CVE-2024-7694
TeamT5 ThreatSonar Anti-Ransomware — TeamT5 ThreatSonar Anti-Ransomware Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type Vulnerability
Response & Mitigation
Why act now?
Prioritisation rationale
CVE-2024-7694 was added to CISA KEV because it enables full remote code execution on the ThreatSonar server — a host that typically operates with elevated privileges and has access to sensitive endpoint telemetry across the protected environment. Although the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N) requires admin-level access to the platform itself, shared or weakly protected admin credentials are common in practice, effectively lowering the real-world attack complexity. The EPSS score of 77.1 % places this vulnerability in the top quarter of all CVEs by exploitation likelihood, making it a credible near-term threat. For NIS2-scoped organisations running ThreatSonar as part of their security stack, a successful compromise of the anti-ransomware agent would undermine the product's entire protective function and could serve as a high-value pivot point for lateral movement deeper into the network.
Runbook · Step 1
Immediate response (0-24 h)
- Obtain and apply the vendor patch from TeamT5 immediately on all ThreatSonar Anti-Ransomware instances — patch version and advisory URL must be confirmed in the official TeamT5 vendor advisory.
- Restrict administrator access to the ThreatSonar management interface to the absolute minimum: disable all non-essential admin accounts, invalidate active sessions, and rotate credentials for all admin accounts.
- Block external access to the ThreatSonar management interface at the perimeter firewall — allow inbound connections only from dedicated management VLANs or approved jump-host IP addresses.
- Disable the file upload functionality within the ThreatSonar platform configuration if the product allows it, as a temporary compensating control until the patch is applied.
- Audit all files recently uploaded to the ThreatSonar upload directory for dangerous types (e.g.
.php,.jsp,.py,.sh,.exe,.dll) — quarantine any suspicious files immediately. - Preserve ThreatSonar platform audit logs for the last 90 days and review them for unexpected admin logins and upload events before any remediation activity overwrites evidence.
Runbook · Step 2
Mitigation layers
- Network segmentation: Restrict management access to the ThreatSonar instance to an isolated management VLAN; apply egress filtering on the ThreatSonar server to block outbound internet connections and limit post-compromise C2 communication.
- WAF/Reverse proxy: Place a reverse proxy with WAF capabilities in front of the ThreatSonar interface; enforce a whitelist of permitted MIME types and file extensions for upload requests (e.g. allow only
.csv,.json,.xml); return HTTP 403 for any request containing executable file extensions. - IAM/Least privilege: Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all ThreatSonar admin accounts; eliminate shared admin credentials and apply least-privilege principles — each admin account should map to a named individual.
- Endpoint hardening on the ThreatSonar server: Mount the upload directory with the
noexecflag (Linux) or configure AppLocker/Software Restriction Policies (Windows) to prevent process execution from the upload path. - IPS signature: Configure network IPS to alert on uploads containing executable magic bytes (ELF
\x7fELF, PEMZ, PHP tag<?php) over HTTP/HTTPS directed at the ThreatSonar management interface.
Runbook · Step 3
Detection rules
- Web server access log: Alert on upload endpoint requests with executable extensions — SPL:
index=webserver sourcetype=access_combined uri="*/upload*" (file_ext=".php" OR file_ext=".jsp" OR file_ext=".sh" OR file_ext=".py") | alert - Sysmon EID 11 (FileCreate) / auditd
opensyscall: New files with executable extensions created in the ThreatSonar upload directory — Sigma shape:EventID: 11, TargetFilename|contains: '<upload_path>', TargetFilename|endswith: ['.php','.jsp','.sh','.py','.exe'] - Sysmon EID 1 / auditd
execve: Web server process (e.g.nginx,apache2,java/Tomcat) spawning unexpected child processes (cmd.exe,powershell.exe,bash,sh,python) — KQL shape:process_parent_name in ("nginx","apache2","java") and process_name in ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","bash","sh","python3") - Windows Event ID 4688 / Linux auditd: Execution of reconnaissance commands (
whoami,id,net user,curl,wget) in the security context of the ThreatSonar service account — flag any process ancestry anomalies. - Network telemetry (Zeek/Suricata): Outbound connections from the ThreatSonar server to unknown external IPs, especially on non-standard ports (e.g. 4444, 1337, 8080) — alert on deviations from the established baseline.
Description
ThreatSonar Anti-Ransomware from TeamT5 does not properly validate the content of uploaded files. Remote attackers with administrator privileges on the product platform can upload malicious files, which can be used to execute arbitrary system command on the server.
Metrics
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Weakness classes (CWE)
CWE-434Base
Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
The product allows the upload or transfer of dangerous file types that are automatically processed within its environment.
cwe.mitre.org →
Public exploit references
Public proof-of-concepts and detection templates for this vulnerability. Maturity ranges from reported PoCs through working detection scripts up to fully weaponized exploit modules. NEOSEC mirrors the code internally for forensic analysis; externally we only link to the original sources.