Microsoft Windows Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2010-2568)
Published In CISA KEV since Sources: CVE.org
What is affected, what to do
Windows Shell in Microsoft Windows XP SP3, Server 2003 SP2, Vista SP1 and SP2, Server 2008 SP2 and R2, and Windows 7 allows local users or remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted (1) .LNK or (2) .PIF shortcut file, which is not properly handled during icon display in Windows Explorer, as demonstrated in the wild in July 2010, and originally reported for malware that leverages CVE-2010-2772 in Siemens WinCC SCADA systems.
The vulnerability is being actively exploited; treat it as a priority. The available sources name no fixed version. Check the vendor guidance in the references below. Immediate actions, mitigation and detection rules are in the runbook below.
- Affected
- Microsoft Windows Server 2008
eq r2..r2
- Microsoft Windows Server 2008
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Metrics
7.8
Priority
XIEM Effective CVSS: highest available CVSS rating from NVD and vendor data.
Source: Vendor (CNA), CVSS v3
7.8
CVSS v3
Severity High on the scale from 0 to 10.
Source: CVE.org
89.6 %
EPSS score
High — model estimates ≥ 50% chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days.
Source: FIRST EPSS, percentile 99.79
Show all metrics
- Severity
- Critical
Priority (0–325)
The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?
Read in glossary- 218.66 Methodology
Exploit maturity
An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.
Read in glossary- actively exploited
XIEM Effective CVSS
XIEM® is the tiered managed-security operating model from NEOSEC and a registered trademark of NEOSEC GmbH. It extends classic SIEM — the central collection, normalisation and correlation of security-relevant events — with endpoint forensics, network visibility and deception technology, and consolidates them into three building tiers: Sentry, Orchestrate and Command.
Read in glossary- 7.8 Methodology
CVSS v3
CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.
Read in glossary- 7.8
EPSS score
The EPSS score is the absolute model output for an individual vulnerability: the estimated probability of real-world exploitation within the next 30 days, expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 % to 100 %). A score of 0.42 means „the model estimates a 42 % chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days“.
Read in glossary- 89.6 %
- High — model estimates ≥ 50% chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days.
EPSS percentile
The EPSS percentile is the relative position of a vulnerability within all EPSS-scored CVEs, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A percentile of 0.90 means „this CVE has a higher EPSS score than 90 % of all other scored CVEs“. Unlike the EPSS score, it is not a probability — but a positioning within a ranking.
Read in glossary- 99.79
- Critical — this CVE ranks in the top fifth of all CVEs scored today (rank ≥ 80%).
KEV status
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- Actively exploited
- Published
In CISA KEV since
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- CISA assessment (SSVC)
- Exploitation: active · not automatable · Technical impact: total
- Source: CISA Vulnrichment, as of 1 May 2025
Response and mitigation
Why act now?
Prioritisation rationale
The flaw fires merely when Explorer renders a crafted shortcut's icon — no authentication and minimal user interaction — making it a textbook propagation vector via USB media and file shares that is purpose-built to cross air gaps into industrial environments. Exploitation likelihood is very high, the exploit has been public for years and is entrenched in worm-style malware, though CISA does not flag known ransomware use. In office IT the residual risk is usually low because modern Windows is unaffected, but in KRITIS estates with legacy HMIs, engineering workstations or embedded Windows it is critical: treat it as top priority there and lean on media control and segmentation rather than patching alone.
Runbook step 1
Immediate response (0-24 h)
- Build an inventory of every Windows XP SP3, Server 2003 SP2, Vista, Server 2008/2008 R2 and Windows 7 host, prioritising engineering workstations, HMIs and SCADA hosts in OT networks (the original in-the-wild case targeted Siemens WinCC environments, see CVE-2010-2772).
- Deploy the vendor security update and verify patch state. Patch available from the vendor — look up the exact version in the vendor advisory. All affected releases are end-of-life; treat any host without verifiable patch state as vulnerable.
- Where patching is not possible (OT, certified systems), apply the vendor-documented workaround: disable shortcut icon rendering (back up, then clear the default value of
HKCR\lnkfile\shellex\IconHandlerandHKCR\piffile\shellex\IconHandler) and disable the WebClient service. - Block removable media on affected hosts immediately (GPO "Removable Storage Access" or EDR device control) and disable AutoRun/AutoPlay globally (
NoDriveTypeAutoRun = 0xFF). - Sweep file shares and transfer folders used by legacy hosts for unexpected
.lnk/.piffiles and accompanying.dll/.cpl/.tmpfiles.
Runbook step 2
Mitigation layers
- Network segmentation: isolate legacy Windows hosts per the zone/conduit model (IEC 62443); block outbound SMB (TCP 445, 139) and WebDAV (TCP 80/443 from the WebClient service) to the internet and office network at zone boundaries so crafted shortcuts cannot pull payloads via UNC or WebDAV paths.
- Perimeter/mail/proxy: strip or block
.lnkand.piffiles in mail attachments, archives and web downloads; enable IPS signatures for "Windows Shell LNK code execution" (Suricata/Snort rulesets ship signatures for malicious LNK files over SMB/HTTP). - Media sanitisation: route all data transfer into OT through a hardened kiosk with multi-engine scanning; physically or policy-lock USB ports on HMIs and engineering stations.
- Endpoint hardening: application allowlisting (AppLocker/SRP) with DLL rules preventing
explorer.exefrom loading libraries from removable drives or UNC paths; run users without local admin rights, since code executes as the logged-on user. - Lifecycle: record a migration plan for the EOL hosts in the risk register (NIS2 risk management) and track them as a compensated exception with an expiry date.
Runbook step 3
Detection rules
- Sysmon EID 7 (image load):
explorer.exeloading.dll/.cplfrom removable or UNC paths — KQL:DeviceImageLoadEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe" and (FolderPath startswith @"\\" or FolderPath matches regex @"^[D-Z]:\\") and (FileName endswith ".cpl" or FileName endswith ".dll"). - Sysmon EID 11 / file system: creation of
.lnk/.pifin the root of removable drives or shares, especially alongside~WTR*.tmpor unknown DLLs in the same directory; Sigma shape:TargetFilename|endswith: ['.lnk','.pif'] AND TargetFilename|re: '^[D-Z]:\\[^\\]+$'. - Windows Security 6416 / PnP: new USB mass-storage device on OT or legacy hosts, correlated with child processes of
explorer.exe(Sysmon EID 1, childrenrundll32.exe,cmd.exe,powershell.exe) within minutes. - Zeek/Suricata: outbound SMB (
smb_files.logpaths containing.lnk/.cpl/.dll) or WebDAVPROPFINDrequests (http.log, user agentMicrosoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir) from legacy clients to external destinations. - EDR process lineage:
explorer.exe→rundll32.exewith a path on removable media or%TEMP%; treat any execution from removable media on engineering stations as an incident.
- Sysmon EID 7 (image load):
Detection rules
No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.
Classification under NIS2 and CRA
Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.
NIS2
NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.
Read in glossary- Actively exploited: treat the vulnerability as a priority in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2. If it is exploited in your environment, check the reporting obligation under Art. 23 (early warning within 24 hours).
CRA
The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.
Read in glossary- Since 11.09.2026, manufacturers of affected products with digital elements must report actively exploited vulnerabilities under Art. 14 CRA, with an early warning within 24 hours via ENISA's single reporting platform.
ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.
Read in glossary- Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.
Description
Windows Shell in Microsoft Windows XP SP3, Server 2003 SP2, Vista SP1 and SP2, Server 2008 SP2 and R2, and Windows 7 allows local users or remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted (1) .LNK or (2) .PIF shortcut file, which is not properly handled during icon display in Windows Explorer, as demonstrated in the wild in July 2010, and originally reported for malware that leverages CVE-2010-2772 in Siemens WinCC SCADA systems.
Source: NVD (NIST), cvelistv5, CISA KEV Catalog, CVE.org (MITRE)
Vendors and products
Affected operating systems
| Windows | microsoft | windows_7 | — |
| Windows | microsoft | windows_server_2003 | — |
| Windows | microsoft | windows_server_2008 | r2 |
| Windows | microsoft | windows_server_2008 | — |
| Windows | microsoft | windows_vista | — |
| Windows | microsoft | windows_xp | — |
Public exploit references
Publicly reported proof-of-concepts, exploit modules and detection templates for this vulnerability. NEOSEC links to the original sources only and does not provide any exploit code.
| CISA KEV Catalog | CISA Known Exploited Vulnerability (opens in a new tab)cisa.gov | actively exploited |
References & sources
- us-cert.govTA10-222AThird-party advisory, x_refsource_CERT, Third-party advisory, US government resource
- isc.sans.edudiary.html?storyid=9181x_refsource_MISC, Exploit, Issue tracking
- oval.cisecurity.orgoval:org.mitre.oval:def:11564Vulnerability database, signature, x_refsource_OVAL, Broken link
- f-secure.comweblog/archives/00001986.htmlx_refsource_MISC, Not applicable
- kb.cert.orgVU#940193Third-party advisory, x_refsource_CERT-VN, Patch, Third-party advisory, US government resource
- krebsonsecurity.com2010/07/experts-warn-of-new-windows-shortcut-flawx_refsource_MISC, Press coverage
- secunia.com40647Third-party advisory, x_refsource_SECUNIA, Vendor advisory
- microsoft.comtechnet/security/advisory/2286198.mspxx_refsource_CONFIRM, Broken link, Patch, Vendor advisory
- isc.sans.edudiary.html?storyid=9190x_refsource_MISC, Issue tracking
- securityfocus.com41732Vulnerability database, x_refsource_BID, Broken link, Exploit, Third-party advisory, Vulnerability database
- f-secure.comweblog/archives/new_rootkit_en.pdfx_refsource_MISC, Exploit
- geoffchappell.comnotes/security/stuxnet/ctrlfldr.htmx_refsource_MISC, Third-party advisory
- securitytracker.com1024216Vulnerability database, x_refsource_SECTRACK, Broken link, Third-party advisory, Vulnerability database
- docs.microsoft.comMS10-046Vendor advisory, x_refsource_MS, Patch, Vendor advisory
- cisa.govknown-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2010-2568government-resource, US government resource
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<a href="https://intel.neosec.eu/en/cve/CVE-2010-2568"><img src="https://intel.neosec.eu/badge/cve/CVE-2010-2568.svg?lang=en" alt="CVE-2010-2568 – NEOSEC Intel" height="20"></a>