Daemon Tools Lite Embedded Malicious Code Vulnerability (CVE-2026-8398)
Published Last modified In CISA KEV since Sources: CVE.org, EUVD
What is affected, what to do
A supply chain attack compromised the official installation packages of DAEMON Tools Lite (Windows versions 12.5.0.2421 through 12.5.0.2434), distributed from the legitimate website daemon-tools.cc between approximately April 8, 2026, and May 5, 2026. Attackers gained unauthorized access to the vendor's (AVB Disc Soft) build or distribution infrastructure and trojanized three binaries: DTHelper.exe, DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe, and DTShellHlp.exe. These files were digitally signed with the legitimate AVB Disc Soft code-signing certificate, allowing the malicious installers to appear trustworthy and bypass signature-based detection.
The vulnerability is being actively exploited; treat it as a priority. The available sources name no fixed version. Check the vendor guidance in the references below. Immediate actions, mitigation and detection rules are in the runbook below.
- Affected
- AVB Disc Soft DAEMON Tools Lite
gte 12.5.0.2421..*
- AVB Disc Soft DAEMON Tools Lite
Not sure whether and how you are affected? Ask a question about this vulnerability
Metrics
9.8
XIEM Effective CVSS
Highest available CVSS rating from NVD and vendor data.
Source: NVD, CVSS v3
9.8
CVSS v3
Severity Critical on the scale from 0 to 10.
Source: CVE.org, EUVD
1.5 %
EPSS score
Moderate — model estimates 1-10% exploitation likelihood.
Source: FIRST EPSS, percentile 74.0
Show all metrics
- Severity
- Critical
Priority (0–325)
The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?
Read in glossary- 209.75 Methodology
Exploit maturity
An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.
Read in glossary- actively exploitedSource: VulnCheck KEV (opens in a new tab) How we classify
XIEM Effective CVSS
XIEM® is the tiered managed-security operating model from NEOSEC and a registered trademark of NEOSEC GmbH. It extends classic SIEM — the central collection, normalisation and correlation of security-relevant events — with endpoint forensics, network visibility and deception technology, and consolidates them into three building tiers: Sentry, Orchestrate and Command.
Read in glossary- 9.8 Methodology
CVSS v3
CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.
Read in glossary- 9.8
CVSS v4
CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.
Read in glossary- 9.3
EPSS score
The EPSS score is the absolute model output for an individual vulnerability: the estimated probability of real-world exploitation within the next 30 days, expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 % to 100 %). A score of 0.42 means „the model estimates a 42 % chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days“.
Read in glossary- 1.5 %
- Moderate — model estimates 1-10% exploitation likelihood.
EPSS percentile
The EPSS percentile is the relative position of a vulnerability within all EPSS-scored CVEs, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A percentile of 0.90 means „this CVE has a higher EPSS score than 90 % of all other scored CVEs“. Unlike the EPSS score, it is not a probability — but a positioning within a ranking.
Read in glossary- 74.0
- High — this CVE ranks above the median of all CVEs scored today (rank ≥ 36%).
KEV status
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- Actively exploited
- Published
In CISA KEV since
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- CISA assessment (SSVC)
- Exploitation: active · automatable · Technical impact: total
- Source: CISA Vulnrichment, as of 15 May 2026
CWE
CWE is a catalogue of typical weakness types in software and hardware — such as flawed input validation, unsafe memory handling or poor authentication. Where a CVE names a concrete vulnerability in a concrete product, a CWE describes the underlying class of defect.
Read in glossary- CWE-506
Response and mitigation
Why act now?
Prioritisation rationale
This entry is on KEV because official, validly signed installers shipped malicious code. Code-signing checks and vendor reputation therefore offered no protection, and every install in the window amounts to a successful initial compromise with no further attacker effort. The model-based exploitation estimate looks moderate, but it captures supply-chain compromises poorly. What matters is simply whether an affected build was installed. CISA does not flag ransomware use. Typical victims are developer, test and admin workstations with local admin rights. Any inventory hit should be handled as a critical incident. With zero hits, block rules plus a retro-hunt are sufficient.
Runbook step 1
Immediate response (0-24 h)
- Inventory: Sweep all Windows endpoints via EDR or software inventory (Intune, SCCM, Tanium) for DAEMON Tools Lite 12.5.0.2421 through 12.5.0.2434, especially copies obtained from daemon-tools.cc between roughly 8 April and 5 May 2026. Also hunt for
DTHelper.exe,DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exeandDTShellHlp.exe, recording path, hash and install date. - Isolate: Network-isolate every host running an affected build via EDR quarantine. This is embedded malware, not an exploitable bug, so treat these hosts as compromised rather than merely vulnerable.
- Don't rely on an update to clean up: Upgrading or uninstalling will not remove second-stage persistence. Capture forensics (memory plus a triage image), then reimage from a trusted golden image. The vendor provides a clean release — check the vendor advisory for the exact version.
- Rotate credentials: Reset every credential used on or cached by affected hosts. This covers logged-on domain users, local admin accounts (force a LAPS rotation), browser-saved passwords, VPN certificates and session tokens (Entra ID: "Revoke sessions").
- Purge installers: Remove and block all DAEMON Tools installers from that window found in software distribution, file shares and user download folders.
- Check reporting duties: If compromise is confirmed, assess NIS2 reporting obligations (24-hour early warning for significant incidents).
- Inventory: Sweep all Windows endpoints via EDR or software inventory (Intune, SCCM, Tanium) for DAEMON Tools Lite 12.5.0.2421 through 12.5.0.2434, especially copies obtained from daemon-tools.cc between roughly 8 April and 5 May 2026. Also hunt for
Runbook step 2
Mitigation layers
- Application control: Add WDAC or AppLocker hash-deny rules for the trojanised binaries. A publisher rule alone will not help, because the malware carries the legitimate AVB Disc Soft signature. Block the AVB Disc Soft publisher outright until the certificate's revocation status is clear.
- Software governance: DAEMON Tools Lite is rarely business-critical, and Windows mounts ISO/VHD natively. Move it onto the disallowed-software list.
- Network and proxy: Block outbound traffic from the three binaries via host firewall or EDR network protection. Restrict freeware download categories at the web proxy and allow daemon-tools.cc only through an exception process.
- Privileges: Remove local admin rights from end users so that freeware has to go through managed deployment.
DiscSoftBusServiceLiteruns as a privileged service, so disable it on any host not yet reimaged (sc config DiscSoftBusServiceLite start= disabled). - Segmentation: Keep developer and admin workstations, where tools like this tend to appear, away from Tier-0 assets (tiering model, PAWs).
Runbook step 3
Detection rules
- Sysmon EID 1 / EDR process ancestry: Watch for the three binaries spawning LOLBins. KQL:
DeviceProcessEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("DTHelper.exe","DTShellHlp.exe","DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe") | where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","rundll32.exe","mshta.exe","regsvr32.exe") - Sysmon EID 3 / EID 22: Flag network connections and DNS lookups from these binaries to destinations outside vendor infrastructure. Prioritise newly observed domains (first seen less than 30 days ago).
- Proxy/web-filter logs: Find downloads from
daemon-tools.ccbetween 8 April and 5 May 2026. Correlate them against the host list to catch installs made outside managed deployment. - Persistence: Look for Security EID 4697 / System EID 7045 (new service), Sysmon EID 13 (Run keys) and EID 4698 (scheduled task) close in time to a DAEMON Tools install. Sigma shape:
ParentImage|endswithon the three binaries combined withTargetObject|contains: '\CurrentVersion\Run'. - Retro-hunt: Search EDR and SIEM history back to 8 April 2026 for hash IOCs published in the vendor advisory or by threat-intel providers.
- Sysmon EID 1 / EDR process ancestry: Watch for the three binaries spawning LOLBins. KQL:
Detection rules
No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.
Classification under NIS2 and CRA
Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.
NIS2
NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.
Read in glossary- Actively exploited: treat the vulnerability as a priority in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2. If it is exploited in your environment, check the reporting obligation under Art. 23 (early warning within 24 hours).
CRA
The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.
Read in glossary- Since 11.09.2026, manufacturers of affected products with digital elements must report actively exploited vulnerabilities under Art. 14 CRA, with an early warning within 24 hours via ENISA's single reporting platform.
ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.
Read in glossary- Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.
Description
A supply chain attack compromised the official installation packages of DAEMON Tools Lite (Windows versions 12.5.0.2421 through 12.5.0.2434), distributed from the legitimate website daemon-tools.cc between approximately April 8, 2026, and May 5, 2026. Attackers gained unauthorized access to the vendor's (AVB Disc Soft) build or distribution infrastructure and trojanized three binaries: DTHelper.exe, DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe, and DTShellHlp.exe. These files were digitally signed with the legitimate AVB Disc Soft code-signing certificate, allowing the malicious installers to appear trustworthy and bypass signature-based detection.
Source: cvelistv5, NVD (NIST), ENISA EUVD, CISA KEV Catalog, CVE.org (MITRE)
Affected products
The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.
| Affected versions | Fixed in | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| AVB Disc Soft | DAEMON Tools Lite |
|
|
| disc-soft | daemon_tools |
|
|
Weakness classes (CWE)
CWE-506Embedded Malicious Code
Class
The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
Entry at MITRE CWE-506
Public exploit references
Publicly reported proof-of-concepts, exploit modules and detection templates for this vulnerability. NEOSEC links to the original sources only and does not provide any exploit code.
| CISA KEV Catalog | CISA Known Exploited Vulnerability (opens in a new tab)cisa.gov | actively exploited |
References & sources
- securelist.comDAEMON Tools software infected – supply chain attack ongoing since April 8, 2026euvd, Technical description, Third-party advisory, Exploit, Third-party advisory
- blog.daemon-tools.ccSecurity Incident Affecting DAEMON Tools Lite: What We Know So Fareuvd, Vendor advisory, Vendor advisory
- cisa.govknown-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-8398government-resource, US government resource
Changes to this CVE
Who changed this CVE and when: NVD (analysis, affected products, CVSS), the CVE publisher (CNA) and additional providers such as CISA (ADP).
Record modifiedkaspersky.com
Show 7 original changes
Individual changes of this event as published by NVD Type Action Before After Affected versions (publisher) added —Affected value modified. <a href="https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/8xxx/CVE-2026-8398.json">CVE-2026-8398</a>Reference added —https://blog.daemon-tools.cc/post/security-incidentReference added —https://securelist.com/tr/daemon-tools-backdoor/119654/Reference removed https://blog.daemon-tools.cc/post/security-incident—Reference removed https://securelist.com/tr/daemon-tools-backdoor/119654/—Reference type removed https://blog.daemon-tools.cc/post/security-incident Types: Vendor Advisory—Reference type removed https://securelist.com/tr/daemon-tools-backdoor/119654/ Types: Exploit, Third Party Advisory—Source identifier: vulnerability@kaspersky.com
Record modifiedCISA ADP
Show 3 original changes
Individual changes of this event as published by NVD Type Action Before After Reference added —https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-8398Reference removed https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-8398—Reference type removed https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-8398 Types: US Government Resource—Source identifier: 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
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<a href="https://intel.neosec.eu/en/cve/CVE-2026-8398"><img src="https://intel.neosec.eu/badge/cve/CVE-2026-8398.svg?lang=en" alt="CVE-2026-8398 – NEOSEC Intel" height="20"></a>