GitPython: Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity (ghsa:GHSA-m64x-33q8-m5h7)
Published Sources: Hersteller
What is affected, what to do
Update GitPython to version 3.2.0.
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Priority (0–325)
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Read in glossary- 30.00 Methodology
Exploit maturity
An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.
Read in glossary- no public PoC known
KEV status
The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.
Read in glossary- —
- Published
CWE
CWE is a catalogue of typical weakness types in software and hardware — such as flawed input validation, unsafe memory handling or poor authentication. Where a CVE names a concrete vulnerability in a concrete product, a CWE describes the underlying class of defect.
Read in glossary- CWE-1333
Classification under NIS2 and CRA
Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.
NIS2
NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.
Read in glossary- High technical severity: assess and remediate the vulnerability in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2 and document the decision.
CRA
The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.
Read in glossary- From 11.12.2027, Annex I Part II CRA requires manufacturers of affected products with digital elements to handle vulnerabilities without delay and provide security updates.
ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.
Read in glossary- Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.
Description
Summary
This is a residual of GHSA-g5vv-9gxw-82hx / CVE-2026-87819. The 3.1.60 fix made Actor._from_string regex-free, but parse_actor_and_date still runs _re_actor_epoch on the same author/committer/tagger line one step earlier. That pattern backtracks quadratically when the trailing epoch or timezone is missing or malformed, so the same class of slow parse is still reachable in 3.1.62.
Details
git/objects/util.py:322:
_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r"^.+? (.*) (\d+) ([+-]\d+).*$")
.+? and (.*) can both absorb the same run of spaces, and the required (\d+) ([+-]\d+) tail is only checked after them. On a long line with no valid tail, the search retries every split point.
It is called from parse_actor_and_date (git/objects/util.py:335), which runs on the author and committer lines in Commit._deserialize (git/objects/commit.py:917, :931) and on the tagger line in git/objects/tag.py:129.
The published payload (letters plus an unterminated <) is fast on 3.1.62. Replacing the letters with spaces is not:
author line (after author ) | 2 KB | 8 KB | 32 KB |
|---|---|---|---|
'a'*n + ' <' (advisory payload) | 0.0 ms | 0.1 ms | 0.4 ms |
' '*n | 28 ms | 453 ms | 7,700 ms |
| valid line, long name (control) | 0.0 ms | 0.0 ms | 0.0 ms |
Cost grows about 16x for each 4x increase in length.
PoC
import time
from git.objects.util import parse_actor_and_date
line = "author " + " " * 32000
t = time.perf_counter()
parse_actor_and_date(line)
print(f"{time.perf_counter() - t:.1f} s") # ~7 s on 3.1.62
End to end, reading Commit.author on a commit object whose author line is 32 KB of spaces followed by any malformed tail (no epoch, no timezone, non-numeric epoch, or bad timezone) takes about 7.2 s per access. The same line with a valid 1191999972 -0700 tail takes 1.3 ms.
Note for reproducing: git hash-object -t commit -w refuses such an object (missingEmail), so the test object was written with --literally. A remote can still serve one, because fetch.fsckObjects and transfer.fsckObjects default to false. This is the same delivery model as CVE-2026-87819 ("craft a commit object with a malformed author field").
Impact
CPU exhaustion (CWE-1333) in any application that uses GitPython to read commits or tags from an untrusted repository: CI tooling, repository scanners, code-hosting integrations. Each access to Commit.author, Commit.committer or TagObject.tagger on a crafted object costs seconds, and a repository can contain many such objects.
Suggested fix
Match the leading field name with .[^ ]* instead of .+?. Both stop at the first space after the first character, but .[^ ]* cannot overlap the following (.*), so the backtracking disappears:
_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r"^.[^ ]* (.*) (\d+) ([+-]\d+).*$")
_re_only_actor = re.compile(r"^.[^ ]* (.*)$")
Verification on current main (73a72c9):
- Differential over 368 actor lines (real-world shapes plus edge cases): 0 differences in match groups for either regex.
' '*nat 64 KB: 32,170 ms before, 0.98 ms after. Valid lines are unchanged (0.01 ms).- The existing test suite gives the same pass/fail set with and without the change
- The new regression test,
test_parse_actor_and_date_malformed_line_is_linear, fails on the old pattern (8.4 s) and passes with the fix (0.5 s).
The full patch (fix plus regression test) is attached below.
diff --git a/git/objects/util.py b/git/objects/util.py
index a68d701f..d8c0594d 100644
--- a/git/objects/util.py
+++ b/git/objects/util.py
@@ -319,8 +319,11 @@ def parse_date(string_date: Union[str, datetime]) -> Tuple[int, int]:
# Precompiled regexes
-_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r"^.+? (.*) (\d+) ([+-]\d+).*$")
-_re_only_actor = re.compile(r"^.+? (.*)$")
+# The leading field name ("author", "committer", "tagger") is matched with ``.[^ ]*`` rather than
+# ``.+?``: both stop at the first space after the first character, but ``.[^ ]*`` cannot overlap the
+# following ``(.*)``, so a line with no valid trailing epoch/offset no longer backtracks quadratically.
+_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r"^.[^ ]* (.*) (\d+) ([+-]\d+).*$")
+_re_only_actor = re.compile(r"^.[^ ]* (.*)$")
def parse_actor_and_date(line: str) -> Tuple[Actor, int, int]:
diff --git a/test/test_util.py b/test/test_util.py
index cf4299d5..e1631420 100644
--- a/test/test_util.py
+++ b/test/test_util.py
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ from git.cmd import dashify
from git.objects.util import (
altz_to_utctz_str,
from_timestamp,
+ parse_actor_and_date,
parse_date,
tzoffset,
utctz_to_altz,
@@ -571,6 +572,30 @@ class TestUtils(TestBase):
Actor("name last another", "some-very-long-email@example.com"),
)
+ def test_parse_actor_and_date_malformed_line_is_linear(self):
+ # A long author line whose trailing epoch/offset is missing or malformed used to make
+ # _re_actor_epoch backtrack quadratically: ~7 s per Commit.author access for a 32 KB line.
+ # The parse result must be unchanged; only the time spent reaching it should move.
+ for tail in ("", " notanumber -0700", " 1191999972", " -0700", " 1191999972 xx"):
+ line = "author " + " " * 32000 + tail
+ start = time.perf_counter()
+ actor, epoch, offset = parse_actor_and_date(line)
+ self.assertLess(time.perf_counter() - start, 1.0)
+ self.assertEqual(epoch, 0)
+ self.assertEqual(offset, 0)
+
+ # Well-formed lines, including one with a long name, still parse exactly as before.
+ actor, epoch, offset = parse_actor_and_date(
+ "author Tom Preston-Werner <tom@mojombo.com> 1191999972 -0700"
+ )
+ self.assertEqual(actor, Actor("Tom Preston-Werner", "tom@mojombo.com"))
+ self.assertEqual(epoch, 1191999972)
+ self.assertEqual(offset, 25200)
+
+ actor, epoch, offset = parse_actor_and_date("author " + "a " * 16000 + "<a@b> 1 -0700")
+ self.assertEqual(actor.email, "a@b")
+ self.assertEqual(epoch, 1)
+
@ddt.data(
("name", ""),
("name", "prefix_"),
Found with AI assistance (Claude) and verified by hand.
Brian Willows
Source: GitHub Security Advisories
Affected products
The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.
| Affected versions | Fixed in | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| pip | GitPython |
|
|
Weakness classes (CWE)
CWE-1333Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity
Base
The product uses a regular expression with a worst-case computational complexity that is inefficient and possibly exponential.
Entry at MITRE CWE-1333