ownCloud graphapi Information Disclosure Vulnerability (CVE-2023-49103)
Published In CISA KEV since Sources: BSI, SingCERT, NCSC NZ, pwn.watch, CVE.org
- Actively exploited
- Source: NCSC NZ, CSA/SingCERT How we classify
What is affected, what to do
An issue was discovered in ownCloud owncloud/graphapi 0.2.x before 0.2.1 and 0.3.x before 0.3.1. The graphapi app relies on a third-party GetPhpInfo.php library that provides a URL.
The vulnerability is being actively exploited; treat it as a priority. The available sources name no fixed version. Check the vendor guidance in the references below. Immediate actions, mitigation and detection rules are in the runbook below.
- Affected
- ownCloud graphapi
eq 0.2.0..0.2.0 - ownCloud graphapi
eq 0.3.0..0.3.0
- ownCloud graphapi
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Metrics
10.0
Priority
XIEM Effective CVSS: highest available CVSS rating from NVD and vendor data.
Source: Vendor (CNA), CVSS v3
10.0
CVSS v3
Severity Critical on the scale from 0 to 10.
Source: BSI, SingCERT, NCSC NZ, pwn.watch, CVE.org
77.8 %
EPSS score
High — model estimates ≥ 50% chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days.
Source: FIRST EPSS, percentile 99.57
Show all metrics
- Severity
- Critical
Priority (0–325)
The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?
Read in glossary- 233.14 Methodology
Exploit maturity
An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.
Read in glossary- actively exploitedSource: NCSC NZ, CSA/SingCERT How we classify
XIEM Effective CVSS
XIEM® is the tiered managed-security operating model from NEOSEC and a registered trademark of NEOSEC GmbH. It extends classic SIEM — the central collection, normalisation and correlation of security-relevant events — with endpoint forensics, network visibility and deception technology, and consolidates them into three building tiers: Sentry, Orchestrate and Command.
Read in glossary- 10.0 Methodology
CVSS v3
CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.
Read in glossary- 10.0
EPSS score
The EPSS score is the absolute model output for an individual vulnerability: the estimated probability of real-world exploitation within the next 30 days, expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 % to 100 %). A score of 0.42 means „the model estimates a 42 % chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days“.
Read in glossary- 77.8 %
- High — model estimates ≥ 50% chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days.
EPSS percentile
The EPSS percentile is the relative position of a vulnerability within all EPSS-scored CVEs, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A percentile of 0.90 means „this CVE has a higher EPSS score than 90 % of all other scored CVEs“. Unlike the EPSS score, it is not a probability — but a positioning within a ranking.
Read in glossary- 99.57
- Critical — this CVE ranks in the top fifth of all CVEs scored today (rank ≥ 80%).
KEV status
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- Actively exploited
- Published
In CISA KEV since
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- CISA assessment (SSVC)
- Exploitation: active · automatable · Technical impact: partial
- Source: CISA Vulnrichment, as of 27 January 2025
CWE
CWE is a catalogue of typical weakness types in software and hardware — such as flawed input validation, unsafe memory handling or poor authentication. Where a CVE names a concrete vulnerability in a concrete product, a CWE describes the underlying class of defect.
Read in glossary- CWE-200
Response and mitigation
Why act now?
Prioritisation rationale
This CVE is on KEV because it is unauthenticated and network-reachable (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) and was mass-scanned within hours of disclosure — exploitation likelihood ranks among the highest in the entire KEV catalogue. The real risk is not the phpinfo page itself but the admin and service credentials it reveals, which attackers use to take full control of the ownCloud tenant and pivot (SMTP relay abuse, database access, lateral movement into Entra ID when SSO is configured). For NIS2-regulated organisations: treat every internet-exposed ownCloud instance as P1 and internal instances as P2 — and remember that patching alone is insufficient, because any credential that was reachable through phpinfo must be rotated regardless of when the patch was applied.
Runbook step 1
Immediate response (0-24 h)
- Upgrade the graphapi app to 0.2.1 or 0.3.1 immediately (ownCloud advisory, November 2023). After upgrade, manually verify and delete
owncloud/apps/graphapi/vendor/microsoft/microsoft-graph/tests/GetPhpInfo.php— disabling the app alone does NOT remove the vulnerable file. - Front the instance with a reverse proxy or WAF rule that returns 403 for any request to
/apps/graphapi/vendor/microsoft/microsoft-graph/tests/GetPhpInfo.php, generic*/GetPhpInfo.php, and path-traversal variants containing/.%2E/. - Rotate every secret that could appear in phpinfo output: ownCloud admin password, SMTP credentials, object-storage keys (S3/Swift), database credentials, license key, OAuth client secrets, LDAP bind passwords. For containerised deployments (Docker/Kubernetes) treat all values stored as environment variables as compromised.
- Hunt web-server access logs (nginx/Apache) retroactively back to at least 2023-11-01 for any hit on GetPhpInfo.php. Each hit opens a security incident and assumes successful exfiltration.
- Prioritise container images built before February 2023 — these expose admin credentials directly through the process environment.
- If patching cannot happen in the next maintenance window: disable the app via
occ app:disable graphapiAND remove the GetPhpInfo.php file from disk. Doing only one of these is not enough.
- Upgrade the graphapi app to 0.2.1 or 0.3.1 immediately (ownCloud advisory, November 2023). After upgrade, manually verify and delete
Runbook step 2
Mitigation layers
- Network segmentation: run ownCloud behind a reverse proxy with allowlist-based URL routing; default-deny for paths under
/apps/*/vendor/,/tests/,/.git/,/config/. - WAF signature: block URI pattern
(?i)/graphapi/.*GetPhpInfo\.phpand inspect egress responses forX-Powered-By: PHPheaders combined with response bodies > 50 KB on endpoints that are not supposed to return large payloads (ModSecurity/Coraza rule). - Container hardening: stop injecting secrets as environment variables. Mount them as files via Docker/K8s secrets, or load them from a secret vault (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager) at container start and unset them from the process environment afterwards.
- IAM minimisation: restrict the admin account to MFA plus source-IP allowlist; create a dedicated service account for bulk operations and keep its credentials out of any phpinfo-reachable environment.
- Configuration audit: review
occ config:list systemfor hard-coded secrets inconfig.php; only migrate to environment-variable references once the container-hardening step above is in place. - External attack-surface scanning: periodic authenticated scan against
/apps/graphapi/vendor/microsoft/microsoft-graph/tests/GetPhpInfo.phpand known info-disclosure paths across all ownCloud instances in the estate.
- Network segmentation: run ownCloud behind a reverse proxy with allowlist-based URL routing; default-deny for paths under
Runbook step 3
Detection rules
- Web access log (nginx/Apache): alert on any request matching
GET .*graphapi.*GetPhpInfo\.php.*plus URL-encoded bypass variants (%2E,%2F,/.%2E/). SPL:index=web uri_path="*graphapi*GetPhpInfo.php*" OR uri_path="*/.%2E/*GetPhpInfo*" | stats count by src_ip, uri_path, status. - Zeek/Suricata HTTP log: rule on
http.uricontainsGetPhpInfo.phpcombined with response size > 20 KB — a typical phpinfo page is 50-150 KB. - Sigma shape:
detection: selection: cs-uri-stem|contains: 'GetPhpInfo.php' sc-status: 200 condition: selection— severity high, since no legitimate traffic hits this path. - Post-exploitation follow-up: admin logins from previously unseen source IPs within 24 h of a GetPhpInfo request. KQL:
OwnCloudAuditLog | where Action == "login" | join (WebAccessLog | where UriPath contains "GetPhpInfo.php") on $left.SrcIP == $right.SrcIP. - EDR on the ownCloud host: unexpected php-fpm child processes spawning
curl,wget, or shells — indicates follow-on activity using the leaked admin credentials.
- Web access log (nginx/Apache): alert on any request matching
Detection rules
No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.
Classification under NIS2 and CRA
Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.
NIS2
NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.
Read in glossary- Actively exploited: treat the vulnerability as a priority in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2. If it is exploited in your environment, check the reporting obligation under Art. 23 (early warning within 24 hours).
CRA
The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.
Read in glossary- Since 11.09.2026, manufacturers of affected products with digital elements must report actively exploited vulnerabilities under Art. 14 CRA, with an early warning within 24 hours via ENISA's single reporting platform.
ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.
Read in glossary- Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.
Description
An issue was discovered in ownCloud owncloud/graphapi 0.2.x before 0.2.1 and 0.3.x before 0.3.1. The graphapi app relies on a third-party GetPhpInfo.php library that provides a URL. When this URL is accessed, it reveals the configuration details of the PHP environment (phpinfo). This information includes all the environment variables of the webserver. In containerized deployments, these environment variables may include sensitive data such as the ownCloud admin password, mail server credentials, and license key. Simply disabling the graphapi app does not eliminate the vulnerability. Additionally, phpinfo exposes various other potentially sensitive configuration details that could be exploited by an attacker to gather information about the system. Therefore, even if ownCloud is not running in a containerized environment, this vulnerability should still be a cause for concern. Note that Docker containers from before February 2023 are not vulnerable to the credential disclosure.
Source: BSI CSAF, BSI WID Portal, CSA/SingCERT, NCSC NZ (CC BY 4.0), pwn.watch, NVD (NIST), cvelistv5, CISA KEV Catalog, CVE.org (MITRE)
Affected products
The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.
| Affected versions | Fixed in | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| owncloud | graph_api |
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| ownCloud | ownCloud |
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Vendors and products
Weakness classes (CWE)
CWE-200Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Class
The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.
Entry at MITRE CWE-200
Public exploit references
Publicly reported proof-of-concepts, exploit modules and detection templates for this vulnerability. NEOSEC links to the original sources only and does not provide any exploit code.
| CISA KEV Catalog | CISA Known Exploited Vulnerability (opens in a new tab)cisa.gov | actively exploited | |
| CSA/SingCERT | Critical Vulnerabilities in ownCloud File Sharing Application (opens in a new tab)CSA/SingCERT | actively exploited | |
| NCSC NZ | Three critical vulnerabilities affecting ownCloud software (opens in a new tab)NCSC NZ | actively exploited |
References & sources
- owncloud.orgsecurityProduct
- owncloud.comVendor advisory: ownCloud graphapiVendor advisory, pwn-watch
- cisa.govknown-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2023-49103government-resource, US government resource
- pwn.watchpwn.watch: ownCloud graphapi: Information Disclosure (CVE-2023-49103)pwn-watch
- NVD (NIST)NVD: CVE-2023-49103pwn-watch
- cisa.govCISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalogpwn-watch
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<a href="https://intel.neosec.eu/en/cve/CVE-2023-49103"><img src="https://intel.neosec.eu/badge/cve/CVE-2023-49103.svg?lang=en" alt="CVE-2023-49103 – NEOSEC Intel" height="20"></a>