The Cold Chain as Attack Surface: What Four Weeks of Refrigeration Attacks Have Established
On 8 November Shadowserver still counted around 170 Danfoss AK-SM 8xxA controllers sitting vulnerable on the public internet. Since 12 October, refrigeration systems in roughly 700 French supermarkets, and in a second wave across further countries including Germany, have been forced into defrost. This briefing sets out the timeline, the vulnerabilities, the numbers and the attribution claims, and separates what is established from what is only reported.
On 8 November the Shadowserver Foundation used its public mailing list to report on a class of device almost nobody was watching four weeks ago. Its daily scan still finds around 170 Danfoss AK-SM 8xxA controllers on the internet that are vulnerable to CVE-2025-41451 and CVE-2025-41452, and 136 vulnerable to CVE-2025-41450. The accompanying instruction is unambiguous: if you receive such an alert and are not running a honeypot, take the system off the public internet.
Patches for all three flaws have existed since March and August 2025.
What has happened since October
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 24 Mar 2025 | Danfoss publishes DSA-2025-03-01 for CVE-2025-41450, fixed in R4.2 |
| 1 Aug 2025 | Danfoss publishes DSA-2025-08-01 for CVE-2025-41451 and CVE-2025-41452, fixed in R4.3.1 |
| 26 Feb 2026 | CISA advisory on Copeland XWEB and XWEB Pro listing 23 CVEs |
| 9 Aug 2026 | Claroty Team82 publishes its technical analysis of the AK-SM 800A and of Copeland XWEB Pro |
| 11–12 Oct 2026 | First wave: refrigeration in hundreds of French supermarkets is forced into continuous defrost |
| 12 Oct 2026 | CERT-FR issues alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-012 on Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC |
| 13 Oct 2026 | CERT-FR adds Copeland xweb and Dixell xweb; Germany's BSI warns operators and points to its recommendation BSI-CS 154 |
| 1–2 Nov 2026 | Second wave across several European countries, Germany among them |
| 3 Nov 2026 | The French blood service EFS confirms altered temperature and defrost settings at three storage sites via a refrigeration contractor |
| 5 Nov 2026 | FBI, CISA, HHS, USDA and DOT jointly warn of ongoing attacks on refrigeration and cold-chain controllers |
| 8 Nov 2026 | Shadowserver: around 170 and 136 vulnerable AK-SM 8xxA instances still reachable |
| 9 Nov 2026 | France, according to media reports, accuses a cyber unit of Iran's Revolutionary Guards |
The mechanism
The attackers did not load a malicious function. They used an existing one. Supermarket refrigeration is managed by supervisory controllers that monitor temperatures, schedule defrost cycles, raise alarms and expose a web interface for the refrigeration contractor. Reports agree that the defrost function was switched on permanently, with a setpoint around 50°C. Defrost with a different duration and a different setpoint is a heater.
The Paris prosecutor mentions fires alongside spoiled stock. There are no reliable loss figures; operators speak of tens of millions of euros.
The numbers for the first wave do not reconcile, which is worth knowing before quoting any of them. Early press reports gave 250 to 350 stores, the trade press around 500, and the French finance minister told parliament about 700 of 10,000 supermarkets. Les Mousquetaires reported 300 Intermarché and Netto stores, Coopérative U 80. These count different things: stores reached, stores that lost stock, stores within one group.
The three vulnerabilities
| CVE | Weakness | Effect | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-41450 | Hidden code-of-the-day login derived from the device's date and time | Administrative session without the configured password; CVSS 3.1: 8.2 | R4.2 |
| CVE-2025-41451 | Password field of the alarm-mail configuration passed unsanitised into a shell command | Code execution after authentication; CVSS 4.0: 8.7 | R4.3.1 |
| CVE-2025-41452 | Web application can replace the Nginx configuration | Disruption or manipulation of the management interface after authentication; CVSS 4.0: 6.8 | R4.3.1 |
Chained, the first two give a route from outside with no credentials to command execution on the controller. One practical point: R4.2 closes only the authentication bypass. Anyone who stopped there still has the other two flaws. Only R4.3.1 fixes all three.
The patch for CVE-2025-41450 predates the first night of attacks by 566 days, and R4.3.1 by 436 days.
What has not been established
Precision matters here, because much of the coverage lacks it.
No authority and no vendor has confirmed that these three CVEs were the way in. CERT-FR's alert names no vulnerability identifier, no cause and no actor. Some trade outlets consider the chain of CVE-2025-41450 and CVE-2025-41451 likely; that is an assessment, not a finding. A security researcher has since publicly reconstructed the suspected chain and released detection rules for it.
According to Danfoss, most of the devices hit are not the series these patches exist for. The vendor points mainly to the discontinued AK-SM 800 and AK-SC 355, which no longer receive software or security updates, along with AK-SM 800A units on outdated firmware. For the legacy units there was no patch that could have been applied.
The access route is also open. Directly over the internet, through maintenance contractors' access, or both: the retailers' statements point in different directions and investigators have not committed.
What the Shadowserver number measures
The roughly 170 instances are reachable AK-SM 8xxA controllers whose firmware level is identified as vulnerable. The figure is not comparable with October's. On 12 October, 2,752 internet-reachable Danfoss systems were counted, 1,590 of them in France; in August Claroty cited 2,765 exposed AK-SM 800A devices from Censys data. Those counted exposure. This counts vulnerability to three specific CVEs.
Two things fall outside it. The discontinued AK-SM 800 and AK-SC 355 are not covered by these CVE tags, although by the vendor's account they make up most of the devices hit. And Copeland xweb and Dixell xweb, which CERT-FR has listed as targets since 13 October, are a separate device class.
So the 170 are the part of the problem a firmware update would resolve. The larger part can only be dealt with by isolation or replacement.
Germany
After the first wave, the German food retail federation said it knew of no affected German stores. The BSI nonetheless warned on 13 October, addressing operators of small and very small installations explicitly. Its president, Claudia Plattner, said that entry points of this kind positively invite sabotage.
Three weeks later it happened. During the night to 2 November, according to ZDF, WDR, BR and Tagesspiegel, refrigeration was manipulated at an Edeka store in Reisbach (Lower Bavaria), a CAP store in Wuppertal, in Wetter-Volmarstein, at a Rewe store in Raesfeld and in Lilienthal near Bremen, among others. The Reisbach store reports up to 50°C; the owner in Lilienthal puts his stock loss at more than 360,000 euros, according to media reports. The BSI confirms individual incidents at supermarkets and, according to media reports, in the pharmaceutical sector as well, and sees no threat to supply.
The profile of the German cases stands out: independently run stores, small operators. These are the installations where nobody in the business is responsible for the controller and the refrigeration contractor set up the remote access.
Who did it
Three layers sit on top of each other, and none is technically evidenced.
On 3 November the pro-Russian groups NoName057(16) and Z-Pentest claimed the attacks on Telegram. The claims are unverified; according to media reports the BSI sees nothing that supports them.
Today, 9 November, media report that French investigators accuse a cyber unit of Iran's Revolutionary Guards. The Iranian ambassador in Paris was summoned, and Foreign Minister Barrot announced he would seek EU sanctions. No public technical evidence has been released so far.
For defence the attribution changes nothing. A controller with a public address is reachable for each of these actors and for every imitator.
Why this case is different
An ordinary function becomes the weapon. There is no malware to hunt for. The attack consists of permitted settings in an impermissible combination.
The common denominator is a device model. Competing retail chains were hit on the same night because they use the same controllers and the same maintenance ecosystem. No single chain could see that shared exposure from inside its own network.
Discontinued devices keep running. CERT-FR states it explicitly: for a device without vendor support, a factory reset is not enough. Persistence is removed, the flaw remains, and the device will probably be compromised again.
The alarm depends on the controller under attack. Store staff reported that alarms sometimes failed to sound. Temperature monitoring that uses the same controller and the same network path fails with it.
What to do now
The order follows the CERT-FR alert and the BSI recommendation.
- Establish reachability. For every refrigeration, HVAC and building controller: vendor, model, firmware level, support status, and by which route it can be reached from outside. Ask the refrigeration contractor in writing which sites it reaches and how.
- Take it off the internet. Remove direct exposure, including port forwards and cellular modems. Filtering on the contractor's source addresses is acceptable as an emergency measure, according to CERT-FR, but not as a lasting one.
- Check the insurance contract before cutting the link. CERT-FR makes a point of this: some policies presuppose remote monitoring by the refrigeration contractor.
- Inspect the configuration. Setpoints, defrost ranges, user accounts. If anything looks wrong, treat the device as compromised: factory reset and full reconfiguration.
- Update where there is something to update. AK-SM 8xxA to R4.3.1 or later, security level set to "Strict", default passwords replaced.
- Replace or isolate discontinued devices. For the AK-SM 800 and AK-SC 355 there is no other lasting step.
- Remote maintenance only through a VPN with multi-factor authentication, named accounts, logged sessions.
- Independent temperature monitoring. Separate sensors, a separate alert path that does not run through the controller, and a person who can be reached at night.
- Rehearse manual operation. Who measures by hand, where can stock be moved, who decides on disposal and documents it for the insurer.
Where NIS2 applies, and where it does not
Wholesale distribution and industrial production and processing of food are among the sectors covered by the NIS2 directive. For those companies the refrigeration contractor with remote access is part of the supply chain under Article 21(2)(d), and its access path belongs in the risk assessment.
The independent store owner, the butcher and the small pharmaceutical distributor generally fall outside it. The BSI addressed precisely this group: no specific IT security rules apply to them, yet their equipment is on the network. The damage reaches them without a department to absorb it.
In recent weeks we have twice written about devices whose position in the architecture makes them a target: RMM servers and perimeter routers. The refrigeration controller belongs in the same line, with one difference: it changes a physical state, and it sits in businesses that have never thought of themselves as IT operators.
Frequently asked questions
Are only Danfoss systems affected?
No. Since 13 October CERT-FR has also listed Copeland xweb and Dixell xweb as attacked systems. The advice to take controllers off the internet applies to any refrigeration or building controller with remote access.
We updated to R4.2. Is that enough?
No. R4.2 fixes only CVE-2025-41450. The command execution and the web-server configuration flaw are closed only in R4.3.1.
Our controller is an older model with no updates. What now?
Disconnect it from the internet and plan the replacement. A factory reset alone is not sufficient, according to CERT-FR, because the device stays vulnerable and will probably be compromised again.
Is it proven that the three CVEs were exploited?
No. Neither CERT-FR nor Danfoss nor the investigators have named the attack path. The chain is technically plausible and has been publicly reconstructed, but it is not confirmed.
Who is behind it?
Pro-Russian hacktivists have claimed the attacks, and according to media reports of 9 November French investigators accuse a unit of Iran's Revolutionary Guards. No public technical evidence exists for either version.
How do we find out whether we appear in Shadowserver's data?
Network operators and organisations with their own address ranges can subscribe to the reports free of charge. Affected systems appear in the "Vulnerable HTTP" report with the respective CVE tags.
Sources
- Shadowserver — Vulnerable HTTP Report(2026-11-08)
- CERT-FR — Alerte CERTFR-2026-ALE-012(2026-10-13)
- Danfoss — DSA-2025-03-01 (CVE-2025-41450)(2025-03-24)
- Danfoss — DSA-2025-08-01 (CVE-2025-41451, CVE-2025-41452)(2025-08-01)
- CISA — ICSA-25-140-03: Danfoss AK-SM 8xxA Series(2025-08-26)
- Claroty Team82 — Freeze the Controller, Defrost the Food(2026-08-09)
- Cloud Security Alliance — Danfoss Controller Hijacking: Physical Sabotage of French Retail Refrigeration(2026-10-13)
- heise online — BSI gemahnt auch Betreiber kleiner vernetzter Anlagen(2026-10-13)
- ZDFheute — Cyberangriffe auf Supermärkte auch in Deutschland(2026-11-03)
- Tagesspiegel — Auch Supermärkte in Deutschland von Störungen bei Kühlanlagen betroffen(2026-11-03)
- CISA — US Government Partners Urge Hardening of Industrial Refrigeration and Cold-Chain Monitoring Systems(2026-11-05)
- SC World — FBI, CISA warn of cyberattacks targeting refrigeration systems(2026-11-06)
- t-online — Frankreich: Iran steckt hinter Cyber-Angriffen auf Supermarkt-Kühlschränke(2026-11-09)
- NVD — CVE-2025-41450
- NVD — CVE-2025-41451
- NVD — CVE-2025-41452