CriticalCVE-2026-117601

    Electrum before 4.8.3 Missing Signature Verification of Mempool Transactions (CVE-2026-117601)

    Published Last modified Sources: pwn.watch, OSV, Hersteller, CVE.org

    What is affected, what to do

    The vulnerability is being actively exploited; treat it as a priority. Update Spesmilo Electrum to version 4.8.3.

    Affected
    • Spesmilo Electrum lt *..4.8.3
    Fixed in
    • Spesmilo Electrum 4.8.3

    Not sure whether and how you are affected? Ask a question about this vulnerability

    Metrics

    9.3

    Priority

    XIEM Effective CVSS: highest available CVSS rating from NVD and vendor data.

    Source: Vendor (CNA), CVSS v4

    7.5

    CVSS v3

    Severity High on the scale from 0 to 10.

    Source: pwn.watch, OSV, Hersteller, CVE.org

    0.2 %

    EPSS score

    Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.

    Source: FIRST EPSS, percentile 7.1

    Show all metrics
    Severity
    Critical
    Priority (0–325)

    The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?

    Read in glossary
    76.50 Methodology
    Exploit maturity

    An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.

    Read in glossary
    actively exploitedSource: VulnCheck KEV (opens in a new tab) How we classify
    XIEM Effective CVSS

    XIEM® is the tiered managed-security operating model from NEOSEC and a registered trademark of NEOSEC GmbH. It extends classic SIEM — the central collection, normalisation and correlation of security-relevant events — with endpoint forensics, network visibility and deception technology, and consolidates them into three building tiers: Sentry, Orchestrate and Command.

    Read in glossary
    9.3 Methodology
    CVSS v3

    CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.

    Read in glossary
    7.5
    CVSS v4

    CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.

    Read in glossary
    9.3
    EPSS score

    The EPSS score is the absolute model output for an individual vulnerability: the estimated probability of real-world exploitation within the next 30 days, expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 % to 100 %). A score of 0.42 means „the model estimates a 42 % chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days“.

    Read in glossary
    0.2 %
    Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.
    EPSS percentile

    The EPSS percentile is the relative position of a vulnerability within all EPSS-scored CVEs, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A percentile of 0.90 means „this CVE has a higher EPSS score than 90 % of all other scored CVEs“. Unlike the EPSS score, it is not a probability — but a positioning within a ranking.

    Read in glossary
    7.1
    Low — this CVE sits in the lower 10% of all CVEs scored today.
    KEV status

    The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.

    Read in glossary
    —
    Published
    CWE

    CWE is a catalogue of typical weakness types in software and hardware — such as flawed input validation, unsafe memory handling or poor authentication. Where a CVE names a concrete vulnerability in a concrete product, a CWE describes the underlying class of defect.

    Read in glossary
    CWE-347

    Detection rules

    No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.

    Classification under NIS2 and CRA

    Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.

    NIS2

    NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.

    Read in glossary
    Actively exploited: treat the vulnerability as a priority in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2. If it is exploited in your environment, check the reporting obligation under Art. 23 (early warning within 24 hours).
    CRA

    The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.

    Read in glossary
    Since 11.09.2026, manufacturers of affected products with digital elements must report actively exploited vulnerabilities under Art. 14 CRA, with an early warning within 24 hours via ENISA's single reporting platform.
    ISO/IEC 27001

    ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.

    Read in glossary
    Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.

    Description

    Summary

    The main Electrum server the client connects to is trusted with mempool ("unconfirmed") transactions. This is documented design. [0]

    However now someone figured out a way to practically exploit it:

    • when the client broadcasts a new tx1, a malicious server can swallow it,
    • and update the client's history with a conflicting (invalid) tx2 that replaces the outputs with the attacker's output address.
    • Tx2 has invalid signatures, but this is not checked (due to light client design).
    • The wallet will display tx2 as an unconfirmed transaction - tx1 will not be displayed.
    • If the client then manually RBF fee-bumps tx2, the client will sign it with a higher fee, and hence pay the attacker.

    Fixes

    Commit 90fe30822 contains the fix [1], included in version 4.8.3. The client now verifies the signatures of wallet.is_mine inputs for mempool txs (before adding them to its local history).

    Users should upgrade (and regularly do so in any case). As a workaround, without upgrading, when signing any transaction, for bumping the fee or not, they should verify the output addresses and amounts are as expected.

    Clients that connect to servers they trust (e.g. run their own) are not affected.

    Remarks

    • some servers are performing this attack in the wild
    • electrum received two user-reports of this. user1 noticed after broadcasting tx1 the wallet history contained a different tx. user2 bumped the fee of tx2 and lost money.
    • user1 reported tx1 was not propagated over the bitcoin p2p, so the server held it
    • both reported the attacker's output address in tx2 was grinded to match the last four chars of the legit address from tx1
    • based on user2's report, the server constructed a tx2 with zero fee (presumably in hope of the user bumping its fee)
    • even with the fix, we still only validate "is_mine" inputs (i.e. paying from addresses that the wallet owns). So e.g. "incoming" txs are not validated. The client lacks a full consensus engine / script interpreter, though even with that, to cover non-is_mine inputs, it would have to validate the unconfirmed parents recursively until reaching mined txs. Mined txs we already SPV.

    Timeline

    • 2026-10-11: user1 sends private disclosure, but the bump_fee vector is not realised
    • 2026-10-18: user2 (Raju-K12) reports privately that they lost money after bump_fee
    • 2026-10-23: version 4.8.3 git tagged, with the fix
    • 2026-10-24: version 4.8.3 binaries released
    • 2026-10-24: public disclosure

    Credits

    Electrum thanks user1 and Raju-K12 for finding and responsibly disclosing this issue to us.

    Source: pwn.watch, OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities), GitHub Security Advisories, cvelistv5, NVD (NIST)

    Affected products

    The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.

    Affected products
    Affected versionsFixed in
    spesmiloelectrum
    • < 4.8.3
    • 4.8.3
    pipelectrum
    • < 4.8.3
    • 4.8.3
    pypielectrum
    • 0
    • —
    • —
    • 4.8.3

    Vendors and products

    Weakness classes (CWE)

    • CWE-347Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

      Base

      The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data.

      Entry at MITRE CWE-347

    References & sources

    • github.comPatch CommitPatch, web
    • github.comGHSA-6jp4-8v48-cc5v: Malicious server can replace a just-broadcast tx and try to trick user into RBF-ing itpwn-watch, Vendor advisory, web
    • vulncheck.comVulnCheck Advisory: Electrum before 4.8.3 Missing Signature Verification of Mempool TransactionsThird-party advisory, web
    • pwn.watchpwn.watch: Electrum wallet: malicious servers swap just-sent transactions and trick users into fee-bumping a payment to the attackerpwn-watch
    • raw.githubusercontent.comElectrum release notes (4.8.3 security update)pwn-watch
    • news.bitcoin.comElectrum Wallet Attack Hid Bitcoin Theft Behind a Fee Increasepwn-watch
    • thedefiant.ioElectrum Patches Wallet Flaw Exploited Through Malicious Serverspwn-watch
    • NVD (NIST)vuln/detail/CVE-2026-117601advisory
    • github.comspesmilo/electrumpackage
    • binance.comen/square/post/381361716824742web

    Changes to this CVE

    Who changed this CVE and when: NVD (analysis, affected products, CVSS), the CVE publisher (CNA) and additional providers such as CISA (ADP).

    1. Record modifiedCISA ADP

      CISA assessment (SSVC): exploitation: none known, automatable: yes

      Show the original change
      Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
      TypeActionBeforeAfter
      SSVC assessmentadded
      —
      {"id":"CVE-2026-117601","role":"CISA Coordinator","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"yes"},{"technicalImpact":"total"}],"version":"2.0.3","timestamp":"2026-10-28T15:56:45.794314Z"}

      Source identifier: 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0

    2. ReceivedVulnCheck

      Show 8 original changes
      Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
      TypeActionBeforeAfter
      Descriptionadded
      —
      Electrum before 4.8.3 fails to verify signatures of wallet-owned inputs in unconfirmed mempool transactions, allowing malicious servers to replace a just-broadcast transaction with a conflicting one. Attackers can swallow the user's transaction and display an invalid zero-fee copy paying an attacker address, tricking users into RBF fee-bumping and signing it.
      CVSSadded
      —
      AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
      CVSSadded
      —
      AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
      Weakness type (CWE)added
      —
      CWE-347
      Affected versions (publisher)added
      —
      New affected value received. <a href="https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/117xxx/CVE-2026-117601.json">CVE-2026-117601</a>
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://github.com/spesmilo/electrum/commit/90fe30822561e515a9d2d6e5a352cc07780999eb
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://github.com/spesmilo/electrum/security/advisories/GHSA-6jp4-8v48-cc5v
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/electrum-before-4.8.3-missing-signature-verification-of-mempool-transactions

      Source identifier: disclosure@vulncheck.com

    Embed badge

    Show the severity and KEV status of this vulnerability on your site – with a link back here. The image is updated hourly.

    Badge preview for CVE-2026-117601
    <a href="https://intel.neosec.eu/en/cve/CVE-2026-117601"><img src="https://intel.neosec.eu/badge/cve/CVE-2026-117601.svg?lang=en" alt="CVE-2026-117601 – NEOSEC Intel" height="20"></a>