HighCVE-2026-68494

    FasterXML Jackson-core: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling (CVE-2026-68494)

    Published Last modified Sources: Red Hat, BSI, OSV, CVE.org, SUSE

    What is affected, what to do

    A flaw was found in jackson-core. A remote attacker can exploit an incomplete fix in the non-blocking JSON parser by streaming specially crafted JSON data in small chunks.

    Update FasterXML Jackson-core to version 2.18.8, FasterXML Jackson-core to version 2.21.4, FasterXML Jackson-core to version 3.1.4.

    Affected
    • FasterXML Jackson-core lt 2.15.0..2.18.8
    • FasterXML Jackson-core lt 2.19.0..2.21.4
    • FasterXML Jackson-core lt 3.0.0..3.1.4
    Fixed in
    • FasterXML Jackson-core 2.18.8
    • FasterXML Jackson-core 2.21.4
    • FasterXML Jackson-core 3.1.4

    Not sure whether and how you are affected? Ask a question about this vulnerability

    Metrics

    8.7

    Priority

    XIEM Effective CVSS: highest available CVSS rating from NVD and vendor data.

    Source: NVD, CVSS v4

    8.7

    CVSS v4

    Severity High on the scale from 0 to 10.

    Source: Red Hat, BSI, OSV, CVE.org, SUSE

    0.5 %

    EPSS score

    Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.

    Source: FIRST EPSS, percentile 40.2

    Show all metrics
    Severity
    High
    Priority (0–325)

    The priority score is a consolidated metric that condenses several individual signals into a single, action-guiding ranking: technical severity (CVSS), exploitation likelihood (EPSS), known-exploited status (KEV) and the context of the affected asset. The aim is to answer the only truly important question in vulnerability management: what first?

    Read in glossary
    78.42 Methodology
    Exploit maturity

    An exploit is code or a technique that specifically uses a concrete vulnerability to force unintended behaviour — such as executing code or escalating privileges. It is the tool that turns a theoretical flaw into a practical attack.

    Read in glossary
    no public PoC known
    XIEM Effective CVSS

    XIEM® is the tiered managed-security operating model from NEOSEC and a registered trademark of NEOSEC GmbH. It extends classic SIEM — the central collection, normalisation and correlation of security-relevant events — with endpoint forensics, network visibility and deception technology, and consolidates them into three building tiers: Sentry, Orchestrate and Command.

    Read in glossary
    8.7 Methodology
    CVSS v4

    CVSS is the globally established, open standard for assessing the technical severity of a vulnerability on a scale from 0 to 10. It describes how easily a flaw can be exploited and what damage it can cause — but not how likely its actual exploitation is. CVSS and the complementary EPSS deliberately answer different questions.

    Read in glossary
    8.7
    EPSS score

    The EPSS score is the absolute model output for an individual vulnerability: the estimated probability of real-world exploitation within the next 30 days, expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 % to 100 %). A score of 0.42 means „the model estimates a 42 % chance of real-world exploitation within 30 days“.

    Read in glossary
    0.5 %
    Low — model estimates < 1% exploitation likelihood.
    EPSS percentile

    The EPSS percentile is the relative position of a vulnerability within all EPSS-scored CVEs, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A percentile of 0.90 means „this CVE has a higher EPSS score than 90 % of all other scored CVEs“. Unlike the EPSS score, it is not a probability — but a positioning within a ranking.

    Read in glossary
    40.2
    High — this CVE ranks above the median of all CVEs scored today (rank ≥ 36%).
    KEV status

    The KEV catalogue is a list maintained by the US authority CISA of vulnerabilities for which active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. It answers not the question „how severe?“ but „is it already being attacked?“ — thereby sharply prioritising patching.

    Read in glossary
    —
    Published
    CISA assessment (SSVC)
    Exploitation: proof of concept · automatable · Technical impact: partial
    Source: CISA Vulnrichment, as of 4 August 2026
    CWE

    CWE is a catalogue of typical weakness types in software and hardware — such as flawed input validation, unsafe memory handling or poor authentication. Where a CVE names a concrete vulnerability in a concrete product, a CWE describes the underlying class of defect.

    Read in glossary
    CWE-770

    Detection rules

    No NEOSEC detection rule is available for this vulnerability yet.

    Classification under NIS2 and CRA

    Rule-based classification from exploitation status and severity. It does not replace a case-by-case assessment.

    NIS2

    NIS2 is EU Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to raise the level of cybersecurity across the Union. It substantially broadens obligations compared with the first NIS directive: more sectors, mandatory risk management, staged reporting duties and personal accountability of senior management.

    Read in glossary
    High technical severity: assess and remediate the vulnerability in vulnerability handling under Art. 21(2)(e) NIS2 and document the decision.
    CRA

    The CRA is EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 setting horizontal cybersecurity requirements for „products with digital elements“ — from industrial controllers and software to connected consumer devices. For the first time manufacturers must ensure security across the entire product lifecycle, handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates.

    Read in glossary
    From 11.12.2027, Annex I Part II CRA requires manufacturers of affected products with digital elements to handle vulnerabilities without delay and provide security updates.
    ISO/IEC 27001

    ISO/IEC 27001 is the internationally leading standard for an information security management system (ISMS). It describes a risk-based, process-oriented framework to systematically plan, implement, review and improve information security.

    Read in glossary
    Control A.8.8, management of technical vulnerabilities: assess relevance to your systems, plan remediation and keep evidence.

    Description

    A flaw was found in jackson-core. A remote attacker can exploit an incomplete fix in the non-blocking JSON parser by streaming specially crafted JSON data in small chunks. This bypasses the intended number length constraint, causing the parser to accumulate excessive memory per connection. This uncontrolled memory growth can lead to a denial of service (DoS) by exhausting the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) heap.

    Source: redhat_csaf, BSI WID Portal, BSI CSAF, OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities), cvelistv5, NVD (NIST), suse_csaf

    Affected products

    The following versions are affected. Older releases of the same product line are also vulnerable unless stated otherwise.

    Affected products
    Affected versionsFixed in
    FasterXMLjackson-core
    • 2.19.0 – < 2.21.4
    • 2.15.0 – < 2.18.8
    • 3.0.0 – < 3.1.4
    • 2.21.4
    • 2.18.8
    • 3.1.4
    FasterXMLJackson
    • < 3.1.0
    • < 2.18.6
    • < 2.21.1
    • 3.1.0
    • 2.18.6
    • 2.21.1
    IBMQRadar SIEM
    • < 7.6.0.3
    • <7.5.0 UP16 IF01
    • 7.6.0.3
    • —
    OracleCommunications
    • 6.1.1-7.0.0
    • 25.2.200
    • 15.2.0.0.0
    • 11
    • 26.1.200
    • 25.2.202
    • 25.2.201
    • 15.0.0.0.0
    • 8.0-8.3
    • 7.5.0
    • 15.0.1.0.0
    • 26.1.202
    • 7.7.0
    • 25.1.100
    • 47.0.0.2.0
    • 7.0.0
    • 6
    • 6.1
    • 7.8.0
    • 24.2.4-25.2.000
    • 7.5.1
    • 25.2.100
    • 8.0-8.1
    • 8.0.1
    • 7.6.0
    • 14
    • 15.1.0.0.0
    • 25.1.200
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    mavencom.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core
    • 2.12.3
    • 2.4.0-rc3
    • 2.18.3
    • 2.15.2
    • 2.2.4
    • 2.9.0.pr2
    • 2.13.2
    • 2.17.3
    • 2.13.0-rc2
    • 2.19.2
    • 2.16.0-rc1
    • 2.7.6
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —
    • —

    Vendors and products

    Weakness classes (CWE)

    • CWE-770Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

      Base

      The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.

      Entry at MITRE CWE-770

    References & sources

    • github.comGHSA-r7wm-3cxj-wff9Vendor advisory
    • github.comFasterXML/jackson-core#1611 - Apply number-length validator on streaming integer path of async parserPatch
    • github.comFasterXML/jackson-core@050b429Patch
    • github.comFasterXML/jackson-core@4cdd529Patch
    • github.comFasterXML/jackson-core@c5941e5Patch
    • CVE.org (MITRE)CVE-2026-18401 - original issue for which this is an incomplete fixrelated
    • GitHub Security AdvisoriesGHSA-72hv-8253-57qq - original advisory for which this is an incomplete fixrelated
    • NVD (NIST)vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68494advisory
    • github.comFasterXML/jackson-corepackage

    Changes to this CVE

    Who changed this CVE and when: NVD (analysis, affected products, CVSS), the CVE publisher (CNA) and additional providers such as CISA (ADP).

    1. Record modified36c7be3b…

      Description added or changed

      Show 2 original changes
      Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
      TypeActionBeforeAfter
      Affected versions (publisher)changed
      jackson-core, jackson-core
      jackson-core, jackson-core
      Descriptionchanged
      The fix released in jackson-core 2.18.6 and 2.21.1 for CVE-2026-18401 (GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq, number length constraint bypass in the non-blocking parser) is incomplete. This record covers the remaining bypass. The earlier fix wired validateIntegerLength() into a new _setIntLength() helper and invoked it wherever the integer portion of a number is decided: a terminator byte arrives, a . or e/E is seen, or input ends inside a fully buffered value. It was not invoked on the attacker-relevant path where the parser runs out of input while still inside the MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS minor state and returns NOT_AVAILABLE to the caller. As a result, an attacker who streams JSON to a non-blocking parser in many small chunks, without ever sending a terminator byte, keeps the parser inside MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS indefinitely. _textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment() grows the accumulator on every chunk while validateIntegerLength() is never called. The accumulator is bounded only by maxStringLength (20 MiB by default) rather than by maxNumberLength (1000 by default), an amplification of roughly 20,000x over the documented limit. Because Java char values occupy two bytes, a single connection can be driven to approximately 40 MiB of heap before the validator finally fires when the value completes. The equivalent fraction-path code is correct: _finishFloatFraction() calls _setFractLength() before its NOT_AVAILABLE return. The missing call affects the integer-digit paths in _startPositiveNumber(), _startNegativeNumber() and _finishNumberIntegralPart() in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase. Impact: reactive frameworks such as Spring WebFlux/Reactor, Quarkus, Helidon and Vert.x feed inbound HTTP or gRPC bytes to the async parser as they arrive, which is precisely the chunked-feed shape required. Operators who set StreamReadConstraints.maxNumberLength expecting it to cap memory per number value do not get that guarantee; memory accumulates per concurrent connection and attacker-controlled concurrency can exhaust the JVM heap. The synchronous parsers (UTF8StreamJsonParser, ReaderBasedJsonParser) and the async parser operating on complete input are not affected. Exploitation requires only the ability to stream data to a parsing endpoint; no privileges or user interaction are needed. This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core from version 2.15.0 through 2.18.7, from 2.19.0 through 2.21.3, and from 2.22.0 through 2.22.0, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-core from 3.0.0 through 3.1.3 and from 3.2.0 through 3.2.0. Versions prior to 2.15.0 are not affected, because StreamReadConstraints -- which defines the maxNumberLength setting -- was first introduced in jackson-core 2.15.0, so no such constraint exists to be bypassed in earlier releases. Note that GHSA-r7wm-3cxj-wff9 states the affected 2.x range without a lower bound.
      The fix released in jackson-core 2.18.6 and 2.21.1 for CVE-2026-18401 (GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq, number length constraint bypass in the non-blocking parser) is incomplete. This record covers the remaining bypass. The earlier fix wired validateIntegerLength() into a new _setIntLength() helper and invoked it wherever the integer portion of a number is decided: a terminator byte arrives, a '.' or 'e'/'E' is seen, or input ends inside a fully buffered value. It was not invoked on the attacker-relevant path where the parser runs out of input while still inside the MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS minor state and returns NOT_AVAILABLE to the caller. As a result, an attacker who streams JSON to a non-blocking parser in many small chunks, without ever sending a terminator byte, keeps the parser inside MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS indefinitely. _textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment() grows the accumulator on every chunk while validateIntegerLength() is never called. The accumulator is bounded only by maxStringLength (20 MiB by default) rather than by maxNumberLength (1000 by default), an amplification of roughly 20,000x over the documented limit. Because Java char values occupy two bytes, a single connection can be driven to approximately 40 MiB of heap before the validator finally fires when the value completes. The equivalent fraction-path code is correct: _finishFloatFraction() calls _setFractLength() before its NOT_AVAILABLE return. The missing call affects the integer-digit paths in _startPositiveNumber(), _startNegativeNumber() and _finishNumberIntegralPart() in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase. Impact: reactive frameworks such as Spring WebFlux/Reactor, Quarkus, Helidon and Vert.x feed inbound HTTP or gRPC bytes to the async parser as they arrive, which is precisely the chunked-feed shape required. Operators who set StreamReadConstraints.maxNumberLength expecting it to cap memory per number value do not get that guarantee; memory accumulates per concurrent connection and attacker-controlled concurrency can exhaust the JVM heap. The synchronous parsers (UTF8StreamJsonParser, ReaderBasedJsonParser) and the async parser operating on complete input are not affected. Exploitation requires only the ability to stream data to a parsing endpoint; no privileges or user interaction are needed. This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core from version 2.15.0 through 2.18.7, and from 2.19.0 through 2.21.3, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-core from 3.0.0 through 3.1.3. Versions prior to 2.15.0 are not affected, because StreamReadConstraints -- which defines the maxNumberLength setting -- was first introduced in jackson-core 2.15.0, so no such constraint exists to be bypassed in earlier releases. Note that GHSA-r7wm-3cxj-wff9 states the affected 2.x range without a lower bound. The 2.22.x and 3.2.x release lines are not affected: those branches were created after the fix commit landed on 2026-05-21 and therefore contain it from their initial releases (2.22.0, tagged 2026-06-03, and 3.2.0, tagged 2026-06-08).

      Source identifier: 36c7be3b-2937-45df-85ea-ca7133ea542c

    2. Record modifiedCISA ADP

      CISA assessment (SSVC): exploitation: proof of concept, automatable: yes

      Show 2 original changes
      Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
      TypeActionBeforeAfter
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-r7wm-3cxj-wff9
      SSVC assessmentadded
      —
      {"id":"CVE-2026-68494","role":"CISA Coordinator","options":[{"exploitation":"poc"},{"automatable":"yes"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"version":"2.0.3","timestamp":"2026-08-04T17:53:50.672098Z"}

      Source identifier: 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0

    3. Received36c7be3b…

      Show 11 original changes
      Individual changes of this event as published by NVD
      TypeActionBeforeAfter
      Affected versions (publisher)added
      —
      jackson-core, jackson-core
      Descriptionadded
      —
      The fix released in jackson-core 2.18.6 and 2.21.1 for CVE-2026-18401 (GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq, number length constraint bypass in the non-blocking parser) is incomplete. This record covers the remaining bypass. The earlier fix wired validateIntegerLength() into a new _setIntLength() helper and invoked it wherever the integer portion of a number is decided: a terminator byte arrives, a . or e/E is seen, or input ends inside a fully buffered value. It was not invoked on the attacker-relevant path where the parser runs out of input while still inside the MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS minor state and returns NOT_AVAILABLE to the caller. As a result, an attacker who streams JSON to a non-blocking parser in many small chunks, without ever sending a terminator byte, keeps the parser inside MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS indefinitely. _textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment() grows the accumulator on every chunk while validateIntegerLength() is never called. The accumulator is bounded only by maxStringLength (20 MiB by default) rather than by maxNumberLength (1000 by default), an amplification of roughly 20,000x over the documented limit. Because Java char values occupy two bytes, a single connection can be driven to approximately 40 MiB of heap before the validator finally fires when the value completes. The equivalent fraction-path code is correct: _finishFloatFraction() calls _setFractLength() before its NOT_AVAILABLE return. The missing call affects the integer-digit paths in _startPositiveNumber(), _startNegativeNumber() and _finishNumberIntegralPart() in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase. Impact: reactive frameworks such as Spring WebFlux/Reactor, Quarkus, Helidon and Vert.x feed inbound HTTP or gRPC bytes to the async parser as they arrive, which is precisely the chunked-feed shape required. Operators who set StreamReadConstraints.maxNumberLength expecting it to cap memory per number value do not get that guarantee; memory accumulates per concurrent connection and attacker-controlled concurrency can exhaust the JVM heap. The synchronous parsers (UTF8StreamJsonParser, ReaderBasedJsonParser) and the async parser operating on complete input are not affected. Exploitation requires only the ability to stream data to a parsing endpoint; no privileges or user interaction are needed. This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core from version 2.15.0 through 2.18.7, from 2.19.0 through 2.21.3, and from 2.22.0 through 2.22.0, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-core from 3.0.0 through 3.1.3 and from 3.2.0 through 3.2.0. Versions prior to 2.15.0 are not affected, because StreamReadConstraints -- which defines the maxNumberLength setting -- was first introduced in jackson-core 2.15.0, so no such constraint exists to be bypassed in earlier releases. Note that GHSA-r7wm-3cxj-wff9 states the affected 2.x range without a lower bound.
      CVSSadded
      —
      AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
      Weakness type (CWE)added
      —
      CWE-770
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/commit/050b429804dce2a7e08f0be1b0b4c3d040fdb9cd
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/commit/4cdd529749da396cc7edf6d4a2aad41d47902641
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/commit/c5941e5aae7fd5aeac55d66933cfb82b9aabeef8
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/1611
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-r7wm-3cxj-wff9
      Referenceadded
      —
      https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-18401

      Source identifier: 36c7be3b-2937-45df-85ea-ca7133ea542c

    One NVD translation into another language is hidden.

    Embed badge

    Show the severity and KEV status of this vulnerability on your site – with a link back here. The image is updated hourly.

    Badge preview for CVE-2026-68494
    <a href="https://intel.neosec.eu/en/cve/CVE-2026-68494"><img src="https://intel.neosec.eu/badge/cve/CVE-2026-68494.svg?lang=en" alt="CVE-2026-68494 – NEOSEC Intel" height="20"></a>