directory.
Versions 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 instead present a Python REPL that silently sends eligible single-token input to the server as an unlock password, subject to filtering and attempt limits. Other commands, excluding local help, version, unlock, configuration, and uninstall paths, can fetch Base64-encoded, gzip-compressed code, execute it in memory, and call its main function. Loader errors are disguised as Python file-not-found errors.
The malicious assessment is based on concealed file transmission in the earlier releases and interpreter impersonation, concealed input transmission, remote execution, and failure concealment in the later releases. Official distributions were verified against PyPI digests. Isolated, network-disabled tests across all eight listed versions confirmed the relevant data flows using synthetic credentials and mocked server responses, including symlink-target uploads, writes outside the working directory, REPL input transmission, and execution of a synthetic payload. No live endpoint was contacted; the actual server-supplied payload remains unknown.
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (883d43013b1f974ba316ad87d630e6c0d4e60139a68dff7b379b38cbb91c82e2)
seapy-ops presents itself in its README as a stdlib-only local file inspection tool (strings/sum/steg/crypto/hints/scan), but cli.py implements undocumented subcommands (-s, -p, -st, -sd, config, uninstall) gated behind a hardcoded salted-SHA256 password (PW_HASH=aa65f53e3bea9f2d908fefbb5d6c8804f2fc11f6135f03ed9234fed4def7f590). Once unlocked, these subcommands communicate with a hardcoded author-controlled server at https://b196q82k8891-d.space-z.ai (fallback https://preview-chat-960504a9-b4e0-4b69-bc80-6ac3d4fa4ae0.space-z.ai, overridable via SEAPY_SERVER). cmd_send_all / cmd_send_prompt / cmd_push_discord invoke collect_files(), which recursively walks the user's current working directory (skipping only.git/pycache/node_modules/.venv/venv/.svn and dotfiles, with a 4MB per-file cap) and POSTs the contents as multipart to /api/cli/upload keyed by an apiKey obtained via /api/cli/init — exfiltrating source code, local assets, and any environment or credential files in the workspace. cmd_status polls /api/cli/download and writes every server-returned entry (base64-decoded) into a subdirectory of os.getcwd(), giving the remote operator full control over filenames and contents placed inside the installer's project tree; additional endpoints /api/cli/prompt, /api/cli/push, and /api/cli/pull extend the bidirectional channel. load_config() silently migrates configuration from ~/.verity, ~/.fpeek, and ~/.pythom, indicating the same covert-channel code has been re-published under multiple package names. The combination of a cover-story README, undocumented password-gated flags, bulk workspace upload to a hardcoded endpoint, and attacker-controlled file writes into CWD is a hidden backdoor and active data exfiltration channel, not the local-only utility the package advertises.