Lowghsa:GHSA-c33x-vcv4-vg3g

    @cedar-policy/cedar-wasm: Improper Input Validation (ghsa:GHSA-c33x-vcv4-vg3g)

    Published Sources: Hersteller

    What is affected, what to do

    Update @cedar-policy/cedar-wasm to version 3.4.3, cedar-policy to version 3.4.3.

    Not sure whether and how you are affected? Ask a question about this vulnerability

    Metrics

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    Priority

    No value is available for this vulnerability.

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    CVSS v3

    No value is available for this vulnerability.

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    EPSS score

    No value is available for this vulnerability.

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    Severity
    Low
    Priority (0–325)

    The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?

    Read in glossary
    30.00 Methodology
    Exploit maturity

    An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.

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    no public PoC known
    KEV status

    The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.

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    —
    Published
    CWE

    CWE is a catalogue of typical weakness types in software and hardware — such as flawed input validation, unsafe memory handling or poor authentication. Where a CVE names a concrete vulnerability in a concrete product, a CWE describes the underlying class of defect.

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    CWE-20

    Classification under NIS2 and CRA

    Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.

    NIS2

    NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.

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    Handle the vulnerability in regular vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2.
    CRA

    The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.

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    From 11.12.2027, Annex I Part II CRA requires manufacturers of affected products with digital elements to handle vulnerabilities without delay and provide security updates.
    ISO/IEC 27001

    ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.

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    Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.

    Description

    Cedar users must be using all of the following features to be affected by this advisory: JSON format policies, policy templates, and the is in scope condition. This advisory only affects JSON-formatted Cedar policy templates containing is in scope conditions that are malformed according to the Cedar syntax. It does not affect syntactically well-formed policies.

    Users of Cedar who author policies in the JSON format were able to write Cedar policies using the is in condition with an incorrect slot identifier in the principal and resource scope constraints (e.g., ?principal in the resource scope constraint) even though this is not allowed when parsing policies from the Cedar policy syntax. Internally, the slot identifiers were silently corrected (e.g. ?resource is placed in the resource scope constraint).

    If the policy contains exactly one slot in either the principal or resource position, then any attempt to create a linked policy from the template results in an error: the internal representation of the template does not contain the slot identifier as written in the malformed JSON policy (it has been corrected silently), so attempting to fill that slot is an error. If instead the template is linked using slot identifier expected internally (i.e., not what is written in the JSON template), the linking will initially succeed, but a subsequent invariant violation will cause a panic.

    When the template contains slots in both the principal and resource position, then both slots will be present in the internal representation: linking succeeds, but with each slot bound to the value intended for the other (the silent correction). The linked policy is then semantically different from the malformed policy the user intended, and any subsequent authorization decision made against that policy may lead to accesses being unintentionally allowed or denied.

    Concretely, consider the following JSON format policy template intended to deny users in a particular project from accessing documents with a particular classification.

    {
      "effect": "forbid",
      "principal": {
        "op": "is",
        "entity_type": "User",
        "in": { "slot": "?resource" }
      },
      "action": { "op": "All" },
      "resource": {
        "op": "is",
        "entity_type": "Doc",
        "in": { "slot": "?principal" }
      },
      "conditions": []
    }
    

    Linked with ?principal = Classification::"topsecret" and ?resource = Project::"alpha", the author expects to create the policy:

    forbid(principal is User in Project::"alpha", action, resource is Doc in Classification::"topsecret");
    

    But because Cedar internally links slots by scope position (not by name), the actual policy evaluated by the engine is:

    forbid(principal is User in Classification::"topsecret", action, resource is Doc in Project::"alpha");
    

    If a user is in Project::"alpha" but not Classification::"topsecret", the forbid policy does not apply, and access is unintentionally allowed.

    Patches

    This advisory is patched in version 4.11.1 and 3.4.3, both available on Crates.io and NPM.

    Workarounds

    If you cannot update to a patched version, you can determine if you are affected by checking your JSON format policy templates for the following two patterns.

      "principal": {
        "op": "is",
        "entity_type": "User",
        "in": { "slot": "?resource" }
      }
    

    and

      "resource": {
        "op": "is",
        "entity_type": "Doc",
        "in": { "slot": "?principal" }
      }
    

    References

    Source: GitHub Security Advisories

    Affected products

    The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.

    Affected products
    Affected versionsFixed in
    npm@cedar-policy/cedar-wasm
    • >= 3.2.0, < 3.4.3
    • >= 4.0.1, < 4.11.1
    • 3.4.3
    • 4.11.1
    rustcedar-policy
    • >= 3.0.0, < 3.4.3
    • >= 4.0.0, < 4.11.1
    • 3.4.3
    • 4.11.1

    Vendors and products

    Weakness classes (CWE)

    • CWE-20Improper Input Validation

      Class

      The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.

      Entry at MITRE CWE-20