SonicWall SMA1000 Appliances Code Injection Vulnerability (CVE-2026-15410)
Published Last modified In CISA KEV since Sources: BSI, CVE.org, pwn.watch, SingCERT
- Actively exploited
- Source: VulnCheck KEV (opens in a new tab), CERT.at, ANSSI / CERT-FR, CSA/SingCERT How we classify
- Ransomware
- Public exploit
What is affected, what to do
Post-authentication improper control of generation of code ('Code Injection') vulnerability has been identified in the SMA1000 Appliance Management Console (AMC) which in specific conditions could potentially enable a remote authenticated attacker as administrator to execute arbitrary OS commands.
The vulnerability is being actively exploited; treat it as a priority. CISA lists it as used in ransomware campaigns. Update SMA 1000 Models-6210, 7210, 8200v to version 12.4.3-03453. Immediate actions, mitigation and detection rules are in the runbook below.
- Affected
- SonicWall SMA1000
lte 12.4.3-03245..12.4.3-03434 - SonicWall SMA1000
lte 12.5.0-02283..12.5.0-02800
- SonicWall SMA1000
Not sure whether and how you are affected? Ask a question about this vulnerability
Metrics
7.2
Priority
XIEM Effective CVSS: highest available CVSS rating from NVD and vendor data.
Source: NVD, CVSS v3
7.2
CVSS v3
Severity High on the scale from 0 to 10.
Source: BSI, CVE.org, pwn.watch, SingCERT
11.8 %
EPSS score
Elevated — model estimates 10-50% exploitation likelihood.
Source: FIRST EPSS, percentile 96.1
Show all metrics
- Severity
- Critical
Priority (0–325)
The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?
Read in glossary- 255.70 Methodology
Exploit maturity
An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.
Read in glossary- actively exploitedSource: VulnCheck KEV (opens in a new tab), CERT.at, ANSSI / CERT-FR, CSA/SingCERT How we classify
XIEM Effective CVSS
XIEM® is the tiered managed-security operating model from NEOSEC and a registered trademark of NEOSEC GmbH. It extends classic SIEM — the central collection, normalisation and correlation of security-relevant events — with endpoint forensics, network visibility and deception technology, and consolidates them into three building tiers: Sentry, Orchestrate and Command.
Read in glossary- 7.2 Methodology
CVSS v3
CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.
Read in glossary- 7.2
EPSS score
The EPSS score is the absolute model output for an individual vulnerability: the estimated probability of real-world exploitation within the next 30 days, expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 % to 100 %). A score of 0.42 means „the model estimates a 42 % chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days“.
Read in glossary- 11.8 %
- Elevated — model estimates 10-50% exploitation likelihood.
EPSS percentile
The EPSS percentile is the relative position of a vulnerability within all EPSS-scored CVEs, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A percentile of 0.90 means „this CVE has a higher EPSS score than 90 % of all other scored CVEs“. Unlike the EPSS score, it is not a probability — but a positioning within a ranking.
Read in glossary- 96.1
- Critical — this CVE ranks in the top fifth of all CVEs scored today (rank ≥ 80%).
KEV status
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- Actively exploited
- Published
In CISA KEV since
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossaryCWE
CWE is a catalogue of typical weakness types in software and hardware — such as flawed input validation, unsafe memory handling or poor authentication. Where a CVE names a concrete vulnerability in a concrete product, a CWE describes the underlying class of defect.
Read in glossary- CWE-94
Response and mitigation
Why act now?
Prioritisation rationale
Admin privileges are required, but once an attacker has them the flaw is network-exploitable without user interaction and yields full appliance takeover. Attackers typically chain this kind of post-auth bug with stolen or guessed admin credentials or a preceding authentication flaw. CISA explicitly flags it as used in ransomware campaigns, and its exploitation likelihood ranks near the top of all scored CVEs. Remote-access gateways remain a favoured initial-access vector into corporate networks. If your AMC is internet-exposed or admin access lacks MFA, treat this as critical and patch within 24 hours. With a strictly segmented AMC and MFA in place, remediation in the next emergency maintenance window is defensible.
Runbook step 1
Immediate response (0-24 h)
- Inventory and version check: Enumerate every SonicWall SMA1000 appliance, including SMA 6210 and virtual instances, and compare its firmware against the affected builds: 12.4.3-03245 through 12.4.3-03434, and 12.5.0-02283 through 12.5.0-02800.
- Patch: A fix is available from the vendor. Look up the fixed build in the SonicWall PSIRT advisory. Deploy it as an emergency change and confirm the running version in the AMC afterwards.
- Lock down the Appliance Management Console (AMC) immediately: The AMC must not be reachable from the internet or from user networks. Restrict the management port (per your configuration) at the perimeter firewall to a dedicated admin subnet or jump host.
- Rotate administrative credentials: Exploitation requires admin rights, so stolen or weak admin credentials are the likely entry path. Rotate all local AMC admin passwords, bound LDAP/RADIUS service accounts and API keys, and disable unused admin accounts.
- Compromise assessment before patching: Preserve evidence first by taking a config export and a support/log bundle. Then review the admin account list, login history and recent configuration changes for anomalies.
- Isolate on suspicion: If you find indicators of compromise, disconnect the appliance and open an incident. Rebuild it from a clean image rather than just patching, and treat all VPN user credentials that passed through it as exposed. Check whether the NIS2 24-hour early-warning obligation applies.
Runbook step 2
Mitigation layers
- Network segmentation: Place the SMA1000 management interface in a dedicated management VLAN with default-deny, allowing only PAWs or jump hosts. Restrict appliance egress to required destinations (NTP, DNS, licensing, syslog, AAA) to block reverse shells and payload staging.
- IAM / least privilege: Enforce MFA on all AMC admin logins. Split roles so monitoring uses read-only accounts and full admin rights go only to named individuals. Eliminate shared admin accounts.
- Application-layer access control: If a reverse proxy or WAF fronts the appliance, allow AMC paths only from admin source IPs. Drop and log POST requests to the AMC from anywhere else.
- IPS rule concept: Add a Suricata/Snort rule alerting on HTTP traffic to the AMC port from outside the admin network (
alert http !$ADMIN_NET any -> $SMA_MGMT $AMC_PORT). Add a second rule for request parameters containing shell metacharacters (;,|,`,$(). - Configuration hardening: Disable unused management services (SSH, SNMP write). Enable remote syslog to the SIEM so evidence survives on-box tampering, and ensure NTP time sync.
Runbook step 3
Detection rules
- Admin logins from unexpected sources: Using AMC audit logs forwarded via syslog, alert on successful admin logins from outside the admin subnet, outside business hours, or following repeated failures. KQL sketch:
Syslog | where Computer in (sma_hosts) and SyslogMessage has_any ("admin","login") and not(ipv4_is_in_range(SrcIP, "10.10.0.0/24")). - Unauthorised configuration changes: Watch for new admin accounts, changed authentication servers, new certificates, or altered syslog/NTP targets. Sigma shape:
logsource: sonicwall_sma; detection: keywords|contains: ['account created','role changed','syslog server'], correlated against change tickets. - Appliance egress: In Zeek
conn.logor firewall logs, hunt for connections from the SMA management IP to external hosts on unusual ports, such as reverse shells or HTTP/HTTPS downloads from unknown hosts. SPL sketch:index=zeek sourcetype=conn id.orig_h IN (sma_ips) NOT id.resp_h IN (allowlist) | stats count by id.resp_h id.resp_p. - Lateral movement from the VPN pool: Flag unusual authentications from the SMA address pool to DCs or servers (Windows EID 4624 logon type 3/10, EID 4768/4769 with rare account names). A spike in SMB or RDP sessions from the pool is a classic ransomware precursor.
- Integrity drift: Periodically compare the running firmware version and config hash against your baseline. Treat unexplained reboots or gaps in log delivery as possible tampering.
- Admin logins from unexpected sources: Using AMC audit logs forwarded via syslog, alert on successful admin logins from outside the admin subnet, outside business hours, or following repeated failures. KQL sketch:
Detection rules
No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.
Classification under NIS2 and CRA
Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.
NIS2
NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.
Read in glossary- Actively exploited: treat the vulnerability as a priority in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2. If it is exploited in your environment, check the reporting obligation under Art. 23 (early warning within 24 hours).
CRA
The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.
Read in glossary- Since 11.09.2026, manufacturers of affected products with digital elements must report actively exploited vulnerabilities under Art. 14 CRA, with an early warning within 24 hours via ENISA's single reporting platform.
ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.
Read in glossary- Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.
Description
Post-authentication improper control of generation of code ('Code Injection') vulnerability has been identified in the SMA1000 Appliance Management Console (AMC) which in specific conditions could potentially enable a remote authenticated attacker as administrator to execute arbitrary OS commands.
Source: BSI CSAF, BSI WID Portal, NVD (NIST), pwn.watch, CISA KEV Catalog, cvelistv5, CSA/SingCERT
Affected products
The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.
| Affected versions | Fixed in | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| SonicWall | SMA1000 |
|
|
| sonicwall | sma8200v |
|
|
| SonicWall | SMA 1000 Models-6210, 7210, 8200v |
|
|
Vendors and products
Affected operating systems
| Other | sonicwall | sma6210_firmware | 12.4.3-03245 |
| Other | sonicwall | sma6210_firmware | 12.4.3-03387 |
| Other | sonicwall | sma6210_firmware | 12.4.3-03434 |
| Other | sonicwall | sma6210_firmware | 12.5.0-02283 |
| Other | sonicwall | sma6210_firmware | 12.5.0-02624 |
| Other | sonicwall | sma6210_firmware | 12.5.0-02800 |
| Other | sonicwall | sma7210_firmware | 12.4.3-03245 |
| Other | sonicwall | sma7210_firmware | 12.4.3-03387 |
| Other | sonicwall | sma7210_firmware | 12.4.3-03434 |
| Other | sonicwall | sma7210_firmware | 12.5.0-02283 |
| Other | sonicwall | sma7210_firmware | 12.5.0-02624 |
| Other | sonicwall | sma7210_firmware | 12.5.0-02800 |
Weakness classes (CWE)
CWE-94Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
Base
The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.
Entry at MITRE CWE-94
Public exploit references
Publicly reported proof-of-concepts, exploit modules and detection templates for this vulnerability. NEOSEC links to the original sources only and does not provide any exploit code.
| CISA KEV Catalog | CISA Known Exploited Vulnerability (opens in a new tab)cisa.gov | actively exploited | |
| CSA/SingCERT | Multiple Vulnerabilities in SonicWall SMA1000 Series (opens in a new tab)CSA/SingCERT | actively exploited | |
| ANSSI / CERT-FRLicence Ouverte 2.0, as of | CERTFR-2026-ALE-006 – Multiples vulnérabilités dans Sonicwall Secure Mobile Access (clôturée 2026-08-24) (opens in a new tab)cert.cyber.gouv.fr | actively exploited | |
| PoC-in-GitHub (nomi-sec) | CVE-2026-15410 (opens in a new tab)github.com | PoC (publicly reported)reported, not verified |
References & sources
- psirt.global.sonicwall.comSonicWall SMA1000 Appliances — CVE-2026-15409Vendor advisory, pwn-watch, Vendor advisory
- cisa.govknown-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-15410government-resource, US government resource
- cert.atCERT.at: Kritische Sicherheitslücken in SonicWall SMA1000 Series - aktiv ausgenutzt - Updates verfügbarcert-at
- cert.cyber.gouv.frANSSI / CERT-FR: CERTFR-2026-ALE-006 – Multiples vulnérabilités dans Sonicwall Secure Mobile Access (clôturée 2026-08-24)cert-fr
- pwn.watchpwn.watch: SonicWall SMA1000 Appliances: SonicWall SMA1000 Appliances Server-Side Request Forgery Vulnerabilitypwn-watch
- NVD (NIST)NVD: CVE-2026-15409pwn-watch
- NVD (NIST)NVD: CVE-2026-15410pwn-watch
- cisa.govCISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalogpwn-watch
Changes to this CVE
Who changed this CVE and when: NVD (analysis, affected products, CVSS), the CVE publisher (CNA) and additional providers such as CISA (ADP).
One NVD translation into another language is hidden.
Linked advisories
- Progress Kemp LoadMaster Flaw Exploited; SonicWall SMA1000 Flaws Exploited in RansomwareSANS NewsBites
- @RISK®: The Consensus Security Vulnerability Alert: Vol. 26, Num. 28SANS @RISK
- Patch SonicWall SMA1000 Models for Two Flaws, One Max-SeveritySANS NewsBites
- @RISK®: The Consensus Security Vulnerability Alert: Vol. 26, Num. 27SANS @RISK
Embed badge
Show the severity and KEV status of this vulnerability on your site – with a link back here. The image is updated hourly.
<a href="https://intel.neosec.eu/en/cve/CVE-2026-15410"><img src="https://intel.neosec.eu/badge/cve/CVE-2026-15410.svg?lang=en" alt="CVE-2026-15410 – NEOSEC Intel" height="20"></a>